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SOUTHWEST



*PREPARE FOR PEACE!*





# PREPARE FOR PEACE!

*By*  
Henry M. Wriston

*New York*



*London*

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HARPER & BROTHERS  
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PREPARE FOR PEACE!

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*To*

R.B.W., B.W., W.B.W.



# CONTENTS

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I	WAR FOR PEACE	I
	The Object of War	
	The Effect of Victory	
	The Political Aspect	
	The Economic Phase	
	The Moral Impact	
	Success in War	
II	THE NEGOTIATION OF THE TREATY OF PEACE	45
	The Armistice	
	Great Expectations	
	Speed as an Essential	
	Triumph over Mistrust	
	The President and the Senate	
	Disintegration of Alliances	
	Boundary Questions	
	Economic Settlement	
	League or Balance of Power	
	Participation of the United States	
III	THE STRATEGY OF PEACE	104
	A Military Analogy	
	Training for Action in a Crisis	
	Tentative Preparations	
	The Inquiry	
	Preparation for the Washington Conference	

## *Contents*

A Proposal	
A Foreign Service College	
IV THE TRANSITION TO PEACE	147
The Environment of the Treaty	
Interpretation of the Treaty in Action	
Vienna and Versailles	
The Instrumentalities of Peace	
V CENTRIFUGAL FORCES	191
Isolation	
The Flight from Reality	
The Fruits of Unreality	
VI A THEORY OF PEACE	229
The Nature of Peace	
Individualism and Internationalism	
The Wave of the Past	
Democracy	

## PREFACE

THIS book grew out of family discussions. Traveling in northern Europe in the summer of 1939, we talked over the exciting events day by day. At the brief meeting of the International Studies Conference in Bergen, Norway, there was a rare opportunity to exchange views with men from other nations just as war was declared. Since then the dinner table and vacations have offered opportunities for members of the family to express points of view. They commanded me to "write it down," and I have; they have offered both suggestions and dissents.

One word should be said about perspective. For various reasons the Far East is largely omitted from consideration; it needs a separate discussion. In dealing with many aspects of the international crisis the role of the United States is emphasized, not because it was decisive, but because it was the part of international relations under our control.

Dr. H. Stuart Hughes has been of great service; his knowledge of the literature and his gift for criticism have both been helpful. Miss Sara Dowty has prepared the text through its several editions with speed and good nature—as well as a sharp editorial eye.



## *Preface*

This is the third book which Miss Ruth Sandborn has seen through preparation and the press with me. Without her patience and skill it would have been impossible to do the work at all.

Other friends have read and criticized the manuscript and I am profoundly grateful. Since this essay is an expression of opinion, they prefer to remain anonymous.

H. M. W.

*Providence, R. I.*

*17 February, 1941*

*PREPARE FOR PEACE!*



## CHAPTER I

# WAR FOR PEACE

---

### 1. THE OBJECT OF WAR

"THE object of war is peace." When I first read those six words in an elementary text on international law twenty-five years ago, they seemed stupid. Yet now, after long reflection, they furnish the keynote of what I want to say.

War can have no other object. Fighting cannot go on forever; no one is mad enough to make that suggestion. It must eventuate in an organization of local or world society which seeks to be constructive, rather than destructive—and that is the definition of peace. Even if the war is one of conquest, it must still seek to achieve an ultimate peace.

There are three stages in the effort to achieve peace. The first is the war itself. The second is the treaty which concludes the war. The third is the continual adjustment of that treaty to the total international structure.

War does not seem a promising instrument for achieving peace. Conceived, as it must be, as the antithesis of peace, established, as it is, upon the ruins of peace, it can only with difficulty be regarded as an in-

## *Prepare for Peace!*

strument for realizing the very condition it has supplanted.

It should be observed that war succeeds the peace; it does not "destroy" it. Peace has already broken down before war ensues. Reason has failed, justice has been abandoned, morals have disintegrated before there is a resort to force. War is not the cause of the failure of peace; it is the consequence of that failure.

Like winter following summer, war brings decay and destruction, but does not kill the seeds of the "new order" which is the ensuing peace. The best that can be said for war is that it destroys some things which have borne their fruit and are no longer useful; it plows the harvested field; it burns the weeds and stubble. It brings into malleable condition things which had hardened in useless patterns; it melts the scrap iron of civilization. These processes are obviously destructive from one point of view. But they are of a piece with the life cycle, in which death is the inevitable concomitant of life. As war succeeds but does not "destroy" the old peace, it germinates but does not mature the new peace. Winter cannot do the work of spring and summer. The "new order" which emerges at the end of the war will necessarily be tender, green, and immature.

### 2. THE EFFECT OF VICTORY

As an instrument for restoring peace, war exhibits the same political, economic, and moral forces opera-

## *War for Peace*

tive in time of peace. The significant difference is that military power is turned to military action; the amount of energy expended in military preparation and action is enormously expanded relative to the total effort of the nation, until it is drawn out of perspective. That is why it is customary to assume that the military part of war is the whole. But though the battles are the most dramatic, they are not always the most decisive phase of a war. In fact the military episodes may well be the mere reflection of other war-time forces, tangible and intangible. Victory or defeat in battle may result, for example, from the state of morale, from the will to win. Although it is often said that the will is no match for cold steel, such a statement lacks perspective, for nothing is clearer than that over the long pull wills may prove stronger than steel.

Faith in the decisiveness of military force is badly misplaced. Our own experience in the last two decades should have taught us the fatuousness of the assertion that in war nothing is important but victory. This generation should need no further proof after its folly in expecting military victory, even complete victory, to make the world safe for democracy!

Victory is important, but in a limited sense. For victory provides only the opportunity to be, for a moment, the dominant element in shaping the treaty which concludes the war. Anyone who reflects upon recent experience or who reads history with discernment will realize the critical importance of the words "for a

## *Prepare for Peace!*

moment." When that moment passes, peace must rest upon more permanent foundations than a fading victory. Yet the lasting influence of victory is almost always overestimated.

Hitler tells his men that on their arms rests "the fate of the German nation for the next one thousand years." He is not the first to make extravagant claims for victory. When France was defeated in 1871, the Marquis of Salisbury said: "The strength of France is broken; her territory is severed; the splendid lustre of military fame that has shone for four glorious centuries is quenched. The future offers a piteous prospect."<sup>1</sup> A London correspondent of the *New York Times* wrote: "Even the most selfish advocates of 'peace at any price' see that the conquest of France leaves all Europe, England included, at the mercy of Germany and Russia. No one speaks now of the freedom of Poland; Denmark awaits her inevitable fate, or, like Greece, depends upon Russia; Holland must go with the Rhine, whose mouths lie in her territory; Luxembourg is gone."<sup>2</sup> Disraeli was no less sweeping: "Not a single principle in the management of our foreign affairs, accepted by all statesmen for guidance up to six months ago, any longer exists. . . . You have a new world, new influences at work, new and unknown objects and dangers with which to cope.

<sup>1</sup> *New York Times*, February 14, 1871.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, February 6, 1871.

## War for Peace

. . . The balance of power has been entirely destroyed.”<sup>3</sup>

When Germany was defeated twenty years ago, an editorial in the *New York Times* declared: “Not only is their military power . . . destroyed but the military spirit . . . crushed. . . . Now . . . their ships have gone; their foreign trade has vanished and they are condemned to half a century of unremitting toil to repay the loss they have caused. . . . The punishment Germany must endure for centuries will be one of the greatest deterrents to the war spirit.”<sup>4</sup>

However, the mistake of regarding the result of a military victory as permanent is not universal. Always there are some men with greater penetration. General Tasker H. Bliss wrote President Wilson on March 25, 1919: “You may strip Germany of her colonies, reduce her armaments to a mere police force and her navy to that of a fifth-rate power; all the same in the end if she feels that she has been unjustly treated in the Peace of 1919, she will find means of exacting retribution from her conquerors.”<sup>5</sup>

Neither the victory in the last war nor the treaties founded upon it lasted even one generation. Indeed the Treaty of Sèvres imposed upon a defeated Turkey in

<sup>3</sup>Quoted in William L. Langer, *European Alliances and Alignments* (New York, 1931), pp. 13-14.

<sup>4</sup>May 8, 1919.

<sup>5</sup>Ray Stannard Baker, *Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement* (Garden City, N. Y., 1922), II, 495.



## *Prepare for Peace!*

August, 1920 was replaced in July, 1923 by a new treaty based upon Turkish victory. The reversal is not always so swift, but it is worth recalling that the German Empire, triumphantly inaugurated in the Hall of Mirrors in Versailles in 1871, gave way to the Republic after a defeat symbolized by the treaty signed in the same room in 1919. And again, be it noted, the armistice of 1918 was signed in the same railway car as the armistice of 1940.

These are a few recent illustrations of an old fact: victory is a transitory phenomenon. It was only two years after the entry of Napoleon into burning Moscow that Czar Alexander entered Paris at the head of his troops. Peace, based upon victory alone, is equally transitory. The experience of Napoleon is decisive on that point. He won victory after victory, but the treaties which concluded his wars never achieved peace. It was the truth implicit in that fact which Wilson sought to expound in his misunderstood and unfortunate phrase about "peace without victory." It was the reality behind it which led Churchill to write, after the World War: "Victory was to be bought so dear as to be almost indistinguishable from defeat. It was not to give security even to the victors."

Just now it is the fashion to say that democracy is dead in Europe, destroyed by the conquering power of Hitler. Those who so glibly consign democracy to the grave should have a care lest the interment be prema-

## *War for Peace*

ture. The democratic nations are overrun, but whether they be dead, time alone will tell; a military victory over them does not give us any proof; they may be ruled but not subdued. The Danes, for example, have been beaten and humiliated before. But singing songs which pledged them to "bend their will alone to God," they built life anew. Cultural continuity, moral stamina will count more in the long run than physical force, economic pressure, or political chicanery. Backs may be bent and heads bowed, but unless the will is broken, democracy can survive defeat.

Dictatorships are brittle affairs, dependent for continuance upon success, real or counterfeit. The substance of democracy is tougher. It is not dependent upon the name, the energy, or the genius of one man. Its leaders are legion, its forms protean. We may well be reminded that Paris was besieged and occupied by German troops in the Franco-Prussian War, and for over three years, from 1870 until September, 1873, parts of France were garrisoned by German soldiers. The nation also saw violent political manifestations—such as the Commune—yet a democratic state emerged. Military defeat does not overwhelm a strong democratic impulse.

### 3. THE POLITICAL ASPECT

The second aspect of war as an instrument for the restoration of peace is political. Political activity in war

## *Prepare for Peace!*

time is both domestic and international. So far as the domestic phase is concerned, there is a tendency to feel that political action must be profoundly altered during a war. The want of perspective which has assigned too great a role to military events has led to a needless defeatism about the war-time effectiveness of democratic institutions. It has become a cliché that the only way to beat the totalitarians is to adopt totalitarian tactics, that the democratic process must be suspended for the duration of the war. For proof we are invited to remember that Lincoln suspended the writ of habeas corpus, that censorship is the usual concomitant of war in a democracy as well as in a dictatorship.

So deeply is this feeling rooted that even so convinced a democrat as Woodrow Wilson could declare a few days before America's entrance into the World War in 1917 that this action would entail the ruin of our democratic institutions.

"Once lead this people into war," he said, "and they'll forget there ever was such a thing as tolerance. To fight you must be brutal and ruthless, and the spirit of ruthless brutality will enter into the very fibre of our national life, infecting Congress, the courts, the policeman on the beat, the man in the street." . . . He thought the Constitution would not survive it; that free speech and the right of assembly would go. He said a nation

## *War for Peace*

couldn't put its strength into a war and keep its head level; it had never been done.<sup>6</sup>

If the author of the phrase, "a world safe for democracy," felt that way, what can possibly be said on the other side? Simply this—that the event did not support his pessimism—nor did he.

Nevertheless, a feeling similar to that of 1917 exists today. Senator Wheeler has said: "War means the end of civil liberties, the end of free speech, free press, free enterprise. It means dictatorship and slavery, all the things we abhor in nazism, communism and fascism."<sup>7</sup> But experience has shown again and again that the democratic tradition produces a strong reaction as soon as war ends. Demand for demobilization is so instant and so vehement as to be almost dangerous. Similarly civil liberties are reasserted with fresh vigor after they have been imperiled during war. That is why such predictions as those of the Senator may be discounted.

As a matter of fact, it can be argued with great weight of evidence that the essential democratic force—the control of policy by public opinion—may actually become more fully operative when democracy is at war. Indeed, at such a time this characteristic democratic force strongly infects even totalitarianism. The longest established and the most emotionally stable totalitarian

<sup>6</sup> Ray Stannard Baker, *Woodrow Wilson: Life and Letters* (Garden City, N. Y., 1927-39), VI, 506-7.

<sup>7</sup> *New York Times*, December 31, 1940.

## *Prepare for Peace!*

government is that of Italy. The controls upon opinion, running all the way from castor oil to propaganda, are fully developed and have long been operative. A whole generation has grown up under their influence. Yet nothing seems more obvious than that the substance of sentiment in Italy has eluded those controls; poor morale has profoundly influenced its military achievement, and morale is a vital factor in war.

During the World War public opinion was important in both the Central Powers. It influenced Vienna in the request for an armistice. Regarding his nation General Ludendorff said: "The waning morale at home . . . encouraged the pacifist leanings of many Germans. In the summer of 1917 my first glimpse of this situation gave me a great shock."<sup>8</sup> In 1939, during the course of a judicial decision, the New York Court of Appeals remarked that an army or navy "can be destroyed quicker by public opinion than by the attacks of an enemy. Many a nation has succumbed to the breakdown of the morale of its people." Public sentiment, which in peace time lacks influence in an autocracy, can prove decisive in war.

Probably no more vivid democratic episode ever occurred in the British House of Commons than at the crisis of the blitzkrieg in May, 1940. Lloyd George, whose "party" represented little more than a family group, whose authority and influence had been for

<sup>8</sup> Quoted in Sir Herbert W. Richmond, *National Policy and Naval Strength* (London, 1928), p. 64.

## *War for Peace*

years in continuous decline, rose and told Prime Minister Chamberlain that there was "nothing that would contribute more to victory in this war than that he should sacrifice his seals of office." In the face of that demand, a government with a huge majority, a minister whose political position had been regarded as all but impregnable resigned. Public opinion proved more powerful than party machinery.

That manifestation of the effectiveness of the democratic process in war time was singularly dramatic, but its substance was not unique. Indeed it is fair to say that it was characteristic, for democracy has again and again demonstrated its capacity to refresh and invigorate its leadership during a crisis. Not infrequently it calls new figures to the service of the state, and sometimes an unpromising man develops unexpected power. Lincoln, who seemed to Seward unable to govern, who seemed merely a local politician to Charles Francis Adams, and a baboon to Stanton, came to dominate them all. Of the second inaugural, Adams' son wrote:

This inaugural strikes me in its grand simplicity and directness as being for all times the historical keynote of this war; in it a people seemed to speak in the sublimely simple utterance of ruder times. . . . Not a prince or minister in all Europe could have risen to such an equality with the occasion.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>9</sup> *A Cycle of Adams Letters, 1861-1865*, ed. W. C. Ford (Boston, 1920), II, 257-58.

## *Prepare for Peace!*

There is no reason to suppose that totalitarianism is more politically efficient than democracy during war. There is a naïve belief that totalitarian countries have abolished "politics" of a distracting sort. Only one party is permitted; others are ruthlessly suppressed. In the one party, discipline is strong and centers in the unchallenged leader. Such a description accepts appearances which conceal the substance. Aristotle called man a political animal, and the operation of the state is a political matter. If the totalitarians eliminate the customary forms, we should not be deceived into believing that they have eliminated human nature or altered the essence of government.

Palace politics, the struggle for influence over the opinions and actions of the "leader," efforts to make the real decisions which are promulgated in his name, rivalries within the enormously large and burdensome party hierarchy, the support of a vast bureaucracy which is the inevitable instrument of totalitarianism, even the attempt to keep rival parties from living underground—all these things reduce the presumed "efficiency" of totalitarianism. The system does not abolish politics, but merely drives the manifestations into other forms, often abnormal.

Proposals that during war democracy should copy dictatorship in "adjourning" politics are quite unreal. The steady fire of criticism from a "loyal opposition," the continuous necessity for the men in office to justify

## *War for Peace*

their behavior are not so much drags upon government as stimulants. The crisis itself leads to self-denial in the luxury of endless petty bickering for small partisan advantages. A sense of perspective makes the process of consent and consensus unusually effective.

On the whole, tax collectors observe less dodging of imposts, a readier will to meet the costs of government. Manufacturers and merchants make the profit motive subsidiary to the national interest. Of course the picture is not without blemishes. Profiteers find many opportunities, just as ghouls stalk the streets after disaster. Nonetheless, war often purifies and makes effective the democratic impulse which had been bogged in peace time by pressure groups and confusion of counsel. A review of history to assess experience reveals nothing to support the defeatist view that democracy is ineffective in war. Democracies have been beaten because they were small, because they made mistakes, or because their democratic faith was dim. However, small size and errors in policy are not democratic traits, and feebleness of faith is a tragedy in itself, but not an indictment of democracy. In time of crisis healthy democracy displays its true strength.

It is wise to look with wary eye upon those who propose to suspend the substance of democracy in war time. The forms of its implementation may be altered to suit new needs, but its forms are constantly modified in peace time also. Its central substance—the domina-



## *Prepare for Peace!*

tion of public policy by public opinion and the basic rights of free speech, free press, free assembly, freedom of religion—should not be tampered with. It is poor doctrine that proposes to defend democracy by war but does not trust it during war.

The importance of faith in war-time democracy lies precisely in the fact that war as an international force is political fully as much as military. The greatest theorist of war, Clausewitz, in his most mature thought expressed it in these terms:

War is nothing but a continuation of political activities with other means intermingled. We say with other means intermingled in order to maintain at the same time that these political activities are not stopped by the war, are not changed into something totally different, but are substantially continuous, whatever means are employed. . . . How could it be otherwise? Do the political relations between different peoples and governments cease when the exchange of diplomatic notes is interrupted?<sup>10</sup>

When political activity is suspended, military victory is utterly futile. "For the political aims are the end; the war is the means, and the means can never be conceived without the end."<sup>\*</sup>

During war there is a continuous diplomatic strug-

<sup>10</sup> Carl von Clausewitz, *On War* (London, 1918), Book VIII, chap. vi B.

## *War for Peace*

gle, fully as complicated and often more intense than the military, and sometimes more decisive. The heat of war melts some of the frozen issues of diplomacy and brings them into fluid form. Naval strategists, for example, have long seen the need for additional American bases to protect more adequately the Atlantic seaboard and the Panama Canal. Until war came their acquisition was not regarded as within the practicable area of diplomacy. Then the matter was settled very swiftly. So it is often with clearly perceived interests.

War offers a unique opportunity to realize political objectives. As a military commander who had no plan of campaign, no strategy except to "defeat the enemy" would not be regarded as very intelligent, so a statesman with no matured policy which his nation is prepared to support is in similar straits. The political strategy of war may have greater and more sustained influence than the military.

One of the alleged characteristics of "total war" is that it is as much an attempt to foment revolution in the enemy nations as to defeat their armies and navies and air forces.

The principal weapon of the Nazis—and one that may be truly described as their "secret" weapon, since its significance is understood by each conquered country only after its downfall—is the transformation of what appears to be an interna-

## *Prepare for Peace!*

tional war into a civil war. With an efficiency not yet appreciated in Britain and the United States, the Nazis systematically discredit all existing leaders, Right, Left and Center; undermine all ideas and systems; sow suspicion among all groups and classes; and finally achieve their aim of disintegrating a country from within, and creating a state of chaos which then is held to justify total German occupation and control.<sup>11</sup>

It is maintained, therefore, that "total war" has a more definitely political character than "old style" wars. So far as that assertion has truth, the difference is one of degree only. The political offensive has always paralleled the military effort.

Woodrow Wilson's speeches during the last war were certainly directed toward revolution in Germany. In the address to Congress calling for a declaration of war, he asserted, "We have no quarrel with the German people." One objective of the war was to provide "the right of those who submit to authority to have a voice in their own Governments." He followed up that lead by declaring, six months later, "We cannot take the word of the present rulers of Germany as a guarantee of anything that is to endure." On September 27, 1918, he reiterated: "We are all agreed that there can be no peace obtained by any kind of bargain or compromise with the governments of the Central Empires. . . .

<sup>11</sup> *Foreign Policy Bulletin*, December 20, 1940.

## *War for Peace*

They have convinced us that they are without honor. . . . They observe no covenants. . . . The German people must by this time be fully aware that we cannot accept the word of those who forced this war upon us." When in October, 1918 the German government asked President Wilson to arrange an armistice, he demanded, as a price of action, a democratic government in Berlin. After this was agreed to, he reiterated it again, and then once more urged the departure of the "monarchical autocrats." Revolution was the prerequisite to armistice.

In the current war exactly the same technique is being followed. On February 24, 1940, Prime Minister Chamberlain declared that Britain never would make peace with Germany's present rulers: "Under the present government of Germany there can be no security for the future." Churchill's dramatic radio appeal to the Italian people last December was precisely upon the Wilsonian model. He sought to draw a distinction between the Italian people and their leader. "One man . . . against the crown and royal family of Italy, against the Pope and all the authority of the Vatican and of the Roman Catholic Church, against the wishes of the Italian people who had no lust for this war—one man has arrayed the trustees and inheritors of ancient Rome upon the side of the ferocious pagan barbarians." The time will come "when the Italian nation will once more

## *Prepare for Peace!*

take a hand in shaping its own fortunes.”<sup>12</sup> His insistence that “one man” was responsible, his appeal to the royal house, the church, and the people were patently designed to stimulate a revolution.

So, despite our feeling that we live in a new world, this appeal is old. Wilson, Chamberlain, Churchill were only repeating what had been said many times in the past. A century before Wilson, Metternich had said, “Peace with Napoleon is not peace.” “A state of calm and quiet . . . must be renounced so long as Napoleon lives.”

President Roosevelt, though still in the role of non-belligerent, was following a well-established tradition when he declared last December, “We know now that a nation can have peace with the Nazis only at the price of total surrender.” In this war, as in the last, revolution is the price of peace. The only new aspect of these appeals is that they are facilitated by the use of radio, which was not available in previous wars.

Other “new” aspects of the political technique of war are novel only in the same restricted sense. They are fresh manifestations of old processes; their newness consists simply of changes in form rather than substance. When tempted to regard the fifth column as something quite unprecedented, we should remember that imperial Germany carried Lenin from Switzerland in order that he might impair the Russian war effort by

<sup>12</sup> *New York Times*, December 24, 1940.

## *War for Peace*

revolutionary tactics. More than a century before, the development of zealous native minority groups in the countries marked for annexation was characteristic of the expansionist activity of the French Revolution. Sympathetic leaders prepared the way for conquest and organized the absorption of their own nations into the French regime. Specific manifestations of fifth column activity may show unfamiliar features, but similar efforts to break the home front of the enemy are as old as war.

It has been a common technique also to appeal to separatist minorities in the enemy state in an effort to disintegrate its fabric. Such were the tactics which Hitler used with the Sudetens in Czechoslovakia, though carried on in time of "peace." The same procedure was followed in the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire and Austria-Hungary in the course of the last war. Of similar nature were Napoleon's maneuvers with the Polish patriots after 1806; he roused their hopes of freedom from Russia and used them for his own political ends without ever fulfilling their cherished ambition. Wherever a nation is structurally weak because of the existence of close-knit minority groups, it is certain that its enemies will do whatever is possible to exploit that weakness. It is one of the normal procedures of war-time diplomacy.

The co-ordination of diplomacy with arms is of vast importance. Diplomacy undertakes the exploitation of

## *Prepare for Peace!*

victory and the mitigation or neutralization of military defeat. Sometimes military victory can be used to support a diplomatic offensive, just as naval and aerial action may support an army drive. The timing of Italy's entrance into this war furnishes an illustration. Another is to be found in German attempts to involve Spain after the defeat of France. Russian influence in the Balkans was obviously used as a counterweight to the Italian attack on Greece, and the resulting fiasco heightened the effect of that influence.

Sometimes a diplomatic maneuver may offset military difficulties. When unrestricted submarine warfare, in 1917, left Great Britain short of warships for convoy purposes, Japan was asked for torpedo boats. The moment was critical, and to assure acquiescence Japan was promised all the German Pacific Islands north of the equator and succession to German interests in Shantung and Kiaochow. This political maneuver added to British naval strength at a critical point—at a price.

Italy, after choosing sides in the last war and suffering a stunning defeat at Caporetto, realized that the Yugoslavs in the Austrian army were unexpectedly bitter foes. In order to placate them and help disrupt Austria, Italy first gave unofficial encouragement to Yugoslav aspirations and then in September, 1918 publicly expressed sympathy with the Yugoslav desire for independence. Diplomatic maneuvers often play

## *War for Peace*

some part, at least, in efforts to neutralize the disastrous effects of military defeat.

Always war stimulates the search for new allies, political, economic, and military. When war broke out in 1914, Italy was a member of the Triple Alliance with Germany and Austria but did not enter the war, being in an exposed position and open to damage by the British fleet. Not content to remain quietly neutral, it sought under the principle of "sacred egoism" to fish in troubled waters, and in 1915 asked Austria for Trieste and the Trentino as the price of continued neutrality. Before those negotiations were complete, Italy entered upon a competing discussion with the Entente and signed a treaty in April, 1915 with Russia, France, and Britain, exacting such enormous concessions that the British negotiator bitterly referred to it as a "purchase" of support. Even then, though Italy declared war on Austria, Turkey, and Bulgaria during 1915, it was not until August, 1917 that it declared war on Germany.

Italy was not the only nation induced to join the Entente during the last war. Rumania had an unrati-fied treaty of 1883 that bound it by moral ties to the Triple Alliance. But in 1916, in exchange for large promises, it declared war on its erstwhile friends. Rash military action was followed by defeat. Russia failed to support Rumania, selling out its allies and jeopardizing the joint effort for particularist reasons. Defeated



## *Prepare for Peace!*

and betrayed, Rumania made a separate armistice in December, 1917, and the capitulatory Treaty of Bucharest, May 7, 1918. Two days before the Allied and Associated Powers granted the armistice on November 11, 1918, Rumania, which had not ratified the Treaty of Bucharest, repudiated it and again declared war—coming in on the winning side by a nose, so to speak.

Of course both sides play the same game. Bulgaria negotiated with the Central Powers and the Entente. Its Premier said as baldly as diplomatic language permitted that Bulgaria would fight for the side which made the largest concessions. Germany and Austria bid highest, and having won the nation which held the balance of power in the Balkans were greatly strengthened for a time. Ultimately their ally became a liability and made a separate peace. When, early in 1917, it seemed to Germany that war with the United States was likely, the German Foreign Minister offered an alliance to Mexico, "on the following basis: make war together, make peace together, generous financial support and an understanding . . . that Mexico is to reconquer the lost territory in Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona."

The most dazzling instance of the alignment and realignment of alliances occurred during the period from 1793 to 1814 when Great Britain and France were almost continuously at war. In the course of that en-

## *War for Peace*

counter Austria was attached first to one interest, then to the other, then to the first again. Russia executed the same complicated maneuver. Holland changed sides, as did Sweden and Prussia. Spain, first allied with Britain, shifted to France, then had separate governments, one loyal to each side. The United States had the famous undeclared naval war with France, and subsequently fought the War of 1812 with Great Britain. In all the bewildering shifts of military support there were many agreements embodying promises of reward, many treaties both open and secret.

If we are inclined to look upon such maneuvers as not wholly moral, it must be remembered that war itself is a failure of morals. Furthermore the margin between victory and defeat is much narrower than is customarily supposed. Statesmen, faced with the awful gamble, are tempted to seize upon any bargain that offers hope of insuring victory. Sometimes the bargains are made at the expense of the strategy of peace. Then they are evidence of a mistaken dependence upon victory not as a prelude of peace but as its guarantee.

In addition to the search for new allies, there is a continuous effort to strengthen the bonds with existing allies. During the last war special efforts were made to keep Russia firmly in the Entente. Great Britain negotiated a secret treaty guaranteeing Constantinople to Russia, and in March, 1917, only a month before the United States entered the war, France and Russia

## *Prepare for Peace!*

signed another secret treaty. It gave Russia a free hand in Poland and provided that France was to have not only Alsace and Lorraine but also the Saar Valley, and that an independent Rhineland buffer state should be established, garrisoned by a French army. Such diplomatic strategy is not new. A hundred years before, after Czar Alexander had been the enemy, then the ally, and once more the enemy of Napoleon, Castlereagh sought by the Treaty of Chaumont in 1814 to make him firm in alliance and unable again to make tangential gestures. To those ends Great Britain, Austria, Russia, and Prussia agreed to extend the duration of the alliance for twenty years.

In the intricacies of diplomacy during the World War, the amazing fact is not that such things should have happened; they are the stock-in-trade of war. However, it seems incredible that the United States made no terms upon its entrance. The American government heard of the secret treaties, but never pressed inquiries concerning them. There was no need for the nation to play this desperate, and often sordid, diplomatic game. Such was its political and moral leadership that it was influential in drawing twelve other countries into the war without making any secret commitments. It will always remain a subject for amazement that when the United States had an opportunity to sweep the board clean of secret treaties, it failed to do so by sheer negligence.

## *War for Peace*

In the field of diplomatic strategy the fortunes of war, political as well as military, may force radical reorganization of plans and methods. The programs for the partition of Germany which French officials were indubitably discussing during the first months of the current war now seem rather remote. But those plans really belonged in the realm of extemporizations. They were themselves a manifestation of the poverty of French policy which had turned to "security" and similar negative and defensive ideas. Indeed it may fairly be argued that the feebleness of French political objectives was one cause of the nation's ineffective strategic activity. Similarly Axis anticipations regarding the control of the Mediterranean and the Balkans appear to have been premature. The naval and military reverses of Italy necessitated a new orientation of policy.

After its defeat last June, France, for over thirty-five years an associate of Great Britain, not only retired from the war, but broke off diplomatic relations and undertook a program of "collaboration" with Germany. Such unanticipated reorientations of policy, however, do not affect the validity of the demand that political strategy should not be abandoned and everything left dependent upon military force. The decisive forces in war are often behind the battle line. They are made effective by imaginative political tactics, by fearless and vigorous diplomatic activity. War, because

## *Prepare for Peace!*

of its very nature, opens the way to bolder and more perceptive diplomacy than peace. To fail to exploit that opportunity under a misguided assumption that military force is all that counts is to throw away one of the few great opportunities for good that can come from war.

In a democratic state at war the tactical moves may be left to those in office, but the strategic "war aims" need to be not merely understood by the public; they must be the reflection of clearly conceived and warmly supported national policies. They must be cultivated as assiduously in war as in peace, else the achievements of war-time sacrifice may be lost in peace-time reaction, a lesson this generation has had bitter opportunity to learn.

Public opinion must crystallize about a large number of difficult and interrelated problems. Undue efforts to simplify the issues defeat their own ends. We are familiar enough with this on the military side, though even in that field there is a temptation to deceptive oversimplification, expressed in such phrases as "the war will be won or lost in England." Nonetheless the realization is fairly general that in this war, as in its predecessors, many military fronts exist. What must never be overlooked is that each area of conflict is the reflection of some political interest. Without the political interest, troops and ships would not be there at all. These interests vary in intensity, and there is a corre-

## *War for Peace*

sponding difference in the intensity of the military efforts which support them.

Just as it would be folly to abandon all military fronts but the one conceived as "critical," so political policy can be made futile by oversimplification. For example, it does not make for understanding to insist that the war is merely a struggle between two philosophies of government. That invites cynics to ask where India, Somaliland, and Ethiopia fit into such a simplified picture. The obvious angling of both sides for Russian support is a further embarrassment to the simple explanation. We are reminded that Greece is not precisely a democracy. An effort to simplify leads to confusion rather than clarity. The war is a war to preserve democracy where democracy exists and wants to be preserved. It is a war for other purposes in other areas. There is no inconsistency in defending democracy in one place and territorial integrity or some other great interest in another. But aims can be made to appear incoherent or inconsistent if they are unduly simplified behind a single slogan.

The military effort is best understood if it is envisaged in all its areas of action, and the political effort needs a like clarity of perception and recognition of its involved character. The demand for active discussion and clarification of complex "war aims" is therefore neither disloyal nor weakening to the war effort; on the

## *Prepare for Peace!*

contrary it is the only realistic approach to war as a political and diplomatic, as well as a military, struggle.

By way of summary, a review of the political strategy of the United States in the last war reveals conspicuous elements of strength—and a fatal weakness. President Wilson's demand for a world safe for democracy was not a hollow slogan. With clear insight and masterly technique he appealed to the German people against their government. He sowed the seeds of revolution and, when opportunity offered, demanded that the revolution come to fruition before the war could end. He did everything possible to see that Germany would be represented at the peace conference by men whose political orientation was such that the democratic nations could trust them.

The necessity for clarifying public opinion on some of the great issues was at least recognized. A league of nations was actively discussed. In the famous "fourteen points" speech, and in others, Wilson expounded the right of peoples to choose their own way of life and the need for open covenants in place of secret treaties. Moreover, there was some recognition of the necessity to prepare for the peace conference. With the assent of the Secretary of State, Colonel House established the Inquiry. Scholars were mobilized for the purpose of assembling data and qualifying themselves to supplement the harassed experts of the State Department who were buried under matters of urgent concern.

## *War for Peace*

There was, however, one fatal weakness. The political strategy of the relationship between the United States and its associates in the war was neglected. There was too much faith in victory as a solution. There can be no question that the secret treaties were called to the President's attention. With the tremendous material and moral leverage which the United States was in a position to exercise, those encumbrances should have been eliminated when the United States entered the war. A temporary alliance would have accomplished it without doing violence to American tradition. George Washington himself had said, "We may safely trust to temporary alliances for extraordinary emergencies." By signing even an executive agreement, it would have been possible to nullify the stipulations of those treaties and rescue the war and the subsequent peace from the moral confusion which produced some of the worst features of the settlement.

Even after that opportunity was missed, Ambassador Jusserand of France offered a program for the peace conference which likewise would have swept out the refuse and litter of those treaties. But because of the preoccupation of the Department of State and the lack of good staff relationships between the President and the department, this proposal was not only not accepted, but no response was ever sent to the French ambassador. That essential failure in the political



## *Prepare for Peace!*

strategy of the war bore bitter fruits in the treaty and in the peace which followed.

### 4. THE ECONOMIC PHASE

War is fought also upon an economic front. Indeed it has been one of the characteristic dogmas of our time that economic power is the decisive factor in war. That thought lay behind the system of sanctions which was established by the League of Nations; economic pressure was to be the effective substitute for military pressure.

It may fairly be said that each cause of war has its reflection in an instrument of war. The overarmament of one nation and the underarmament of others or the overarmament of all may be the precipitating cause of military strife. The breakdown of law and international political understanding precedes and causes the widespread political and diplomatic activity of war. Similarly it is not surprising that what has been conceived as the most potent cause of war—namely, economic tension—should become one of the most potent instrumentalities of war after the peace has been destroyed.

Thinking through this enormously complex problem is facilitated if we go behind the façade of appearance and ask ourselves whether we really mean economic forces as such, or economic forces employed as political instrumentalities. Thus, for example, when we speak of economic maladjustments and injustices as

## *War for Peace*

primary causes of war, we are really talking about the political distribution of economic assets and their political manipulation. The inequities between the "haves" and the "have-nots" are inequities which find their roots and the basis for their continuance in political interests. In like manner when we speak of the breakdown of economic institutions, we actually mean that political considerations and political instrumentalities have set up economic barriers or economic pressures to further political ends.

If we get to the heart of the matter, therefore, it may be fair to say that the so-called economic cause of war is really largely political interference with normal economic forces, the use of political authority for anti-economic ends. The policies are motivated and dictated, that is to say, by considerations not economic at all; they represent the sacrifice of sound economics for some presumed political benefit.

This fact explains protective tariffs which begin as an effort to supply a political foundation for an uneconomic activity. Often their basic purpose is not enrichment, an economic idea, but security, a political fetish. As time goes on, they tend to deteriorate both politically and economically. Extreme deterioration appears in autarchy, which involves complete political control for anti-economic purposes. The pseudo-economic doctrine of autarchy is really the political dogma of sovereignty in its most extreme form. Just as tariffs

## *Prepare for Peace!*

arise because of want of faith on the part of political authority in the resourcefulness and economic capability of its own people, so autarchy is founded upon want of faith in the reality and effectiveness of the international political structure. The very existence of the ideal of autarchy is evidence that war is at hand. For war is the final and most disastrous step in the anti-economics of politics.

Therefore, it is beyond question that war represents a terrible economic loss to the whole world. In a speech on December 13, 1940, Defense Commissioner Knudsen spoke about the orders which were outstanding as requiring "about 18 billion man hours." And that is just the beginning. Multiplying by the total number of nations at war, or preparing against war, one can see at a glance that the amount of energy which goes into the sterile production of instruments of destruction is stupendous. Then when those instruments of destruction are used, they multiply the destruction still more.

The loss is further compounded by the employment of economic weapons to supplement military measures and political efforts. On the positive side, loans and grants are made to stiffen the fiscal structure and increase the fighting power of nations whose interests are conceived to be common or related. The creation of the enormous inter-Allied debt during the last war is the classic example for Americans. But Britain fought Napoleon by subsidizing his enemies as persistently as

## *War for Peace*

with land and sea forces. Since the World War the United States has made loans of political rather than economic significance to China, Finland, and other nations. And when Loan Administrator Jesse Jones speaks of a nation as a "good risk," his words are not those of a banker, but a governmental officer supporting a political objective.

On the negative side, economic weapons are used for destructive purposes. Starving the enemy has been a feature of warfare since history's first siege, and starvation of his industries by cutting communication with raw materials, such as oil, tin, and rubber, is one of the conspicuous features of warfare as we know it today. The loss involved in that demoralization of economic forces is so great that even if the winner took for himself all the resources of his defeated enemies, it would not repay even his own losses. Briand, spokesman of a victorious nation which still expected to collect enormous reparation payments, nonetheless confessed: "In modern war there is no victor. Defeat reaches out its heavy hand to the uttermost corners of the earth, and lays its burdens upon victor and vanquished alike."

As an economic device, war is reminiscent of burning the house to roast the pig. No wealth can come out of the fantastic waste and destruction of war, and none should be promised. Neither reparations nor payment of debts will ever liquidate the material losses, and any pretense to the contrary is dishonest. It is a mad theory

## *Prepare for Peace!*

of political economy that a man can get rich at the expense of a bankrupt debtor, or that he can prosper in trading with people who are near the margin of subsistence, or that his prosperity is increased by the misfortunes of others. The long history of slave labor and forced labor shows that such a theory is essentially uneconomic.

It is the essence of free government that the state is the servant of the citizen, not his master. But the upshot of political anti-economics is that the state is master of the man; there is no room for "private" enterprise. Hitler expressed it well: "In economic matters the members of the party and all true Nazis have the highest duty in blind obedience to the leadership of the Reich, taking account not only of its orders but its mere requests." As the war has progressed, German economic dictatorship has become more absolute. The state must control capital, it must control labor, it must control management, it must control trade and industry. Just as by damming a watercourse we may transform that enormous energy into electricity, so the state by damming up the channels of industry, trade, and finance may transform what should be economic power into political force. As autarchy represents the logical extreme of that policy upon the domestic scale, so war represents the ultimate in the same policy upon the international scale. Just as the military effort represents sheer waste and destruction, which must be re-

## *War for Peace*

paired in peace, so the international economic madness of war sets no pattern for peace. It is merely useful in bringing the enemy temporarily to terms.

The domestic aspect of economics in war time presents a different face. From a national standpoint that economic system is justified which gives maximum production. The domestic aspects of economics during war should fall into the pattern characteristic of peace. That is the best test of its validity. It is for the same reason that the democratic process should not be abandoned but refreshed and strengthened on the political side. The effective use of war for the achievement of peace requires that the government shall be the servant of economic forces and not their master. In the totalitarian nations the state is all, the citizen is nothing; in the democratic states the citizen is master. Similarly in the totalitarian states economics is the servant of politics; but in the democratic states freedom consists not only in the freedom to vote and to control political policies; freedom consists also in the right to choose one's vocation, in the right to bargain for one's labor, in the right to freedom in the economic sense equally with the political. Political action should free the channels of economic action rather than dominate them.

As we should look with suspicion upon those who say that in order to win a war we must abandon democratic processes for totalitarian political practices, so we should look with even greater suspicion, if that is

## *Prepare for Peace!*

possible, upon those who insist that we must follow totalitarian economics in war time. The true policy is to reverse the trend of the last twenty years, which has been an unconscious reflection in the democratic countries of what is openly and boastfully carried forward in Russia under communism, in Italy under fascism, in Germany under nazism—namely, the absorption of economic forces by the political authority.

Among all the tragic myths that have grown out of the World War to confuse us in these critical days, none has less truth than the assumption that the United States then had an economic dictatorship, and the conclusion that therefore an economic dictatorship is efficient. Democracy is utterly worthless if it is only a fair weather enterprise. If it were true that men work better under compulsion, then compulsion would be the better theory for peace as well as for war. That is the doctrine of the totalitarians. But if it be true, as it is, that men work better when they are free, it ought to be true, and it is true, that they work best when they are free and aware of a great urgency in the resolution of which they have a passionate interest.

Mr. Baruch, who is supposed to have been the American economic dictator during the last war, himself has shown the absurdity of applying any such concept to his work. He wrote concerning the War Industries Board of which he was chairman:

## *War for Peace*

The board members had no vote. The object was to obtain their views, to discuss their problems in common council and to co-ordinate their action. As a matter of practice there was never a lack of unanimity and the chairman was never called on to overrule a member. This organic principle was carried down through every committee and commission of the Board.<sup>13</sup>

If that is dictatorship, it is not in the books! It has often been said that compulsion was not needed because it was known to be available. That may have been true in some instances, but the vastly more significant fact was that compulsion was not used because willing co-operation was available. The eagerness of men living under a system of free economics to perpetuate that system is reason enough for the success of the work of the War Industries Board. The gun behind the door was for the rare enemy.

If labor has a right to be free, it should not be deprived of its fundamental rights in war time; it should be encouraged to self-discipline and the subordination of temporary desires to a great objective. And upon that basis it is most effective.

In short, the economic doctrine for a democracy in time of strife is not centralization; it is the precise reverse. The true policy is decentralization, the sum-

<sup>13</sup> Quoted in the *New York Times*, December 24, 1940, p. 14.



## *Prepare for Peace!*

moning of every individual to exert his full power in a common interest. Private enterprise should be enlisted in the public interest. That is the democratic process and it is as effective in war time as in peace. Those who are so eager to "crack down" are simply giving expression to a suppressed desire, and if they get the opportunity to crack down in an international crisis, they will use the same technique in a domestic emergency. And there will always be a convenient emergency.

### 5. THE MORAL IMPACT

War is not entirely a military, political, and economic struggle. It is a moral struggle as well. The past twenty years have been dominated by the mistaken belief that war is the root of evil, and men have asked the question, as though only one answer were possible: Is anything worse than war? Bad as war indubitably is, it is the fruit of evil more than its source. It represents the result of a failure of reason, of the exaltation of shoddy values over higher values. It is the consequence of the failure both of the intellect and of the spirit. As the British Commander-in-Chief in the eastern Mediterranean, General Wavell, said to his troops, "Have you ever thought what a world we could make if we put into peace endeavors the energy, self-sacrifice and co-operation we use in the wastefulness of war?"

In the past decade, the utterly irresponsible selfish-

## *War for Peace*

ness of extreme isolationism established a moral level almost as low as that of the totalitarians, and not nearly so dynamic. In 1936 Stanley Baldwin declared, "I feel convinced that among the common people of Europe in many countries and in our own and in France there is such a loathing of war as such . . . that I sometimes wonder if they would march on any other occasion than if they believed their own frontiers were in danger."<sup>14</sup> Such a statement represented a measure of national responsibility so morally bankrupt, so ethically poverty stricken that it was an invitation to war.

Appeasement was predicated upon the age-old fallacy that man can live by bread alone. But appeasement in material things did not bring peace; it probably did not even purchase respite from war. It may have made war inevitable by the utter poverty of its spiritual ideal.

The economic determinism which has dominated thought about men and society for twenty years conceived of man, not as little lower than the angels, but as only a little higher than the grub. It was so subtle and so fundamental an assault upon human dignity as to destroy the whole spiritual basis of life and with it the democratic thesis. It conceded by inference all Hitler's mouthings about the "haves" and the "have-nots"; it abandoned the moral foundations of both democracy and peace. The Sermon on the Mount should have taught us once and for all that what has happened in

<sup>14</sup> *Times* (London), June 19, 1936.

## *Prepare for Peace!*

the mind and heart constitutes the real tragedy before ever it is reflected in overt actions at all. The readiness to take human life is both a brutal impulse and a brutalizing influence. The preaching of hate, the appeal to greed, to lust for power in order to induce men to kill are even worse. Those, however, are the causes, not the consequences, of war.

The danger implicit in war, when it succeeds the lost peace, summons men to a reassessment of values. Mr. Chamberlain is not a popular source of quotations. But he touched the moral weakness of the peace-at-any-price advocates when he said: "Armed conflict between nations is a nightmare to me. But if I were convinced that any nation has made up its mind to dominate the world by fear of its force, I should feel that it must be resisted. Under such a domination life for people who believe in liberty would not be worth living."<sup>15</sup>

Freedom gets taken for granted. All the intangibles that go to make up the complex idea of liberty are discounted until danger arises. Only then does the reassessment of values that make men ready to sacrifice life for the preservation of things of the spirit develop into a real moral gain. In time of war, if ever, it is clear that there can be no freedom without sacrifice, no liberty that is not perpetually rewon. In war time those realities are brought into sharper focus. When, in his opening address to Parliament as Prime Minister, Mr.

<sup>15</sup> *New York Times*, September 28, 1938.

## *War for Peace*

Churchill said, "I have nothing to offer but blood, toil, tears, and sweat," the essence of his promise was the unspoken assurance of the intangibles those bitter experiences would revive and preserve.

This ethical impact of warfare has a definite, indeed a profound, importance for war conduct and for war aims. For a democracy it is essential that the moral issue should not be obscured by cheap appeals to prejudice and hatred. Edmund Burke's statesmanlike words, "I do not know the method of drawing up an indictment against an whole people," need to be kept ever in mind. This sound principle entered into the Wilsonian distinction between the German people and their rulers.

The central moral strategy of war for a democracy is the steady realization that in the enemy countries, in conquered nations, there are millions of people whose sense of the dignity of life has been outraged, whose yearning for spiritual release is very powerful. The shape of things to come lies hidden in the recesses of the hearts and minds of men. If their will to freedom grows greater than the dictator's will to power, if freedom becomes their most ardently desired possession, if they are steadfast in their yearning for a life of dignity and freedom, the momentary military successes of the totalitarians will prove futile in the long run. This is the explanation of the failure of Hitler's efficiency to attach to Germany the conquered peoples of the Con-

## *Prepare for Peace!*

tinient. "Protection," promises of a material "new order" on a heathen basis do not have charms enough to establish such bonds of sentiment as those that bind together the parts of the British Commonwealth.

This whole moral power—this soul force, to borrow Gandhi's phrase—is utterly lost if life is conceived in material terms or if democracy is regarded as a luxury. The moral impulse of a democracy must be centered on a passionate belief that democracy is a stark necessity, a political reflection of the essential dignity of the human spirit, the political fruit of Christian ethics, the finest flower of political theory. Unless it is the response to something fundamental, something permanent in the human spirit, it is nothing.

When William James spoke of the moral equivalent of war, he touched a chord men were too deaf to hear. The spirit of sacrifice, devotion to ideals, the stiffening of the will, a refreshed sense of values—if those things rust in time of peace, they must inevitably be burnished in time of war. The economic determinists who said war was for gain, the political theorists who defined democracy as the end product of pressure groups, all the shoddy "realists" created the moral setting that made war inevitable. The war can cause nothing but loss in the terms of their feeble faiths. On the other hand, in spite of all its cruelties and brutalities, it may bring spiritual reawakening to a sense of greater values. It is an old and common human experience that loss

## *War for Peace*

may be an essential purge. But moral fruits are dependent upon the clarity and the purity of war aims. The demand for clear and unequivocal definition of purpose and program is as essential in the moral as in the military or political spheres.

### 6. SUCCESS IN WAR

The phrase "total war" is a new one, but the substance is old. It is a useful term in that it reminds us that war represents a reorientation of all human energies after the breakdown of institutions, ideas, habits, and ideals which have proved inadequate to preserve the peace. War touches every aspect of life and raises fundamental questions as to values. Its object is peace; its success in attaining that objective is the product of military, political, economic, and moral energies wisely directed and expended. Unless it tends to a viable peace, the war is a failure, whatever victories are won.

The period of war, therefore, is not a period when it is proper to shelve our democratic processes or to play down our political objectives. War is no time to drift in matters of eventual policy. Since the shape of things to come is in flux, war is the precise moment when everything for which democracy stands should be accentuated, when its policies should be reviewed, its aims re-explored, and the means of attaining those ends defined. Then only can the state come to the peace conference with its purposes fully clarified and its responsi-

## *Prepare for Peace!*

bilities accurately delineated. There is an aphorism, which appears frequently in literature, "In time of peace, a wise man prepares for war." It is even more true to say, "In time of war, a wise man prepares for peace."

The object of war is peace; war, therefore, is merely an instrument of policy. The war is no more successful, however complete the military victory, than the statesmanship which exploits it. That was the meaning of Blücher's bitter words, "May the fruits reaped by the swords of the army not be destroyed by the pens of the ministers."

## CHAPTER II

# THE NEGOTIATION OF THE TREATY OF PEACE

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### 1. THE ARMISTICE

FIGHTING is concluded by surrender or an armistice. Either of those two events is military, not political. The true status of an armistice was accurately described by Lincoln in a telegraphic instruction on March 3, 1865 addressed to General Grant, "You are not to decide, discuss, or confer upon any political question"; all such were reserved exclusively to the President. General Sherman, immediately after the death of Lincoln, transgressed those boundaries in dealing with General Johnston of the Confederate army, and was promptly disavowed. He wrote at once, "I admit my folly in embracing in a military convention any civil matter."

It is one of the tragedies of our age that public opinion overlooked this simple distinction and regarded the armistice in 1918 as the real end of the war, instead of a mere prelude to peace. Lloyd George himself was so moved by the fact that fighting was to cease that, standing on the steps of 10 Downing Street on November 11, he declared, "At eleven o'clock this morning the war



## *Prepare for Peace!*

will be over." No one then living can ever forget that first Armistice Day when crowds surged through the streets in a wild delirium of joy because it was "over, over there."

Ever since then Armistice Day has been celebrated. No attention whatever is paid to the day when peace was actually proclaimed; indeed few people can tell when it occurred. The fact that the armistice was misconstrued and regarded as the peace accounts for the utterly irrational readiness of the American people to pay the awful cost of war but refuse the modest price of peace. All that seemed important at the time was that victory had been won; the enemy had been defeated; the threat of the organization of the world upon the principle of force had been met and worsted; therefore the world was safe for democracy. That conclusion resulted from a desperate and fatal confusion of mind in which victory appeared the end rather than a means.

In reality, the armistice did not even close the military phase of the war. It simply directed it into new channels and governed it by different methods. The most dramatic evidence of military pressure was the continuance of the blockade, which went on its course for months. The officers of the armistice set about the task of occupying territories by garrisons, receiving surrendered arms and ships, seeking to make renewal of fighting impossible for the enemy. Even that was done only imperfectly. Turkey, which had been granted an

## *The Negotiation of the Treaty of Peace*

armistice October 31, 1918, objected to the imposed Treaty of Sèvres, took up arms again, and secured a revision of terms at the Treaty of Lausanne.

The political effect of an armistice is the substitution of direct negotiations for discussions through neutral intermediaries or by reciprocal public statements. There has been ample opportunity to observe the working of that process since the armistice between Germany and France in June, 1940. Direct negotiations between Pétain and Hitler or their representatives go forward continuously. The subject matter and progress are obscured by secrecy and censorship, but the fact of continuous political contact is evident enough. Nonetheless force, while not active, constitutes the most important single factor in the situation and serves to remind us that the two nations are still at war. The German army continues to occupy about half of France. The transfer of French people from Lorraine gives clear intimations of the presumed destiny of that province. One clause of the armistice makes German occupation of the entire country possible, so the further employment of force hangs as a perpetual threat over the Vichy regime.

There is no standard period of time between an armistice and the negotiation of a peace treaty. The latter may be undertaken very promptly, long before victory is won over every foe. In the last war Russia dropped out late in 1917 and made a separate peace at Brest-Litovsk. Rumania also asked a separate armistice

## *Prepare for Peace!*

and signed a separate treaty. In the current war there has been much discussion of an immediate separate peace between France and Germany, but at the moment of writing little progress appears to have been made.

### 2. GREAT EXPECTATIONS

As there is a marked tendency to attach too much importance to the armistice, so also too much is expected of the peace treaty. Before the convening of the Paris Conference, Lloyd George exclaimed, "That conference will settle the destiny of nations and the course of human life for God knows how many ages." It was an old ambition. An acute observer at the Congress of Vienna a century before recorded, "Men had promised themselves an all-embracing reform of the political system of Europe, guarantees for peace; in one word, the return of the Golden Age."

It is characteristic of the human mind that it tends to ascribe too great significance to dramatic events. These words are written on New Year's Day, and that suggests a parallel between a treaty of peace and New Year's resolutions. The year has been inaugurated on many different days in history; only in relatively recent times has January 1 attained something like general use. Even now it is by no means universal. The transition from one year's end to the beginning of the next is merely a conventional matter; in reality "New Year's" is just another day. But that slight occurrence is drama-

## *The Negotiation of the Treaty of Peace*

tized and thereby achieves a false significance. The more noisy and spirituous the celebration of the night before, the more sweeping and drastic are the resolutions of the morning.

So it is with resolutions regarding the treaty. The more earth-shaking and disastrous the war, the more extravagant are the expressions of determination to establish a new order. But precisely as the overdrastic resolutions formulated in a moment of temperate reaction are too often transitory, so also the utopian visions that follow a bath of blood are almost certain of defeat. It is natural enough after catastrophic events to feel that they must lead to decisive results. It seems incredible that the gains should not be at least commensurate with the sacrifices. But the reconstitution of the world involves dealing with enormous masses, whose inescapable characteristic is inertia.

Human nature changes, but it changes slowly. Institutions evolve, but unless they are altered by revolution the process is slow. Moreover revolution is not infrequently followed by counter-revolution, so that the expectation of cataclysmic reorientation is often defeated. The New Year's resolution that has the best chance of survival is the modest one. That is in rhythm with the principle of change by growth—or decay! Similarly the peace negotiation which offers the best hope of achievement is one with limited objectives. For as the transition from one day to the next, however we

## *Prepare for Peace!*

dramatize it, is no more than just that, so the transition from war to peace, however delirious our joy at the change, represents simply a reaccent upon political, economic, and moral forces and a reduction of emphasis upon military action. It represents the projection of policies primarily supported by arms into a new arena where their principal support must be of a different character. Clausewitz called war the projection of policy; it would be equally true to say that the treaty of peace is simply the contractual support of policies recently imposed or validated by arms.

Of course, being human, we can never escape temptation. So, after a great war—let us say a “war to end war”—there will always be the temptation to look upon the treaty not as the mere liquidation of a period of turmoil, but as *the* peace, the great peace. Armageddon deserves an eternal peace. But if we cannot escape temptation, we can avoid yielding to it. We can persistently remind ourselves that any great break in the continuity of human history is more abnormal than war itself. We can insist, as we tremble with excitement over some utopian vision, that great alterations in the rhythm of life are unhealthy.

President Wilson succumbed to the temptation. He proclaimed “certain clearly defined principles which would set up a new order of right and justice.” The inevitable and tragic reaction to so great a hope was the shoddy slogan of “normalcy” uttered by his successor.

## *The Negotiation of the Treaty of Peace*

People are always eager to be done with the sacrifices and the labors to which war summons them. Bismarck was ruthless, but he never overestimated the fruits of war. When the war with Austria was won, he nearly suffered a nervous collapse resisting the ambitions of the generals; the architect of victory rushed sobbing from the conference room because they asked so much he feared a reaction. He contemplated suicide when the Prussian king seemed likely to follow their advice rather than his. Neither mercy nor absence of ambition shaped his course; it was simply a prudent effort to conserve the fruits of war. The effort to garner too much may lose all.

If it is wise to restrain our ambitions, it is also sensible to speak kindly of procedures which are well established. Always in contemplating the promised land, men envision a new road to reach it without traversing the tiresome wilderness. So at the end of war there is likely to be a boast of the effectiveness of the "new" diplomacy. This temptation to overdramatization leads to disillusionment. "Open covenants openly arrived at" was anything but a reality to the hungry newspaper men trying to penetrate the secrecy of the Council of Ten.

The ceremonials of diplomacy, the stiffness, the accent upon protocol are not nearly so foolish as they appear to the impatient reformer. They result from experience in meeting thorny questions of procedure, and avoiding the difficulties that arise when men who

## *Prepare for Peace!*

do not understand each others' languages must do business together on matters of great moment. Diplomats have learned, by trial and error, how representatives of sovereigns may uphold their dignity and still achieve concrete results. By expressing contempt for all those methods, we discard experience and project complicating questions into an already intricate situation. Thus time and energy must be expended on issues that could well lie dormant.

It is as though someone decided not to shake hands—taken by itself certainly a silly gesture, and somewhat unsanitary. But reason alone does not rule conventions; the man would have to explain to each person he met why he appeared rude, but was not really so. He would spend time and energy—and not always successfully—upon a trivial detail. So the “new” diplomacy often finds itself threshing old straw, stirring up a great deal of dust and garnering no wheat. In seeking to travel the road away from war, a conservative choice will lead through less new construction and one-way traffic. Instead of being scornful of tradition, it is wise to make use of it and supplement it, if we are sufficiently imaginative, with fresh or refreshed ideas.

### 3. SPEED AS AN ESSENTIAL

However modest the objectives and however correct the procedure, making a treaty of peace is beset with staggering difficulties. One of these is the necessity for

## *The Negotiation of the Treaty of Peace*

speed. A reaction from the strain of war is absolutely certain. People become restive if enormous armies are kept in the field when no fighting is to be done. The soldiers, sick of it all, are eager to get home and start the process of readjustment. Their families, long frantic for their safety, are just as eager. The business community raises an insistent cry for demobilization in order to cut down the ominous pace of government spending. The vanquished enemy wants to start the process of economic and moral recovery. All these factors and many others create a situation where statesmen who do not move swiftly find their mandates evaporating and their hold on the public slipping.

As the political position of a plenipotentiary weakens, his task of persuasion becomes slower and more difficult. At best the tasks of understanding, compromise, adjustment, agreement, and drafting are arduous and time consuming. When the public gets restless, all difficulties multiply as the need for haste increases. The effort to speed up brings fatigue. Usually the principal participants in the conference are men who have already borne the incredible strains of labor and responsibility in the conduct of the war. The wonder is that there remain energy, insight, persistence, and courage enough to make a treaty at all. Tired minds lose imaginative power; they are less resourceful, less flexible; they are less amenable to reason and compromise. As these deteriorating factors multiply and as over-work proceeds,



## *Prepare for Peace!*

principles grow dimmer and minds turn more and more to details, adding burdens that clearer perspective would slough off.

To be viable the treaty should be as bare of details as possible, certainly as sparing of elaboration as the Constitution of the United States. It is the restraint the Constitution exemplified in stating principles and leaving the details to legislation, practice, and judicial interpretation which is one of the major reasons for its continuing strength. Many state constitutions, like the Treaty of Versailles, are too detailed. Those which go into the most detail are oftenest amended and shortest lived. They sink to the status of laws or even ordinances and leave little or nothing to modifying practice or interpretative judgment. The problems of a peace treaty are difficult and complex enough when limited to the barest essentials, stated in the most lucid but the broadest terms.

At very best the liquidation of a great war is so incredibly complex that no one mind can comprehend it. There are not a few important questions to answer but many. Those questions cannot be answered one at a time, for they overlap and interpenetrate bewilderingly. A new boundary cuts a city from its water supply; it makes a railway all but impossible. Political and economic issues are inextricably entangled. The conference, therefore, cannot proceed down from the largest questions to the smallest, because often the small issues

## *The Negotiation of the Treaty of Peace*

determine the great. In fact it is proper to insist that the character of a treaty is shaped not by a few monumental decisions, but by the cumulative effect of a great number of relatively small decisions.

The Paris Peace Conference at the close of the last war set up fifty-eight committees, and they held more than fifteen hundred meetings. Twenty-six commissions were sent out to make investigations and reports; some were asked to present recommendations for future action. The principal small policy-determining groups held two hundred and fifty meetings. The number of people involved was enormous. One national delegation had two hundred persons charged with various degrees of responsibility regarding the negotiation of the treaty. There were twenty-seven nations represented by seventy plenipotentiaries.

Always, it must be remembered, it is of the essence of sovereignty that no nation can be committed by another. There must be unanimity, for the treaty has to be signed and ratified by each state, small or great. If the treaty is to survive, that unanimity must be largely real and not forced, for nations which are discontented will inevitably pursue policies destructive to the fabric of the treaty. On the other hand, if too many specific log-rolling concessions are made, the integrity of the treaty is destroyed and its moral position left so weak that the treaty cannot survive.

The need for speed, the enormous complexity, and

## *Prepare for Peace!*

the necessity for unanimity at a peace conference all point to the limitation of objectives. The fewer the issues dealt with, the less chance there is of splitting the conference. These same factors also serve to remind us that careful preparation long before the conference opens is absolutely essential. Without preparation chaos ensues, without organization the whole treaty process bogs down.

At Paris so intense was the confusion that some major decisions were never formally made at all—they just happened. For example, it has been customary to break the process of treaty-making into two stages—a preliminary treaty and a definitive treaty. Apparently the conferees at Paris started to draft a preliminary treaty, but as the process went forward and more and more details were incorporated into the document, it became the definitive instrument. Ineffective preparation of agenda, over-weening ambition to write the charter of a new order for the world, confusion and fatigue combined to settle in fact what minds did not foresee or even fully realize as they went along.

Haste and confusion settled one other great issue at Paris, and will always settle it in the same way unless the most farsighted and complete preparation is made and great care taken with problems of organization. It was generally expected, despite some vociferous protests, that the conference would reach tentative decisions and then call in the enemy to negotiate. Indeed

## *The Negotiation of the Treaty of Peace*

many parts of the treaty give evidence of having been drafted on that assumption; more was asked than was expected. Room was left for bargaining. Yet the bargaining never took place. There was no formal decision to impose the treaty rather than negotiate. But it took so long to make the draft that there was neither time nor energy nor courage left for negotiation.

When one considers the matter in the cool light of reason, it is transparent that a peace should be negotiated rather than dictated. Usually a dictated peace is regarded as an act of strength, but actually it is much more an act of fear and doubt. Ever since the Congress of Vienna, when Talleyrand neutralized the military victories over France by political finesse, there has been a fear that the victorious nations would be cheated at the peace conference. That fear is well summed up for Americans in the famous remark of Will Rogers that the United States never lost a war or won a conference. A dictated peace is, therefore, a clear manifestation of doubt as to the clarity of one's own interpretation of what has been wrought by the war.

The real act of strength is to enter upon a negotiation. The first and most obvious reason for such a determination is that the treaty does not destroy the enemy. If the enemy is utterly annihilated, no treaty is necessary. Even a defeated nation cannot be held in chains forever; common sense says that any attempt to do so is self-defeating. Therefore, in the long run, the

## *Prepare for Peace!*

treaty must be acceptable not only to the conqueror but to the vanquished. And the best assurance that it can ever be made palatable to the vanquished is to have him participate in making it.

Finally, there is another consideration of great force—namely, that the treaty is designed to interpret the outcome of the war. If the outcome of the war is seen from one side alone, there remains an opposing side which is wholly unknown. John Stuart Mill summed up this point of view:

He who knows only his own side of the case, knows little of that. His reasons may be good, and no one may have been able to refute them. But if he is equally unable to refute the reasons on the opposite side, if he does not so much as know what they are, he has no ground for preferring either opinion.<sup>1</sup>

A treaty that is to be viable, that is to survive in the new environment in which it must find itself should take cognizance of all the aspects of the war and its consequences, including those known only to the defeated party. These will be presented while the treaty is being negotiated—or later. Less harm is done to the prospect of peace by considering them before the treaty is completed.

The fact that a peace must be negotiated should be

<sup>1</sup> Quoted in Richmond, *op. cit.*, p. 220.

## *The Negotiation of the Treaty of Peace*

recognized the moment war is declared. No statesman should undertake any commitments which will rise up later to hamper his work or make it fruitless by the imposition of terms which will arouse such bitterness that the treaty cannot stand.

### 4. TRIUMPH OVER MISTRUST

The negotiation of a contract presupposes men of good faith; so it is with a treaty of peace. The process of agreement is simplest and most successful if those who face each other across the green baize feel mutual trust and assurance, each supporting his own view but not seeking any unfair advantage, each fully confident that his adversary may be trusted equally with himself. But how can one hope for such an atmosphere at the bitter end of a dreadful war? If such a condition had been in existence before passions were stirred still more by fighting, war would not have occurred. It would be almost incredible for war to cure the lack of trust and confidence.

Far from making the situation better, war exacerbates it, because war calls to office men of different stamp from those who attain leadership in time of peace. As political considerations are important in military affairs, so military necessities have their repercussions upon politics. Asquith was Prime Minister of Great Britain in 1914, but Lloyd George finished the war. Similarly the unchallenged leadership of Clemenceau in France was the

## *Prepare for Peace!*

product of the war. In the present war Chamberlain was one of the first casualties when the fighting entered the active phase, and Churchill, who a year before would not have been conceded an outside chance of ever becoming Prime Minister, took over.

War brings to power men of quick decision, men of action, men of firmness, often ruthless men, impatient of opposition, not infrequently ready to gamble. The nature of war accentuates such personal qualities, heightening their effect, sharpening their edge. If victory comes, they are not only confirmed in power but their characteristic qualities become almost legendary. Having demanded great sacrifices, they feel obligated to bring back the trophies of a "strong" peace—a peace "commensurate" with the victory. They may have promised extravagant things, such as to "hang the Kaiser," and are then forced to make extravagant demands at the peace conference. Their temperaments, their experiences, their moods, and their promises unite to make difficult a treaty which is temperate, restrained, judicious, and calculated to effectuate long-run objectives.

Such men could not readily deal with those whom they have been denouncing as rascals, tyrants, and worse. The revolution which they have been seeking to foment in the enemy nation becomes prerequisite to a conference at which a negotiated peace is to be considered. It does not take much to precipitate it. What had

## *The Negotiation of the Treaty of Peace*

been regarded as elements of strength in the leadership of the defeated nation now appear in a different light. Quick decision is interpreted as reckless and shallow haste. The old leaders are discredited by failure; the regime which produced and promoted them is discredited also; revolution almost inevitably follows.

Unfortunately revolution is unpredictable. To be perfectly effective in bringing to power men who are acceptable representatives at a peace conference, the revolution must proceed just so far and no further. It must stop at the precise point of repudiation of the old government without proceeding to extremes. Usually that is asking too much, for the very nature of revolution makes its control difficult or impossible. We may well remember that when the Czar of Russia gave place to Prince Lvoff, President Wilson spoke of the revolution as "wonderful and heartening." "Does not every American feel that assurance has been added to our hope for the future peace of the world? . . . Here is a fit partner for a League of Honor." But the Lvoff government did not survive; revolution proceeded and Kerensky came to full power. This was more wonderful than heartening; yet co-operation was still possible. But again the revolutionary wheel turned and the Bolsheviks gained control. Americans could no longer feel that assurance had been added to hope for the future peace. The menace of world revolution succeeded the German threat of domination by force. So great was this menace



## *Prepare for Peace!*

that the United States did not recognize the new government for sixteen years, and relationships with it have never been satisfactory.

Clearly, revolution is an uncertain means of bringing to the peace conference statesmen with whom a treaty may confidently be negotiated. Russia is by no means the only illustration. During the meetings of the Conference of Paris in 1919, bolshevist revolution so held Hungary in its grip that one American journalist remarked, "In the race between peace and anarchy, anarchy seems ahead." Germany itself was seething with all kinds of revolutionary movements, which competed with the government in power at the moment. It was impossible to be sure which group was actually going to hold control; indeed such was the infection of bolshevism that there was no certainty that any such entity as the German Reich would survive until peace could be made.

In the turmoil of revolution the dregs are stirred up and come to view. Under such circumstances the result may be reaction to the right instead of a swing to the left. If a liberal regime is overthrown, it may be the minuscule reactionary fraction which seizes power and establishes authoritarian control.

Even if revolution does not run to violent extremes, the representatives of the new government come to the conference board without a clear mandate. They scarcely constitute a government in the accepted sense.

## *The Negotiation of the Treaty of Peace*

They are likely to be loosely organized. They may be inconspicuous and inexperienced men whom the real leaders are glad enough to give a brief tenure as scape-goats. If they do not achieve a diplomatic success, and many factors make that extraordinarily difficult, they lose power as soon as they return home, or even before. Then the process of negotiation may have to begin all over again.

We are once more having a tragic opportunity to observe these revolutionary processes in France. As the Third Republic was born of revolution after defeat by Prussia seventy years ago, so it perished in the defeat of June, 1940. The endless and obscure jockeying for position in the new government goes on. No political figure has emerged with any clear claim to speak for the French. Only a military figure, whose honor is unsmirched, represents the state. But for how long, and what the next act of the drama is to be, who can say?

There is a somewhat analogous difficulty in the representation of states which emerge during the war. Czechoslovakia was organized originally as a government in exile. No elections had been held or could be held. Only the prestige of Masaryk gained him recognition.

One may speculate upon the representation of those nations in this war that now have two governments, one at home and one in exile. If Germany is defeated, how fresh may the mandate of the exiles be regarded?

## *Prepare for Peace!*

At the Paris Peace Conference the problem of representation for Montenegro was so hopelessly confused that this sovereign state was represented in plenary sessions of the conference by an empty gilt chair and a place card. No one could be found whose credentials were so convincing, not only in the formal sense but in the deeper sense, that he could speak for his nation. An empty chair seemed very much better than the wrong man.

The problems of representation, and they are legion, furnish another reason to insist upon speed in negotiating the peace treaty—and the careful preparation which makes speed possible. Such are the realities of political life, whether in a democracy or an autocracy, that the plenipotentiary must always be glancing over his shoulder to see how his master, one man or a vast public, regards his work. Lloyd George went to Paris with a fresh mandate, yet before the conference adjourned there was grave danger that the British delegation would split wide open, and the chorus of dissent at home was swelling. Before the war was really liquidated, he was out of office. Clemenceau, the “strong man” of the Big Four, retired within a few days after the conference adjourned, denied election to the presidency of the Republic, and rebuked by public opinion for too “soft” a peace. Orlando left office while the conference was still in session.

It is a central fact that the responsible authors of a

## *The Negotiation of the Treaty of Peace*

great treaty are not technical experts but politicians. However much an expert may know, however keen his insight, with whatever skill he may negotiate or draft protocols, he lacks the all-essential element—a mandate from the people. Without that mandate there can be no confidence that he speaks for, and fully represents, his nation and that the commitments he makes will be honored by his people. That is why the plenipotentiaries, those with “full power,” must be politicians—that is to say, men who hold office and are desirous of continuing to hold office.

Since the realities of political life make this situation inevitable, there are only two possible safeguards. The first is intense, continuous, and skillful preparation. Every prospective decision should be canvassed in advance, the several alternative solutions identified and defined. The whole should be reduced to clear and simple statements such as can be readily grasped by a hurried man who carries great responsibilities amid distracting influences. His selection among those solutions will be conscious and purposeful rather than confused and vague, and the basis for explanations to a critical public will be carefully developed in advance.

The second essential is the organization of an expert staff whose members have attained what the navy demands of its officers, “a state of mutual understanding.” That objective is wholly independent of personal feelings; it can come only when men work together for

## *Prepare for Peace!*

long periods under firm leadership and to a common purpose. Anyone who knows how messages and speeches of public officials are prepared will instantly recognize how a political leader will respond if material is ready, apt to the situation, skillfully presented by a staff "with a passion for anonymity."

### 5. THE PRESIDENT AND THE SENATE

The negotiation of a treaty of peace on the part of the United States entails special problems which require particular consideration. Under the parliamentary system, the work of a plenipotentiary is almost certain to be ratified. It involves merely parliamentary approval, which must be given if the government is to remain in power. Instances where an important treaty has failed of ratification can readily be found in such countries, but they are distinctly unusual and do not require special notice.

In the United States, on the other hand, the plenipotentiary can have and can give no assurance that his draft of a treaty will be accepted. Ratification requires approval by the Senate, and for historical reasons that has become difficult to obtain. The constitutional requirement that a two-thirds majority of the Senate must advise and consent to ratification was founded upon certain presumptions which have not been realized. This is a reminder that the Constitution in action is in

## *The Negotiation of the Treaty of Peace*

many vital respects quite different from the Constitution in the mind of the framers.

Specifically, certain presumptions upon which the framers relied did not materialize. It was assumed, for example, that all treaties would be framed in the United States, where the co-operation of the President and Senate would be practicable. In the light of experience such an expectation now seems incredibly naïve. But it was by mere chance that in the first thirty years under the Constitution no treaty was signed in this country, except an article explanatory of Jay's treaty. This historical accident, for it was not the product of design, prevented active participation by the Senate in negotiations. It had been expected that the Senate would act as a council in such matters. This also seems absurd today, but Congress managed treaty-making from 1776 to 1789, and it was not dissatisfaction with that phase of government which led to the new Constitution.

It was not anticipated that the amount of treaty-making would constitute a burdensome part of the Senate's business. No one had the slightest premonition of the way in which foreign contacts would multiply. For example, the first Congress under the Constitution, after setting up a Department of Foreign Affairs, changed it to a Department of State so that it might have domestic duties when all the necessary treaties had been made and foreign problems would no longer be significant enough to absorb its energies. This was not

## *Prepare for Peace!*

so ridiculous as it seems, for during the twelve years of the administrations of Washington and Adams only ten treaties were presented to the Senate; there were only seven in Jefferson's administrations, five in Madison's, and ten in Monroe's. Thus while the framers were living the rate did not accelerate. They could not be expected to foresee that in a later period of twelve years 211 treaties would be submitted to the Senate, yet that number was actually transmitted during the administrations of Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover. Treaty-making in any such volume as that simply could not employ the procedures envisaged in 1787.

Despite the fact that the Senate never participated directly in treaty-making, attempts were made to keep it informed. Before undertaking a negotiation, Washington and some of his successors in office submitted the names of proposed negotiators for approval. In that way the Senate at least had knowledge that a treaty was contemplated and could express its confidence in the man or group of men who were to make it. Furthermore Washington regularly, and some of his successors occasionally, submitted the proposed instructions of the plenipotentiaries. Thus the Senate was informed of the objectives desired and the limits of discretion committed to the negotiators. This opened the way for senatorial comment or criticism and involved some moral responsibility to approve ratification of the draft

## *The Negotiation of the Treaty of Peace*

if the treaty did not transcend the boundaries of the discretion accorded.

One other factor must be taken into account in understanding the difficulties which have become so serious an obstacle to successful treaty-making. The framers of the Constitution had a vigorous aversion to political parties. The Constitution was founded upon the assumption that parties would not exist. However, that presupposition was rudely shattered when a vice-presidential candidate nearly captured the presidency, and a constitutional amendment tacitly recognizing parties became necessary. Without parties, the two-thirds majority required to approve ratification of treaties was simply an aggregation of individuals. After parties were organized and disciplined, a two-thirds majority became vastly more difficult to obtain. The subject matter of the treaty had to be non-contentious, or a bipartisan arrangement had to be made, or party discipline broken. The more important the treaty, the more difficult it is to secure approval of ratification by a Senate divided sharply into parties.

The first treaty submitted to the Senate in Washington's administration had been negotiated before the new government took office. It was in accordance with congressional instructions and the Senate approved its ratification without change. But the first treaty negotiated by the new government, the famous Jay treaty, was amended in the Senate. In that way the body estab-



## *Prepare for Peace!*

lished its independence and it became necessary for the President to gain the consent of Great Britain to the change before ratifications could be exchanged. During John Adams' administration two treaties were amended by the Senate, and both became effective. But a treaty with Great Britain signed in May, 1803 failed because a Senate amendment was not acceptable.

Despite various difficulties, the system worked well on the whole, for it was not until 1824, thirty-five years after the Constitution went into operation, that the Senate refused to ratify a treaty. And it was not until 1826 that a second treaty failed because of an unacceptable amendment. For a long time, therefore, even though procedure under the Constitution was difficult, ratification by the United States was as regular as in other nations.

With the passage of time, the rivalry for power between the executive and legislative branches heightened the difficulties. As Jefferson's view that the conduct of foreign affairs was "executive altogether" came to be the working principle of Presidents, they designated their own plenipotentiaries without regularly asking the approval of the Senate; after a time that procedure became the customary one. Similarly the practice of sending proposed instructions to the Senate was abandoned, except in unusual circumstances. As each arm of the government stood upon its rights and dignities, the process of treaty-making became essentially two

## *The Negotiation of the Treaty of Peace*

separate operations—negotiation by the representative of the President, and wholly independent consideration by the Senate.

Such a complete break in continuity could have stalemated the whole process except for three factors. One was the fiction that "politics stops at the water line." Although a fiction, it nonetheless tended to mitigate the rigidity of party discipline in the matter of treaties and encouraged some freedom of individual action without fear of political reprisal. The second factor was personal conference by the President or Secretary of State with individual senators, the Committee on Foreign Relations, or its chairman. The third was the occasional practice of using members of the Senate as plenipotentiaries. This gave assurance that when the Senate went into executive session to debate ratification, some of the members would be familiar with the instructions, the course of the negotiations, the reason for concessions, and the measure of success which the treaty represented.

That extra-constitutional device, designed to overcome the unforeseen difficulties of co-operation, itself became a bone of contention. Matters reached a crisis in the administration of President McKinley. Senator Hoar of Massachusetts felt that the freedom and dignity of a senator in discharging his constitutional duty to advise and consent regarding ratification were limited if he had acted under the instruction of the President in negotiating the instrument. He and other senators

## *Prepare for Peace!*

saw this as a surrender to executive usurpation of leadership. Some went to the absurd extreme of asserting that a plenipotentiary was an officer, and that in accepting another office the senator vacated his seat. After discussing the question with some of his colleagues, Senator Hoar read the President a curtain lecture, and Mr. McKinley, with astonishing meekness, yielded to their point of view.

The result of this final breach in co-operative action was that the Senate had a feeling of frustration; its position was equivocal; it did not have the approval of negotiators; it did not see the instructions; it could participate in the "negotiations" only by the process of amendment. Moreover, it had an *ex parte* knowledge of the factors involved; it tended strongly to see its own side and not the other side; it could not clearly assess the temper of the negotiation or fairly judge the concessions which had to be made in order to have it succeed at all.

It was after the McKinley-Hoar episode that the Senate achieved its reputation as the graveyard of treaties. During an ensuing six year period, only sixty-two treaties among the ninety-seven submitted to the Senate were ratified; thirty-five failed. It led John Hay to lament, " 'Give and take,' the axiom of diplomacy to the rest of the world, is positively forbidden to us, by both the Senate and the public opinion. We must take what we can and give nothing, which greatly narrows our

## *The Negotiation of the Treaty of Peace*

possibilities.”<sup>2</sup> For the most part, consent to ratification was not flatly refused; that has happened only fifteen times. However, more than seventy treaties have died in committee, never having been brought to vote. The principal procedure has been to amend the instrument so drastically that there remained no hope of acceptance by the other nation. Of approximately one hundred and seventy-five treaties amended by the Senate, over fifty have failed as a consequence.

The most conspicuous, and in many respects the most disastrous, failure of the President and Senate to co-operate was at the end of the World War. It furnished a dreadful anticlimax to the leadership of President Wilson during the war and at its close. It profoundly impaired the prestige of the United States. The question remained whether we had a national purpose in international affairs, and if so, whether it could be effectuated. The leverage which the United States exercised upon world affairs became negative rather than positive, to the detriment of peace and good order in the world.

It is interesting that the first senator to become President after the McKinley-Hoar episode reversed that precedent. Mr. Harding had been in the Senate during the Paris Peace Conference. He was familiar with the irritation and sense of frustration of senators while the treaty was taking shape, and with the effect of those

<sup>2</sup> Tyler Dennett, *John Hay* (New York, 1933), p. 288.

## *Prepare for Peace!*

feelings upon the fate of the treaty. When he appointed plenipotentiaries for the Washington Conference, therefore, the senior majority and minority members of the Foreign Relations Committee were included. This had the desired effect; all the treaties were ratified. However, the Senate had an even more important influence upon the negotiations. As the conference neared its conclusion, there was clear evidence of restlessness in the Senate over failure to solve the Shantung question. The issue regarding Shantung had played a significant part in the refusal to ratify the Treaty of Versailles, and the senators had developed a special interest in it. In order to avoid danger that the new treaties might fail, a special effort was made to reach an agreement on that question. Success in doing so gave satisfaction to the Senate and helped secure consent to ratification.

Experience under the Constitution has produced an unforeseen and exceedingly difficult situation regarding treaties. It has brought into question the mandate of our plenipotentiaries; it has tended to make tactical concessions difficult even when they help achieve a large strategic aim. Thus far the use of senators as plenipotentiaries has brought the best results in practice. It seems clear, therefore, that majority and minority parties in the Senate should be represented among the commissioners to negotiate a treaty of peace. It is not merely a matter of political concession; it is a practicable way to make the constitutional provisions workable.

## *The Negotiation of the Treaty of Peace*

Moreover, whatever handbooks are prepared by the Department of State for the use of peace commissioners should be printed and made available to the members of the Foreign Relations Committee, if not the whole Senate. The "Peace Handbooks" of the British delegation in Paris were made freely available to members of the American delegation. It can hardly be anticipated that such memoranda will contain matter so confidential that it should be withheld from the Senate.

After the experience of President Wilson, there is little likelihood that a President of the United States will again be tempted to serve as plenipotentiary acting "in his own name and by his own proper authority." Mr. Wilson went to Paris with a world leadership unmatched in modern history. But he had domestic political problems which needed urgent attention. Both houses of Congress had hostile majorities, and his absence gave the opposition many opportunities. There was desperate need for him to renew his domestic mandate and keep it as fresh as his European prestige. His brief return to the United States made it apparent that he had not done so. On that visit home he was confronted with a round robin signed by thirty-nine senators who insisted that consideration of the establishment of a league should be postponed until the peace treaty was in effect. This was so profoundly at variance with his basic policy as to constitute a clear warning of trouble to come. Thereafter skepticism grew among

## *Prepare for Peace!*

the delegations at Paris regarding his ability to get the treaty ratified. That doubt became an insidious drag upon his effectiveness. It made opponents less amenable to both his arguments and his assurances.

There is another compelling reason why the President should not be a negotiator. When he serves in that capacity there is really only one plenipotentiary. He is not what the chairman of a delegation should be, *primus inter pares*. Being the source of their power, when he is present the other members of the commission are substantially without authority. They may attempt to exercise leadership only at the risk of destroying the basis upon which they can be effective—namely, the possession of the full confidence of the President. If they take any line of their own, they become his rivals rather than his servants. That was the situation which produced the tragic tension between President Wilson and Colonel House. Of Secretary Lansing, Wilson wrote, "While we were still in Paris, I felt . . . that you accepted my guidance and direction on questions with regard to which I had to instruct you only with increasing reluctance."

If the President stays at home, he can serve his representatives in a way vital to their success. The plenipotentiaries have no mandate in their own right, for they derive all their authority as negotiators directly from the President. The thing which is of first importance in a long and difficult negotiation is to keep their

## *The Negotiation of the Treaty of Peace*

mandate fresh. In that task no one can be a substitute for the President.

If he remains in Washington, he has several means of working on the problems of realizing the strategy he has prescribed. Long military experience has shown the desirability of the commander-in-chief being elsewhere than in the confusion of the front line trenches; the admiral has a better view of the naval battle if he is not in the skirmishes of the advanced units of the fleet. There can be no question whatever that the President can exercise more effective leverage from a distance. When he is present, no plenipotentiary can gain time by pleading for the necessity of fresh instructions. And the President himself will often be forced into difficult and embarrassing situations which impair his prestige at home or abroad.

Finally, great as the importance of the treaty is, it is only one item in the vast and complex problems which face a country at the end of a war. There being no other executive direction except that which is contributed by the President, it is a false sense of proportion which abandons all those tasks, postpones all those decisions, and confuses all those issues by exclusive preoccupation with one which, however vital, is not the whole.

### 6. DISINTEGRATION OF ALLIANCES

The need for haste in drafting the peace treaty discussed earlier in this chapter is urgent for still another



## *Prepare for Peace!*

reason. Victorious alliances dissolve rapidly. Nations which have scores to settle with a common enemy may join together to reduce it to compliance. But their several interests are not identical; indeed they are often inconsistent. Alliances are marriages of convenience, often with no love between the principals. During critical days when attention is concentrated upon the thin margin between victory and defeat, differences of opinion and interest are minimized. When victory comes, however, that abnormal solidarity begins to disintegrate. The external pressure which held the states together being removed, they tend to pursue their several interests, serene in the faith that their common task has been discharged. Historically, nothing is more common than that allies should fall to quarreling among themselves.

Great Britain and the United States had very much in common at the Paris Peace Conference. On the whole the personal relationships between the two delegations were cordial, particularly at first. Yet their intelligence services were watching each other closely. Cables in code were cracked and deciphered to ascertain what steps the other was taking for the recovery of trade. Co-operation rapidly turned to competition; even personal relationships began to deteriorate.

Not only differences of interest, but differences in war experience accentuate divisions in points of view. For example the essential fabric of the United States was

## *The Negotiation of the Treaty of Peace*

untouched in the World War. There was tragic loss of life—but small in comparison with countries which were longer in the war and closer to the field of action. There was enormous financial and economic loss—but relative to the resources of the country not so crushing as the losses of other countries. No boundaries were at stake, no colonies. The great threat of rule by force was ended. Why not organize the world for peace and get on with it?

This magnificent detachment was relatively easy to attain in a nation that had only to listen to the siren call of “normalcy” to imagine it had reached the goal. Unhappily detachment was mistaken, then as now, for elevation. What was primarily a physical fact was misinterpreted as moral superiority. In his famous talk to the members of the American delegation on board the “George Washington” as they sailed toward Paris, President Wilson told his colleagues that they “would be the only disinterested people at the Peace Conference.” A dreadful mistake of that kind leads to disastrous consequences. In December, 1940 an isolationist senator who again and again has disclaimed American responsibility for the situation in Europe and violently opposed American intervention in any active form, lest it lead to war, was nevertheless ready to outline “a working basis for a just peace.” He dealt freely with boundaries and interests which he was quite unwilling to have the United States do anything to make real or effective. It

## *Prepare for Peace!*

was a perfect example of moral arrogance, ethical irresponsibility, and intellectual confusion. There need be no occasion for surprise when such qualities provoke irritation. Clemenceau professed not to understand why Wilson issued fourteen "commandments" when "even le bon Dieu was content with ten."

There can be no doubt that distinct traces of a superior moral attitude were evident on the part of some Americans at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. There can be no question whatever about a difference in moral elevation between the "fourteen points" and the secret treaties. But there can be serious question whether the one represented the superior qualities of a people or primarily a difference in situation. In any event, the air of moral superiority was irksome to those whose lives had been cast in the midst of war.

Detachment is always impossible for a nation, such as France, which had been used for four years as a battlefield in the World War. "Normalcy" was far away under the best of circumstances. Half the country's young men were dead, and half the survivors wounded. It was a loss which could never be replaced. Half the statesmen, the industrialists, the bankers, the merchants, the artists, and poets of a whole generation were gone. Leadership was inevitably impoverished. Years of slow and painful reconstruction lay ahead. The nation's ruined cities had to be rebuilt and repopulated, its industries reconstituted, its flooded mines restored

## *The Negotiation of the Treaty of Peace*

to production. Even its fields had to be cleared of thousands of miles of barbed wire; it would take years to plow out the unexploded shells and fragments of shrapnel.

Under such circumstances calm detachment would—and should—mean political suicide. The experimental approach to the problem of keeping the peace does not flourish in such an environment. It is easy for people to bring blueprints of utopia over the sea—and sail home again. But the representatives of the nation which has paid the greatest cost in life, in labor, in money, in dislocation will look with wary eyes upon enthusiasm and schemes as a substitute for security. It is not surprising that Clemenceau regarded the League of Nations “as a luxury, perhaps a danger.”

The variant circumstances of each country, the price each has paid for victory, the interests each holds most essential constitute a series of differences so utterly basic that the miracle is not that allies are tempted to quarrel, but that they can agree at all. When one nation unilaterally proposes a set of principles to guide all, the resulting irritation is almost certain to be intense. It is essential as we prepare for the next peace to avoid mistakes which made other nations resentful at the Paris Conference, and which then made the plenipotentiaries of the United States appear inconsistent when they offered placating concessions.

One instance of detachment and its influence will

## *Prepare for Peace!*

indicate the danger. During the last war, as during this, Bulgaria was the key to the Balkan situation. Ultimately the Central Powers bid highest, and Bulgaria entered the war as their ally. The British and French governments paid heavily for that event; it was the considered opinion of some of their responsible leaders that the entrance of Bulgaria lengthened the war by perhaps two years. They were not likely to treat it with special consideration at the peace conference. By the time the United States entered the war, however, Bulgaria was already showing the signs of fatigue and indifference which were a prelude to its defeat and military collapse. There was no occasion for a declaration of war against Bulgaria by the United States, and none was made. Americans then went to the peace conference with a lively memory of missionary and educational relationships, with sentimental ties of some warmth, but with no very real sense of how dearly Bulgarian belligerency had cost the other powers. It was natural enough, therefore, that sharp differences of view should arise regarding its treatment.

Perhaps the most dramatic episode at Paris concerned the Italians. Their treaty of alliance was not in accord with the "fourteen points." After concessions which clearly contravened the principles for which he stood, President Wilson refused to compromise further. When the Italian plenipotentiaries stood firm, he made an appeal over their heads to the Italian people. This ac-

## *The Negotiation of the Treaty of Peace*

tion was a reflection of the belief he expressed to the American delegation on the way to Paris that the men whom he was "about to deal with did not represent their own people." Viewed in retrospect, his appeal seems almost incredible. It was a deliberate attempt to mix in the domestic politics of a friendly nation and destroy the mandate of its accredited representatives. The inevitable result was to make the dispute a question of national honor, to insure the plenipotentiaries a fresh mandate, confirming for a time a position which had been shaky. It let loose passions that would not soon cool. Indeed, the seeds of bitterness then planted bore fruit in the reversal of alliance that placed Italy on the other side in the present war.

Dozens of illustrations could be given to demonstrate how easily allies become enemies. It is the tenuous character of nearly every alliance during the period of reaction after fighting is over that makes it possible for the defeated enemy to play one ally against another, as Talleyrand did when Russia and Prussia were on the verge of war with Britain and Austria over boundary questions in 1815. The fear of that maneuver is one of the principal deterrents to a negotiated peace.

The relationship to the present situation is clear. The United States should not enter another peace conference without the most precise formulation of its own interests; it should not participate in decisions upon issues where it does not have an interest of such mag-

## *Prepare for Peace!*

nitude that it will make efforts to support the solution after the peace treaty is signed. At the Paris Conference there was serious consideration of an American mandate over Constantinople and the Straits, or Palestine. That such mad suggestions would gain a moment's consideration is evidence of confusion as to the scope of American interests and delusions as to the range of responsibility which the nation was ready permanently to assume.

### 7. BOUNDARY QUESTIONS

Nearly every war raises again the thorny problem of boundaries. They have been the subject of passionate differences of opinion many times. Yet no political question is approached with more naïveté. There is a feeling that if a "good" boundary were drawn, the problem would disappear.

An ideal boundary has a number of requirements. It should follow natural and easily identified contours which make it strategically favorable to both sides, capable of being securely defended at minimum cost in men and money. It should enclose a region which has a nice balance between raw materials—diverse in kind and plentiful in quantity, ample water power or coal to make power, sufficient industrial and manufacturing centers, established domestic and foreign markets. Part of the boundary should be seacoast, well equipped with natural harbors. The region enclosed by this boundary should be inhabited by men of the same race, all of

## *The Negotiation of the Treaty of Peace*

whom speak the same language, profess the same religion, cherish the same traditions, and comprise a unified cultural community. They should have lived together for many generations so that the sense of national solidarity is fully matured. The one difficulty with such specifications is that they apply to no boundary in all the world.

A reciprocally defensible boundary is almost a contradiction in terms. The longest straight stretch of boundary of the United States is along the forty-ninth parallel of latitude. It is a surveyor's dream—a straight line—but strategically incredible. For a thousand miles it pays not the remotest attention to those essential topographical features by which alone a sound strategical plan can be devised. While that stretch of boundary between the United States and Canada is one of the most striking illustrations of neglect of military considerations, it can be said with some confidence that strategic boundaries of equal advantage to both sides are rare indeed.

As for enclosing an economic unit, only the boundaries of the United States, and perhaps the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, even remotely approximate the requirements. Denmark built an elaborate and successful economy with substantially no raw materials. Switzerland, likewise, found a way to add such valuable skill to imported raw materials that its lack of natural resources has not proved an insuperable handicap. The idea that by a mere exercise of good will, even if supple-



## *Prepare for Peace!*

mented by high intelligence, nations can have boundaries that will make them economic units is pure fantasy.

Racial, linguistic, and cultural solidarity are likewise impossible specifications. Americans are prone to feel that we have a mixed population, but except for the Negro we have no serious minorities problem at all. Men have been moving to and fro in the Danube Valley for centuries, just as silt has been carried down the river. The effort to analyze the sources of particles of silt in the delta would be scarcely more difficult than to separate the population into its racial, linguistic, and religious constituents. Great Britain, which has boundaries meeting many requirements, is occupied by a congeries of people. After all these hundreds of years there are still great differences between the Welsh, the Scotch, and the English. And there are strains of many other peoples on the island. Switzerland has three groups, each tenacious of its own language, customs, religion, even costume. Upon the basis of the specifications, the Swiss nation could not exist. But it does.

Drawing new boundaries is never simple and never wholly satisfactory or equitable. It is a painful process, reminiscent of surgical operations before the days of anesthetics and antiseptics—so painful and likely to shock, so prone to infection as often to be more hazardous than helpful. No wonder Colonel House exclaimed

## *The Negotiation of the Treaty of Peace*

in discouragement, "To create new boundaries is always to create new trouble."

It is probable that, with all the shortcomings of the settlements at Paris, no more skillful or conscientious effort was ever made to draw "good" boundaries. From a scientific point of view that conference gave Europe the best set of boundaries it ever had. It took cognizance, by plebiscites and otherwise, of the desires of populations. It went further and provided machinery for the peaceful modification and rectification of boundaries. It went still further and made the most careful arrangements for the protection of minorities that had ever been drawn. When for strategic, economic, or other reasons, men were incorporated into a "foreign" land and could not by exchange of populations rejoin their own people, efforts were made by international action to protect them from abuse. Yet that "best" set of boundaries has been altered by force and threat of force again and again until the map today bears little resemblance to the "scientific" product of the treaty-makers.

It is not the wickedness of Europeans that accounts for boundary difficulties. American history is full of episodes like the bombastic "fifty-four forty or fight" instance, which ended without either. Those who know how the boundary with Canada cuts across the valley of the Red River are familiar with the expansionist movement which influenced Riel's rebellion, and with other such disturbances. Even in recent years the fact

## *Prepare for Peace!*

that there are unused deep harbor facilities in nearby Mexico, just across an utterly unnatural boundary, has offered great temptations to men in Arizona. It is hard to see those resources go to waste while they must ship their products over long and costly railroad hauls. These episodic outbursts of the expansionist spirit and local demands for "living room" have been subordinated to the larger interest of peace. But that has been possible only because they were relatively so small a part of the national interest.

In looking forward to the next peace, therefore, Americans cannot neglect an interest in "fair" boundaries. But, on the other hand, no faith should be put in a newer readjustment of boundaries as a relief to the situation. After Hitler had mercifully put an end to the "intolerable" situation of the Sudetens in an alien and "inferior" land, reasons were soon found for further alterations of boundary. Modern means of transport and communication, modern engineering and science can go far to make any boundary tolerable, and a fair boundary satisfactory. The essential is the cultivation of the will to find the solution. The Swiss, the Danes, and many others have found how to live without eternally quarreling about the insoluble.

### 8. ECONOMIC SETTLEMENT

The economic sections of the treaty are in some respects the most baffling of the lot. Within broad limits,

## *The Negotiation of the Treaty of Peace*

and subject to many qualifications, other sections of the treaty record the facts as they have been delineated by the military and political activity of the war. The loss of the German colonies during the last war was a military fact; the treaty, wisely or unwisely, simply reflected that fact. The break-up of the Austro-Hungarian Empire was a settled achievement; the peace treaty had only to apportion the remnants in accordance with secret treaty stipulations and military accomplishments. But economic settlement cannot, in any true sense, reflect the facts.

War is an anti-economic process. Whatever its outcome, it cannot, therefore, result in an economic situation which is defensible. A treaty that merely recorded the economic methods characteristic of war and projected them forward as a basis for peace would be sheer madness—though precisely that is Hitler's program. Nothing is more generally agreed upon than that before war is declared economic nationalism has produced controls characteristic of war. These tend to be intensified by war. To project them forward into the "peace" would mean no peace at all.

The first question that must be faced is whether economic penalties are to be laid upon the defeated nation. It has been customary in the past. Paris paid what amounted to ransom when the Germans reached the city in 1871, and France was not freed of Prussian garrisons until a heavy indemnity was paid. Americans

## *Prepare for Peace!*

need no reminder of the fabulous reparations required of Germany at the close of the last war. In the long run the demands proved essentially self-defeating. Payments could be made only in goods or services or gold. There was not gold enough in the world to meet the total, and Germany could not accumulate enough even for installments except in exchange for goods and services. Always the question of payment met with one answer: goods or services or both. But if enough demand for German goods and services had been created to permit the liquidation of the reparations, Germany would have become an industrial and commercial colossus that would have overawed the world. So we were lured into the fatuous expedient of pumping in loans and siphoning part of them out again after they had been properly disguised. After repeated modifications the whole process broke down.

The collapse of the nightmare reparations structure carried with it the inter-Allied debt structure, and contributed mightily to the growth of isolationist sentiment in the United States. The Johnson Act, forbidding loans to nations in default, was not primarily a financial measure. It was not essentially designed to keep good money from following bad; its basic purpose was political. Taking advantage of a prejudice which had grown out of a fatuous fiscal procedure, it limited diplomatic freedom to produce further "involvements." It was isolationist not so much financially as politically.

## *The Negotiation of the Treaty of Peace*

The present mood of the world is to avoid reparations, not from sympathy but from self-interest. It is, however, a question which should not be decided on the basis of a mood. There is need for the most careful, not to say expert, analysis of American national interest and the formulation of a clear statement of policy to implement that interest. Important as the reparations question admittedly is, it is merely collateral to a more important issue. The real question is, shall the settlement be economic in fact, or economic only in form though political in fact?

If the peace treaty attempts to arrange a settlement which will increase the wealth of the world and raise the standard of living, it will require that the nations restore the lost emphasis upon private trade. There is no escape from that decision if wealth is the premise. The reasons are very simple.

A private citizen does not engage in international trade for any but an economic reason. Prestige supplies him no motive. For his business he may need materials not so readily or so cheaply available in his own country. Being interested in a profit, he searches for such materials wherever they can be found. By devious routes the payments trickle back to the vendor, who is concerned only with receiving his money; the channel matters not. If there is no government intervention, the process becomes infinitely complex. The buyer and the seller employ agents, shipping companies, banks, insur-

## *Prepare for Peace!*

ance companies, warehousing companies, and many other facilities. Under such circumstances the difference between "have" and "have-not" nations ceases to be vital. There is a kind of international division of labor in which both profit in the economic sense. Switzerland and Denmark have long exemplified this reality.

Governments sometimes intervened in order to protect their nationals engaged in international trade from abuse. Sometimes this protection amounted to pressure upon a foreign state, interference in its domestic processes. It constituted one phase of imperialism, and for a time seemed to stimulate profits. The United States followed a program of "dollar diplomacy." Ultimately the emotional reaction was such, and the costs and hazards so great, that individuals were left to suffer severe losses without receiving active assistance. A familiar example is the expropriation of American-owned oil properties and the very meager support given their demand either for return of their properties or for adequate compensation.

As long as international trade is private business, therefore, diplomacy is free to decide in each instance what measure of support the nation will give its citizens. It may refrain from giving any, it may give moral support, it may give diplomatic support, it may make a show of force, or go to war. Always there is a choice, and war in support of private trade has become a rare choice indeed.

## *The Negotiation of the Treaty of Peace*

From a condition of complete non-intervention, or intervention only for police purposes, an ascending scale of government activity is possible. Tariffs, quotas, restrictions of one kind or another can be multiplied. Exchange control finally gives complete authority to the government bureaucracy. The ultimate consequence of this rising curve of interference is trade in the hands of the state itself. That is the totalitarian outcome—the sum total of many partial decisions whose net effect may not have been clear in any but the final stages.

Control of the means of production and exchange, as in the Soviet Union, involves the state as principal in international trade. The inevitable consequence of this practice is political trade, not commerce upon economic principles. The corporate state of the Fascists, the anti-capitalism of the Nazis come to precisely the same result. As Russia, Germany, Italy, and Japan have steadily moved in the direction of defining international trade as a function of the state, other nations have defensively adopted analogous tactics which may rapidly harden into totalitarian practices. During war that process becomes substantially universal.

It is the central question, it is the very essence of the economic settlement whether that process is to continue or whether it will be reversed at the end of war. The name of the state system makes little difference; the granite reality is that when the political authority



## *Prepare for Peace!*

becomes the principal in international trade, the motivating force in that trade ceases to be economic; it takes its nature from the state and becomes political. Under those circumstances a trade dispute is not a matter between private individuals living in two independent jurisdictions. It is not even a matter between a private individual and a foreign state. It becomes a matter between two states. Every trade dispute may develop into a clash of sovereignty which must be settled by state action. Thus a vast area for potential war is developed.

It is no accident that as international trade has ceased to be primarily economic and has become essentially political it has also become bilateral. One of the most astounding anachronisms is the abandonment of the flexibility, the freedom, and the profit which have grown out of modern means of communication and exchange. But the reason is simple. Beneath all the welter of phenomena which confuse our minds one fact explains it adequately. By the very nature of sovereignty, contact between states is either bilateral or through international conference. Their method of procedure, built up through long years, inhibits the development of any other alternative process. Bilateralism in trade, essentially barter, is the crudest form of economic exchange. Mr. Sumner Welles did not exaggerate in the least when on March 9, 1940 he said in a memorandum to M. Paul Reynaud: "International

## *The Negotiation of the Treaty of Peace*

trade cannot prosper when its flow is diverted and distorted by attempts at exclusive bilateralism." The devices of state-controlled trade "are instruments of economic warfare. The world's recent experience has clearly demonstrated . . . their depressive influence on standards of living and general economic well-being within nations."

All the drift to paternalism, all the "wave of the future" arguments in favor of collectivism have been carrying the world to the practices of the totalitarians. The question remains whether, if the totalitarians lose the war, they will win the peace by imposing a political system of international trade upon the whole world.

There is nothing whatever in the experience of the last twenty-three years to indicate that political trade makes for peace or stability. In practice it has been marked by chicanery of the worst character. The story of German "trade" with the smaller states it sought to dominate is sordid in the extreme. The record of "economic" penetration which proved to be political is plain upon the record. And it is not alone because of the wickedness of the rulers. The system puts in the hands of the state a weapon which nations committed to the principles and practice of free enterprise do not have. Possession of a weapon is an invitation to use it, and the invitation has never yet been declined.

There is nothing whatever in the experience of the last twenty-three years to indicate that political trade

## *Prepare for Peace!*

leads to fairer domestic distribution of wealth, or a higher degree of domestic prosperity. This "new order" has existed for over twenty-three years in the Soviet Union, but it has not resulted in a collectivist economy of abundance to shame an individualist economy of scarcity. Planned scarcity in America, as in Russia, was an act of government. It is a matter of record that Russians were allowed to starve while the state exported food to buy machinery, engaging in trade for political ends at the cost of the very lives of the subjects of the state. It is historical fact that scarcity of butter in Germany is not the result of the British war-time blockade, but of a deliberate policy of guns before butter, another political raid upon human welfare.

The conclusion appears to be that international trade is motivated by economic, that is, wealth-producing objectives only when it is in private hands. For twenty years the states of the world have been engaged in building higher fences and devising, at the same time, new means to surmount them. The net effect is international tension and universal impoverishment.

It is now, during war, when the effects in terms of cost and the sacrifice of the economics of plenty are obvious, that American policy at the peace conference and thereafter should be determined. The conclusion should be founded upon no defensive or negative considerations whatever. The net effect of such foundations we already know—surrender to the totalitarian

## *The Negotiation of the Treaty of Peace*

theory and practice even if the rulers of those states are overthrown. We have seen how futile it is to stab Caesar but let Caesarism dominate the world. The elimination of the dictators will be meaningless if in exile they still dictate the economic policy of the world. Yet if war-time practices are embodied in the treaty, from whatever motive, the rule of the dictators will be effectively preserved.

### 9. LEAGUE OR BALANCE OF POWER

Whenever a war engulfs a large section of the world, as in the Thirty Years' War, the Napoleonic Wars, the World War, and now again in the current war, minds turn to the organization of the world for peace. When the peace conference assembles, with most of the world's great powers in attendance, plans for a formal world structure are almost certain to be explored.

In a broad sense there are two ways of organizing the world, one of which represents a theory, the other a practice. The practice is the balance of power. It has no elaborate theoretical structure at all. It is based upon the assumption that interests of one sort or another will lead to groupings of powers. Those interests have been dynastic, geographical, commercial, religious, ideological, with perhaps others. If a group of nations finds a very substantial common body of interests and draws into close alliance, then other powers will draw together to prevent the first from dominating the continent, or

## *Prepare for Peace!*

the world. The makeweight in such a world is likely to be a nation which is strong, but somewhat detached, which pursues a fluid course, now associating with one group, then with another.

The role of makeweight in the balance has traditionally been assigned to Great Britain, and looking back over the last two centuries we may fairly say it has been predominant in that role. But it is not merely a "British policy." Other powers have been less self-conscious participants in the mutations of political alignment predicated upon that principle. Among the nations which have had a lively part in the system, the United States must certainly be counted. Jefferson watched the rise of Napoleon and his threat to America by way of Santo Domingo and Louisiana. In 1802 he wrote to Robert R. Livingston:

The day that France takes possession of N. Orleans fixes the sentence which is to restrain her forever within her low water mark. It seals the union of two nations who in conjunction can maintain exclusive possession of the ocean. From that moment we must marry ourselves to the British fleet and nation.<sup>3</sup>

The wedding was postponed by the purchase of Louisiana, but the issue arose again. With the break-up

<sup>3</sup> *The Works of Thomas Jefferson*, ed. P. L. Ford (New York, 1904-5), IX, 365.

## *The Negotiation of the Treaty of Peace*

of the Spanish Empire, England made expansive claims, and Russia also. Against Russia John Quincy Adams was blunt; he expressed himself to England with acid candor and gave diplomatic support to Spain to assist it in keeping Cuba. Meanwhile, however, the alliance of the conservative powers was threatening to intervene in the new world to return Spain's colonies to the mother country. Promptly Great Britain and the United States drew together. Adams' statement on their community of interest seemed to some a suggestion of alliance. Jefferson once more was for co-operation with Great Britain; so was Madison. The characteristic result was what has come in recent years to be known as independent "parallel action." The Monroe Doctrine was an independent declaration. But Canning saw the basic relationship and expressed it in his bombastic phrase, "I called the New World into existence to redress the balance of the Old."

During the long period of substantial peace in Europe there were no other such dramatic episodes until Theodore Roosevelt made the weight of the United States felt in the settlement of the Russo-Japanese War and the Algeiras Conference. His gestures served to remind the world of a role the United States could play. And play it we did with a vengeance after 1914. Then indeed this nation became the decisive makeweight. After Versailles it redressed the bal-

## *Prepare for Peace!*

ance in the Far East and broke the Anglo-Japanese alliance.

Despite all the excesses of isolationism most of the world has been aware of the weight of this country and conscious that if the balance was seriously upset that weight would be felt. Perhaps Americans are more surprised than other people that now again, consciously and openly, the United States is seeking to redress the balance. It should be clear by now that despite its lack of surface attractiveness, the balance of power as a principle in international affairs is old and deeply rooted, and the United States, although avoiding alliances by "parallel action" and by fighting as an "associated power," knows the game.

The other principle, a league of nations, "the Parliament of man, the Federation of the world," is also old. It has been one of the favorite themes whenever the world has suffered the agony of war. Schemes and designs have been made by men of many nations, and have involved loose federations, regional unions, and world states of supranational sovereignty. But the idea has never come to life. The Czar of Russia had some such plan in mind when he fought Napoleon. He hoped to establish world government upon the ruins of the French adventurer's empire. However Castlereagh circumvented him, and preserved the principle of the balance of power as the effective doctrine.

Woodrow Wilson was determined that the issue

## *The Negotiation of the Treaty of Peace*

should be faced at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. He sacrificed much for the achievement of the League of Nations. But it had two defects. It did not include the whole world. By the exclusion of Germany and Russia it was organized primarily as a league of victors, and its function as a world-wide agency was postponed. The postponement was fatal, for the United States did not join, and without so powerful a nation the idea was hollow. In the second place the organization was accompanied by the treaty of guarantee signed by Great Britain and the United States. The reality behind that treaty was French insistence upon a balance of power reinsurance of the whole League idea. When the treaty failed to become effective because the Senate would not approve, the result was not to throw France back upon the League for security, but to send the French out on the errand of gathering allies. Many treaties were made with reinsurance as their avowed aim. Thus the United States and France both reverted to the balance of power principle, and from that moment, whatever the appearances and whatever its achievements, the League was doomed to ultimate extinction as a political force.

Now again proposals for regional federation and for world government are absorbing the minds of men. But we may well be reminded that it is customary to "stick to the Devil you know." Those who do not have direct responsibility can draw blueprints of world union and explain how reasonable it is. Some even attempt to



## *Prepare for Peace!*

show how safe it is. On the other hand the political leader of the nation which has suffered at first hand the agonies of war attaches himself to what he knows from experience instead of to what he hopes for or dreams. Before this war is over, a complete and critical analysis should be prepared so that the plenipotentiaries of the United States may have a concrete and realistic appreciation of the factors in the problem, of the choices that may and perhaps must be made.

### 10. PARTICIPATION OF THE UNITED STATES

An attempt has been made to sketch some of the problems and difficulties involved in making the treaty of peace. Even that expression oversimplifies the problem. The last world war required nearly thirty treaties for its liquidation, and the period of negotiation extended all the way from the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, March 3, 1918, to the Washington treaties of 1921-22, or even to the Locarno treaties of October 16, 1925.

Throughout the discussion it has been assumed that the United States is to be an active participant in the peace conference. That assumption is not founded upon a prediction that our nation will declare war. But having moved from a position of isolationist neutrality to non-belligerent intervention, we have acquired so great a stake in the outcome that it can hardly be imagined we will fail to protect the ideas and interests which have so profoundly altered our diplomatic ori-

## *The Negotiation of the Treaty of Peace*

entation. It is difficult to understand to what else President Roosevelt referred in his message to Congress on January 6, 1941 when he said: "We are committed to the proposition that principles of morality and considerations for our own security will never permit us to acquiesce in a peace dictated by aggressors and sponsored by appeasers."

It might prove a good thing if we were to attend the peace conference as a neutral. We should then have no temptation to think "we won the war," no basis for moral arrogance. There could be no expectation that we could remake the world with one effort. This would invite an attempt to attain limited objectives, and thus avoid reaction. The need is to have a sense of direction, then take one step at a time to realize the potentialities of our faith.

## CHAPTER III

# THE STRATEGY OF PEACE

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### 1. A MILITARY ANALOGY

THERE is one important respect in which war and peace are the same. Each represents a phase of the national will in action. It is a fatal error, therefore, not to unify the strategy of peace and the strategy of war. "As strategy is continuous, it must give continual attention to successive tasks. Any advantage gained must be put to immediate use as time is always working to nullify it."<sup>1</sup> That military doctrine is strictly applicable to the strategy of peace, particularly at the close of a world war.

Foggy strategy is futile, for no one knows how to employ tactics to achieve a vague end. "Tactics is the employment of means to gain an immediate local aim, in order to permit strategy to gain a further aim. Tactics, unguided by strategy, might blindly make sacrifices merely to remain victor on a field of struggle. But strategy looks beyond, in order to make the gains of tactics accord with the final purpose."<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> G. J. Meyers, *Strategy* (Washington, D. C., 1928), p. 81.

<sup>2</sup> *Sound Military Decision* (U. S. Naval War College: Newport, R. I., 1938), p. 56.

## *The Strategy of Peace*

Thomas Jefferson, whose insight illuminated so many fields, saw the similarity between military problems and diplomatic issues; he asserted that "peace requires strategy and tactics." The tactics of diplomacy consists in obtaining assent on the part of foreign nations to concessions to the national will or making small concessions to gain larger ones in return. The motive is to gain so many of these minor agreements that ultimately their total involves consent to a major objective of national policy. It is a rare occurrence in war for one battle to decide a campaign. And many a campaign has been lost because a victory in battle was not exploited to the full. The tactical advantage gained by one stroke must be followed up in order to achieve the larger military purpose. So it is, precisely, with diplomatic success.

Military strategy, in turn, is utterly valueless unless it is part of the larger national policy. Marshal Foch, like every great soldier, saw that point with perfect clarity: "The determination of a final goal of a war, the decisive objective, falls evidently to the political side of national life, which alone can tell us why war is made at all."<sup>3</sup> We should not be confused by such aphorisms as that attributed to Clemenceau when asked for his war aims: "Je fais la guerre." The peace conference in Paris showed perfectly clearly that he had not used the phrase to describe military activity alone. Indeed he asserted that war was far too important to be

<sup>3</sup> Quoted in Meyers, *op. cit.*, p. 131.

## *Prepare for Peace!*

left to the soldiers, and had a more precisely defined strategy of peace than men suspected. He did not win every minor point at the conference table, but it will be conceded that when all the specific decisions were totaled up in the final treaty, he had attained his broad strategic objective. Mr. Wilson had won many of the battles, but who can doubt that he lost the campaign? Lloyd George supplied much of the color; his tactics were brilliant—but Clemenceau effectively dominated the peace.

There are those who take a fatalistic attitude and assert that the treaty of peace is merely a reflection of the war, the implication being that no wisdom, no judgment, no skill can substantially alter the outcome. President Wilson gave aid and comfort to this belief when he said, September 27, 1918, the war "has positive and well-defined purposes which we did not determine and which we cannot alter. No statesman or assembly alters them; no statesman or assembly can alter them. They have arisen out of the very nature and circumstances of the war."

In that statement there is an element of truth, but there is a larger element of tragedy. The outcome of the war blocks the ambitions of one party or the other, and usually prevents the realization of some of the plans of both. The exigencies of the struggle distort objectives, and new political realities take shape under military and diplomatic pressure. In this sense it has

## *The Strategy of Peace*

well been said that the Treaty of Versailles recorded the accomplished facts of 1918. But it did much more than record achievements, for some of them were inconsistent. Wilson's famous "fourteen points" were one of the central realities in that situation, recognized explicitly by both parties to the war. But the secret treaties were just as real. And the resolution of the conflict between those contradictory facts was the great task of the conference.

Physically the treaty recognized the disintegration of Russia, the Ottoman Empire, Austria-Hungary. The military outcome assured Alsace-Lorraine to France. In these and many other ways the treaty reflected military achievements. But in a larger view, in a perspective that covers a longer period, the treaty was the outcome of many tactical struggles over specific policies. That outcome most Americans have always regarded as a substantial diplomatic defeat.

The central purpose of this book is to insist that two common attitudes regarding the making of peace are fundamentally wrong. Nothing in history justifies the fatalistic and defeatist view that the war makes the treaty. The treaty is the product of events during and after the war, and of the way minds work upon those events. The notion that only the victor can have a policy which is effective at the peace conference denies the experience of history. Even the defeated nation may, by foresight and skill, fall back in orderly fashion

## *Prepare for Peace!*

upon previously prepared diplomatic positions, and by shrewdness and energy greatly mitigate the effects of defeat.

In 1919 the Germans could have achieved much if they had pursued a different diplomatic strategy and if their tactical approach had been different. Indeed it seems obvious that German peace preparations had been made too exclusively upon the assumption of victory; only in a hasty and extemporized manner had the Foreign Office and its experts prepared a strategy or considered the diplomatic tactics available in defeat. When the mistakes at Paris are considered, the confusion and want of skill shown by the Germans in handling their admittedly difficult problem are an important constituent in the ultimate failure of the treaty. Diplomatic victory is facilitated by military victory; it does not follow inevitably. Complete diplomatic defeat is not an inevitable concomitant of military defeat.

The second mistaken attitude regarding peace-making is that brilliant generalizations which capture the imagination can be realized without hard staff work and intelligent diplomatic tactics, both solidly grounded upon study and intense thought. It is a striking and an ominous fact that almost every public discussion of the coming peace either has been expressed in a fatalistic mood or has attempted unreal improvisations. The fatalists see a trend in the affairs of the world and, accepting a kind of historical pre-

## *The Strategy of Peace*

destination, see no hope of preventing the inevitable new order, whether we like it or not. At the other extreme are those who would immediately "negotiate" while the military realities make their improvised schemes fantastic.

Escape from both these morasses depends upon a wholly different approach to the problem. An analogy with the military method of intellectual preparation for war may give hints regarding a method of intellectual preparation for diplomatic success.

### 2. TRAINING FOR ACTION IN A CRISIS

It is the essence of military and naval training to prepare for crisis. In time of peace many of the same operations have to be performed as in time of war. A ship must be maintained and navigated; the crew must be cared for and disciplined to its routine duty. Likewise there is a normal and inescapable routine for an army. But at the moment of combat those forces must do what they have never done before, and do it as though it were a regular thing—with precision, with steadiness, with effectiveness. No major vessel now in service in the United States Navy has ever fired a gun in combat. Yet we do not doubt that if our navy were suddenly involved in a fight, it would give a good account of itself.

The fundamental preparation for entrance upon a military or a diplomatic career has much in common.



## *Prepare for Peace!*

Young men are brought into the army and navy as officers through admirable special schools operated by the government; other young men become foreign service officers after extensive university training and extremely careful selection. The lack of a separate "West Point" or "Annapolis" for diplomats is cared for by supplementing their university education with special training in the Department of State soon after appointment. During that period of intensive work in the departmental school, the new foreign service officers get a great deal of technical training that will be of direct advantage to them in the discharge of their duties. The special preparation of all these officers, military and diplomatic, is followed by assignment to duties which provide practical experience.

In order that their work may contribute to professional growth, naval officers have a tour of duty afloat and then ashore. Care is taken not to allow them to become shore officers only. So far as possible, the foreign service is operated upon the same principle. The career man serves abroad and is then assigned to a post in the Department of State insofar as there is room. The number of appropriate posts in the department, however, is too small to permit all foreign service officers to have the opportunity for experience in Washington.

After these somewhat parallel experiences, the course of development for the army and navy officers diverges

## *The Strategy of Peace*

sharply from that of the foreign service officer. The army maintains a series of schools, one for each principal branch of the service, where the mature officer is trained in command. Some of the ablest military officers are detached entirely from routine or administrative responsibilities and are given an opportunity to devote themselves entirely to study. At the top is the Army War College, where officers of experience and superior ability study problems that are likely to be vital in the moment of crisis.

The navy does not have so elaborate a scheme of training schools, but concentrates all advanced study in one institution, the Naval War College. That institution, however, takes various classes and gives work at different levels. The essence of the matter is that officers with a substantial amount of operative experience are detached from all routine duties and given freedom to study and solve problems. At the higher level those problems deal with the great strategic issues a crisis would precipitate.

Both these institutions reflect long experience. They represent a decision on the part of the American military and naval authorities to develop a high average of leadership, rather than to depend upon the all too rare coincidence of genius with crisis. It is true that Frederick the Great, Napoleon, and other men of genius were not the product of such institutions. But over a century ago, the Prussian military leader, Scharn-

## *Prepare for Peace!*

horst, saw that experience and competence in daily routine provided inadequate preparation for crisis and did not furnish satisfactory criteria for selecting crisis leaders. He realized, also, that mere imitation of the great constituted no program of leadership. The true course was to study past campaigns, deduce principles, and then apply trained imagination to the solution of problems likely to arise in future campaigns.

Scharnhorst was taunted, as are all who indulge in education, with the epithet "theorist." But, like all who put their faith in an understanding of the past, in disciplined imagination, rigorous logic, and mental power as the goals of education, he brilliantly justified his point of view. His principles have been followed in many nations, including the United States. The most elementary grasp of the importance in American military leadership of the two war colleges would calm all fear that they are frills and not essentials. It is precisely in an imaginative assault upon the problems characteristic of crises that men learn to meet critical moments with steadiness and confidence.

Of course such studies do not take the place of practical experience. Relative to the time spent on active duty, officers are not often kept in the war colleges for long periods. But these institutions do provide the opportunity to gain perspective by a study of the something which practical experience cannot supply—past and insight by projecting the imagination upon

## *The Strategy of Peace*

emerging problems. Even in peace time the duties of an officer are arduous and exacting. They do not leave him time for the broader and more fundamental task of reflection. He is so lost in the trees, it is not easy for him to survey the forest. A year in the war college offers the opportunity and training for that purpose.

The foreign service officer also faces arduous tasks daily. Diplomacy is a continuous operation, never at a pause, much less a standstill. Nevertheless, there are periods of acute crisis. They are almost as unpredictable as those of the military officer, and call for qualities which routine experience cannot be counted upon to develop. Yet thus far no provision has been made to give the foreign service officer an opportunity like that supplied mature military officers to review critically the experience of others, as well as his own. He is allowed no relief from the steady pressure of day-to-day decision and action in order to consider principles, trends, significances. He is offered no opportunity, as an experienced man, to reflect upon the inner meaning of what he "knows" and to exercise his intelligence and perceptive imagination upon the issues which are likely to meet him face to face when the crisis develops.

Effective command in war is recognized as requiring "intimate knowledge of the fundamentals, as well as an appreciation of the capacities and limitations of the technique, the ability to fit the practical details into the general scheme in their true relation thereto. The need

## *Prepare for Peace!*

for these qualities is manifestly not restricted to the hour of supreme test. . . . The forging of the weapon and its adequate preparation for use are not matters susceptible of deferment until the crucial hour. The exacting requirements of war are essentially such as to preclude the requisite intricate instrument and its skillful use without previous studied effort. Mental power, which includes the ability to solve military problems and arrive at sound decisions, is a recognized essential component of fighting strength. Its development in those who may be charged with the successful conduct of war may not safely be postponed." "Before war can be effectively conducted, before the fundamentals can be applied with skill, the mind of man must have been concentrated upon the problem." Those words, which express an essential purpose of the Naval War College, apply with equal pertinence to the problems of the peace officer as he faces moments of crisis.

Such a crisis is certain to occur at the end of a war. Careful study of what happened at the Paris Conference in 1919 demonstrates that the shortcomings of the treaty did not occur through lack of knowledge. Information was available by the ton, and experts jostled each other on all occasions. But as one of the most skillful diplomats expressed it, "the lack was . . . coordination. It was the . . . fault which vitiated the whole system from the start." Such experience is a reminder that in his normal duties the diplomat, like the

## *The Strategy of Peace*

military officer, has his own relatively narrow range of responsibility. He is not faced, urgently and imperatively, with the problem of integrating his effort with the work of others to achieve a large design. The organization of which he is a part is solid and substantial; its routines largely take the place of conscious co-ordination. Haste is normally not so urgent as in moments of crisis, and time cures many troubles.

It is at the moment of crisis, when not one problem but an enormous complex of problems demand instant and, it seems, final attention that co-ordination becomes vital. And it is precisely then, when the work must be carried on in the wholly abnormal atmosphere of a great international conference, that the organization which usually assures co-ordination is lacking. The individual officer must deal with his problem with wider perspective. His effort at co-ordination must be more conscious and explicit; it must arise from unusual breadth of view and firmness of grasp.

Our military organizations have recognized that characteristic problem of crisis, and the war colleges give it consideration and attention. It is to this end that they lay such stress upon "mutual understanding." The phrase has no necessary connection with personal relationships. It is valuable to have a friendly spirit among co-workers; but it does not assure a proper military result. Admiral Richmond illustrates the point by the Austrian and Sardinian campaign of 1796 against

## *Prepare for Peace!*

France: "There were the best of all possible relations between the commanders. . . . Personal friends of long standing, meeting constantly to talk things over, repeating to each other that nothing should ever be done to interrupt the harmony of their relations, they wholly failed to co-operate. . . . It is the *doctrine* that matters."<sup>4</sup> That might, with less emphasis upon the warmth of friendship, have described the efforts of the Americans and the British to work together at the Conference of Paris in 1919. It might even describe the situation within the staff of the American delegation.

The military achieves a state of mutual understanding by the process of indoctrination. It consists in defining terms with great precision, insisting upon orderly communication, the maintenance of the hierarchy of command. "This mutual understanding, initially important to the transmission of the superior's viewpoint and its absorption by the subordinate, attains its final aim when, the superior being unable to act in time, subordinates can be relied on to cooperate effectively with each other, and to act as the superior would have acted, had he been present."<sup>5</sup> That condition was never even approximated within the American commission to negotiate peace at Paris.

The diplomatic service is organized in a hierarchy

<sup>4</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 200.

<sup>5</sup> *Sound Military Decision*, pp. 14-15.

## *The Strategy of Peace*

not unlike the military. It is capable, if given the opportunity, of developing the same type of morale, a state of mutual understanding that does not impair initiative, but provides it a clear channel through which to flow. Nothing destroys imagination, initiative, energy, resourcefulness and all other desirable qualities so quickly and completely as confusion. Co-operation, in short, is the product of discipline in mutual understanding of a common purpose, not of amiability. It is developed by working together in the consideration of common problems related to that purpose. It is facilitated if those problems can be worked upon as a major enterprise, rather than with a mere fraction of the attention of an already overburdened official.

In order to understand strategy in a larger sense and reinsure co-operation between the armed services, the army and navy interchange officers at their respective war colleges, some army officers being assigned to the Naval War College, and a few officers of the navy going to the Army War College. This has not been carried to the extent regarded as desirable by either organization. But the principle is recognized and a beginning has been made. There are some men in each service who have enjoyed a special opportunity to get the point of view of the other, to gain some insight into its special problems and its characteristic methods of attacking and solving them. There are



## *Prepare for Peace!*

strong reasons why that interchange of assignments should be carried much further. There is need also to take a further step and establish a National Defense College, on the lines upon which, after the last war, Great Britain set up the Imperial Defense College.

In any event it is extraordinary that in the "triad of a nation's forces—diplomacy, the navy, the army," only the foreign service officer is denied an opportunity, after he has had experience and has reached maturity, to reflect upon the experience of the past. He needs time to study its relationship to the old problems which seem new because they are always assuming novel forms. As a step in that direction, it has been suggested that foreign service officers be attached to the war colleges for brief periods. In behalf of the proposal it has been urged that the atmosphere of these institutions would be refreshing to the diplomat. The intercourse and interchange of views between experienced officers of the armed services and the foreign service, all thinking upon the same plane and all bent upon the development of a sound professional judgment, would be beneficial to both groups.

As early as 1921 some diplomatic officers were assigned to the Army War College because of its convenient location in Washington. The benefits of the assignments were not great because the foreign service officers were not relieved of their other duties as were the military officers. The diplomat had to accept his

## *The Strategy of Peace*

appointment at the War College as a net addition to his already heavy responsibilities. Because the Naval War College is in Newport and attendance there would necessitate relief from normal official duties, the pressure of current business has thus far prevented any foreign service officer from having the benefits of study there.

A distinguished historian, in describing the development of Britain in the days of Elizabeth, remarked that "the true expansion of England . . . was not territorial, but an expansion of the mind." The approach to the problem of war and of peace requires that every effort be made toward the expansion of the mind. The problems are so great that no mind can be too powerful to find them without challenge. They are so complex that only the process of disciplined co-operation can even begin their solution.

### 3. TENTATIVE PREPARATIONS

In time of war the Department of State and the foreign service naturally find themselves overwhelmed with duties. Problems of many kinds which do not often arise in peace time press for immediate action. Despite the pressure of current business, Secretary Hull determined in January, 1940 that special forward-looking measures must be taken. Accordingly he set up a committee in the department to gather data and study both the immediate and long-range results of

## *Prepare for Peace!*

war policies. He sought proposals regarding the manner in which the problems might be handled so as to prevent undesirable enduring results.

The Under Secretary of State was made head of this special committee to consider the extraordinary problems arising from the present conflict. The vice-chairman was the former ambassador to Germany, a seasoned career diplomat. Since that time no public announcement has been made regarding the work of the committee. The vice-chairman, however, retired from government service at the end of 1940.

Two observations seem pertinent. The first is that the chief responsibility was placed on the principal professional officer of the department, one of the ablest, but also one of the most hard-pressed officials in Washington. It would be beyond human energy to expect him to organize his urgent—and increasingly urgent—daily tasks in such a way as to leave any significant portion of his time free for the calm and reflective consideration of the strategy and tactics by which fundamental American policies may be effectuated at the future peace conference. His immediate subordinate on the committee, now resigned, had in the course of the year many duties, including a special mission to the Dominican Republic which took him away from Washington for some weeks. These tasks were not relevant to preparations for peace. The Under Secretary also had an important and somewhat protracted mis-

## *The Strategy of Peace*

sion in Europe; this, however, may well prove vitally related to the objectives, if not the detailed progress, of the committee.

The second observation is that since January, 1940 the dimensions of the problem have grown enormously, and the relationship of the United States to the problem has been profoundly altered. Since that time Germany has extended the war to Denmark, Norway, Holland, and Belgium. Italy has actively joined the war and Greece has been drawn in. The firm adhesion of Japan to the Axis and the formal union of the war in the East with the war in the West has occurred. Rumania has had a minor revolution and is occupied in part by German troops, who have also entered Hungary and Bulgaria. The United States has radically altered its policy and has adopted an openly interventionist and only thinly veiled non-belligerent position.

All these developments have catapulted into the lap of the committee a vast number of new issues, and have also made it a virtual certainty that the United States will be forced, for the protection of its own interests, to engage in the conference that fits the international world together after the war. Indeed the plain import of the President's message to Congress on January 6, 1941 is that the United States plans to participate in the conference which will liquidate the war.

## *Prepare for Peace!*

The dimensions of the problems of foresight have now grown so great as to require a review of the situation. When the committee was established it was a sound procedure. Now circumstances have altered so radically that a corresponding revision of the plan is inevitable.

### 4. THE INQUIRY

As the last world war proceeded, there arose a similar recognition of the need of preparation for the peace conference. Then, as now, the Department of State was overwhelmed with both regular and emergency duties. To an unusual degree President Wilson depended upon his roving unofficial ambassador, Colonel House, for the broad strategy of dealing with war problems. As the President's personal representative, Colonel House had direct access to him without using State Department channels.

During the summer of 1917 President Wilson learned that other governments were gathering material in preparation for the peace conference. He also had a growing realization that his own conception of a just peace was somewhat at variance with those of his associates abroad who were responsible for the conduct of the war in their several countries. He did not want to undermine co-operation in the prosecution of the war by publicly airing those differences of objective, but equally he did not want to yield to

## *The Strategy of Peace*

them by default. Early in September, 1917 he suggested a systematic effort to discover what the several Associated Powers were likely to insist upon. Then it would be possible to determine which policies to support and which to oppose, as well as the means to employ. He saw the problem somewhat on the analogy of the preparation of a lawyer's brief.

The President put the whole matter in Colonel House's hands. Secretary Lansing was consulted, went over the preliminary scheme of organization, and officially advised the President to make funds available from one of the "blank check" appropriations under his control.

Nominally "the Inquiry," as it came to be called, was under the State Department. Effectively, however, it was wholly independent. It was set up in New York; its director was Colonel House's brother-in-law, and only he and Walter Lippmann, its secretary, had direct contact with Colonel House. No member of the staff had regular or customary access to Secretary Lansing or the President, though Mr. Wilson received material for his famous "fourteen points" from the Inquiry. Colonel House was out of the country for considerable periods, so that much of the time the organization moved in its own orbit.

The ubiquitous contacts of Colonel House and the energy of the Inquiry staff assured it much information. Every propaganda agency was eager to supply

## *Prepare for Peace!*

documents, which were winnowed with care and skill. The staff members were aware of the work going forward along the same line in England, where eminent scholars had been pressed into the service of the Foreign Office. Likewise, through the French mission in Washington, they were given access to what was being prepared by experts and research scholars in Paris.

Under severe pressure of time, under a hastily extemporized but constantly growing program, and with a quickly assembled staff, the Inquiry accomplished a remarkable amount of work. No abler group of scholars could have been gathered. They labored with zealous industry and, on the whole, with remarkable harmony. Their monographs on historical, economic, territorial, and legal questions, the basic maps they prepared on problem areas were fully as adequate as the comparable studies in France and Great Britain. In addition to preparing factual material, they considered the problems of the coming settlement and formulated proposed solutions, so that recommendations would be available to the peace commissioners when they were needed. From every point of view their achievement was remarkable and, looked at in retrospect, it commands admiration.

Unhappily, however, there was one serious defect in the structure of the Inquiry for which the members of the staff were not in the least responsible and which

## *The Strategy of Peace*

they were powerless to remedy. While the organization was technically under the Department of State, the connection was unreal. No member of the Inquiry then had, or had ever had, any connection with the department. No one of the group had ever had any diplomatic experience whatever. Those facts partly reflect the inadequacy of the original scheme, for both the size and the significance of the Inquiry grew far beyond the conception of its originators. It is not too much to say that those who had launched it were not only surprised but somewhat terrified by its development; only the urbane and persuasive legal adviser of Colonel House made its continuance and growth possible. Even then no one foresaw any diplomatic activity on the part of its staff. Since the Inquiry was not established on the same principles as the departmental structure, its files and documents, its methods and procedures were not readily absorbed into official channels when the delegation to the peace conference was finally organized.

The independent and separate status of the Inquiry also had an adverse emotional effect, which should have been foreseen, and which could have been avoided. The Department of State was composed of loyal and skillful men. They had borne the heat and burden of the day; they naturally and properly looked forward to the peace conference as in the line of their duty. It was galling in the extreme to these men who



## *Prepare for Peace!*

had spent their lives gaining experience to see a temporary body of amateurs attaining a position of influence with the President and his alter ego, Colonel House. It is indubitable that the members of the Inquiry looked to Colonel House as their "chief"; their loyalties were attached to him personally, just as their communications were addressed to him. In similar fashion the officers of the Department of State designated to serve with the peace commission looked to their chief, the Secretary. This emotional orientation had something to do ultimately with the rift between President Wilson and Colonel House, and with the marked coolness between Secretary Lansing and the Colonel.

As soon as the commission to negotiate peace was organized, the unfortunate effect of these influences became evident. Colonel House was abroad and Secretary Lansing exercised his authority to leave at home a considerable part of the Inquiry staff. This was a reflection of official resentment at the growth in size and influence of that body. When the party boarded the "George Washington," there was rivalry between the State Department group and the Inquiry about quarters on the ship. It was regarded as a distinct triumph when the latter staff was assigned a higher deck than the former. A trivial incident, nevertheless it was indicative of the lack of that military ideal, the fruit of discipline, "mutual understanding." Even

## *The Strategy of Peace*

when they reached Paris, the two groups were never fully merged.

Inattention to the basic problem of organizing the peace delegation added other difficulties. The military intelligence officers had not been considered in the scheme for the Inquiry and were never adequately integrated into the structure. Moreover they had a natural tendency to look to General Bliss, and this orientation of their loyalty operated to accentuate the structural fault. There were, in addition, representatives of the War Trade Board, of which Mr. Baruch was chairman, as well as of other economic organizations in Washington. Despite the fact that labor problems bulked large, there was no representative of the Department of Labor in the American delegation.

Inevitably there was confusion. The peace commission was different in structure from anything that had preceded it. The attempt by the Secretary General of the American commission to devise a system of organization was met by prompt and vigorous resistance. The essence of the issue was whether the experts who had been members of the Inquiry were to send communications to the plenipotentiaries through the State Department officers who comprised the secretariat. The Inquiry group won again, as they had on the question of shipboard quarters. But the victory was somewhat hollow, for their contact with the plenipotentiaries remained inadequate. Secretary Lansing in his *Peace*

## *Prepare for Peace!*

*Negotiations: a Personal Narrative* declares, "Whatever data were furnished [President Wilson] did not, however, pass through the hands of the other Commissioners who met every morning in my office to exchange information and discuss matters pertaining to negotiations." It is significant, also, that the Inquiry is mentioned just once in the volume of *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House* which deals with the peace conference. That single reference has to do with a meeting on shipboard, on the way to Paris.

Nonetheless the scholars who had participated in the Inquiry acquired influence in unanticipated ways. They were assigned from time to time to attend the Council of Ten, or its successor councils, as advisers to the American commissioners. Then as the work of negotiation bogged down, the drafting of sections of the peace treaty was parceled out to special commissions. Members of the Inquiry were made members of those commissions and transformed at one stroke from the status of advisers into negotiators and draftsmen. As time pressed harder, as confusion mounted and tempers wore thin, it came to be the usual practice of the Council to incorporate into the treaty any unanimous recommendation coming from the commissions. Specialists fell into the usual mistake of presenting solutions that lacked breadth of perspective. Because of the defective organization of the conference, those recommendations were un-co-ordinated. In consequence, when the treaty

## *The Strategy of Peace*

was complete, the sum of its parts achieved a wholly unplanned and largely unforeseen total. The members of the Inquiry were not responsible for this fault; it would be more accurate to say they were the victims of an organization which had been deficient from the first. The Inquiry was not set up so that its gears meshed with official cogs. The American commission in Paris never achieved compact organization.

Whatever the responsibility, the Versailles Treaty was not a success. The sacrifices of the world deserved a better recompense. Ten million men had lost their lives. There had been over twenty million lesser casualties. Treasure and labor, love and patriotism had been poured out beyond measure. And President Wilson was right in one prophecy. He said if the settlement were such that the peace treaty would not work, "the world will raise Hell." It has!

### 5. PREPARATION FOR THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE

The work of preparation for the Washington Conference of 1921-1922 offers some significant contrasts. Several months before the conference was to convene, a special division was established within the Department of State headed by a career diplomat of wide experience both abroad and in the department. To the new section were appointed a number of scholars, some of whom had already served on the Inquiry. In this instance, however, they became members of the depart-

## *Prepare for Peace!*

ment, subject to its usual rules and procedures. Also among the experts assigned to the special task were foreign service officers whose work in this instance was similar to that of the men borrowed from universities. Moreover, because of his special competence, an official of the Department of Commerce was loaned to the new division and made brilliant contributions to its work. Officers of some of the regular divisions of the Department of State gave such help as was feasible.

Except for the head of the division, the officers assigned to the work of preparation were freed from regular current responsibilities. They were given the duty of preparing monographs, just as were the members of the Inquiry. Operating as individuals and in groups under the usual departmental methods, they reviewed their findings and recommendations with the Secretary of State from time to time. In addition to the work of research and review, some of them were assigned other special tasks that did not compete with the regular operating divisions of the department.

Besides those who were appointed to the department, other men were called upon for part-time service. One of the Foundations subsidized scholars to prepare bibliographies and make compilations of relevant documents. One expert produced a volume on the Anglo-Japanese Alliance which was utilized by departmental officers.

When the conference met, there was no friction be-

## *The Strategy of Peace*

tween the experts and the secretariat, no jealousy between the professional career men and the scholars drafted for service because of specialized knowledge. There was no basis for feeling that "outsiders" were taking over official duties or that amateurs were usurping the functions of experienced diplomats. The channels of communication with the plenipotentiaries were clear and unconfused. In short, the whole procedure was a model of orderly and thorough preparation. The care spent in organization, the thought put upon prevention of jealousy resulted in a negotiation which was not only handled brilliantly by the plenipotentiaries, but the staff work of which was extraordinarily effective.

Other factors also contributed to the success of the conference. The sessions were held in Washington; not so many nations were in attendance; the objectives, though a great many issues were involved, were relatively limited; and the need for haste was not so great as at Paris. However, it seems clear that the nature of the preparations was an important factor in the result. Some now regret the policy followed at the Washington Conference; no one doubts that both in tactical detail and in its strategy the American delegation was remarkably successful.

### 6. A PROPOSAL

Now, in 1941, billions are again being spent for war. To the end that it may be as destructive as possible,

## *Prepare for Peace!*

millions upon millions are being expended in the research laboratories of government, of industry, and of universities. It has been said that the nation with the best laboratories will win. But the object of war is peace; and at each step we are forced to ask, "Are the preparations for the problems of peace as thorough and as vigorous as those for war?"

There needs to be an insistent reminder that if the fruits of war are not to be lost, there should be as much technical preoccupation with the coming peace as with the conduct of the war. It is not intelligent to pour out human life and great treasure, to impoverish the race, physically, culturally, and economically, and to reap no harvest but destruction. Then indeed, as Briand said, no one is victor; then in truth all share defeat. The only chance that the fruits of victory may be less bitter than gall is through foresight, through careful attention to the shape of things to come. To insist that thought must wait until the war's end is to deny any meaning to the war at all. Unless war is to be reduced to senseless violence, foresight is essential.

If the object of war is peace, that peace must be defined. The only argument against foresight is that it is difficult. But it is no more difficult than the prevision necessary to decide how many ships, and of what type, we will need, or how many and what kinds of airplanes. We will want a viable treaty, one that looks forward and is likely to survive. The direction had best be de-

## *The Strategy of Peace*

terminated while there is still time for thought. When fighting ends, the moment for instant treaty action is upon us.

The time to prepare for peace is now. Its problems should be attacked upon a scale commensurate with the urgency and significance of the enterprise. The entire technical section of the American delegation to the coming peace conference should be organized in skeleton outline at once. Profiting from the experience gained in preparing for the Paris and Washington Conferences, the new unit should be a special division of the Department of State, under the direction of a seasoned foreign service officer. He should be a man of energy, imagination, and administrative capacity, thoroughly familiar with departmental procedure.

The chiefs of section in the special division should so far as possible be foreign service officers, or officials borrowed from other departments. These men are familiar with the channels of action by which "the chief" can be made aware of what has been prepared for his use. They know the technique of drawing proposals down to manageable proportions, whatever the mountains of data, and however long the consideration and discussion may have extended. It is of first importance that the channels between the experts and the plenipotentiaries be clearly established.

Being a division of the Department of State, it would never be out of the control of those officers of the gov-



## *Prepare for Peace!*

ernment principally concerned with foreign policy. It would, as a matter of departmental routine, make such reports as were prescribed by the Secretary in the order providing for its establishment. The regular officers would exercise supervision and control, but would be relieved of immediate responsibility. There would be no danger that the new division would develop the separatist spirit which made it difficult to absorb the Inquiry, for all its sterling virtues, into the peace commission of 1919.

The division should be located some distance from Washington. Such a procedure has several advantages. In the first place, it would give assurance to the regular divisions of the department that the special division would not interfere in the conduct of daily business. This body should not be the recipient of the vast flood of current telegrams, cables, and dispatches that are the basis of the daily operations by which the policies of the department are implemented. Nothing would more quickly have an adverse effect on the morale of an overburdened department than the feeling that a kind of super-department was being set up, reducing the regular operations to the level of merely administering policy instead of directing it. Taking the special division away from all regular contact with daily problems will give the assurance necessary on that point. Slight as this matter may appear, it is of genuine importance.

It is equally desirable from the standpoint of the

## *The Strategy of Peace*

special division that it be located elsewhere. The nature of its task, the rhythm of its operations are so different from those of other divisions of the department that a physical separation and a more appropriate environment will contribute to its effectiveness. The enterprise, though it may be small at first, will soon become a large-scale operation, and should not be located in an already overcrowded city or in cramped quarters in an inadequate building.

After its establishment, the first topic of inquiry should be what other government agencies ought to have representatives upon the staff of the peace commission. Fortunately the committee established by Secretary Hull in January, 1940 has laid the foundation by its contacts with several government agencies. When the study is complete, personnel should be borrowed immediately from each, and the plan of organization worked out, not only on a blueprint, but it should be tried out and modified from time to time in order to see that the most efficient set-up is attained.

Certainly there will be representatives of the Treasury, the Army, the Navy, the Departments of Labor, Commerce, Justice—and others. In preparing for the last peace conference, the British Foreign Office group had a long and continuous period of active co-operation with personnel from the Intelligence Division of the Admiralty and the Geographical Section of the Army General Staff. Thus they did not face the neces-

## *Prepare for Peace!*

sity for new organization when the expert staff was transferred to Paris. Through an early assignment of personnel to the special division, not only will personal relationships be established, but the even more important official relationships will be determined and not left to hasty extemporization when the conference is already under way.

Following the study of the borrowings necessary from other government departments, a second basic enterprise should be the preparation of manuals on the organization of a conference, the American commission in particular, and the preparation of agenda. No failure at Paris was more conspicuous, perhaps none contributed so much to its unsatisfactory features as the failure to develop a compact organization and a clear program of items to consider.

The essential point is that this special division, which by analogy we might think of as a laboratory of peace, should be organized by officials along official lines. Such a proposal would have been wholly impracticable before the United States had a seasoned foreign career service. When the Inquiry was established, the law creating such a corps was only two years old; the number of competent trained men was much smaller than at present. In fact it was not until 1924 that the Rogers Act united the consular service established in 1906 with the diplomatic service organized in 1915. There are now about six hundred foreign service officers, and

## *The Strategy of Peace*

there are in retirement many more who could be available for emergency service of this character.

Despite this large number, the pressure of work in Washington and in the embassies and legations abroad is so severe that only a skeleton organization can be drawn from officers of the foreign service, the State Department, and other departments. But two devices will mitigate this disadvantage. If the organization is well designed, and if war continues some time, official personnel may be exchanged from time to time, just as men are transferred from one assignment to another in the foreign service. In this way a maximum number of officers will have direct experience in the special problems of the new organization, and so be ready to enter smoothly upon its work when the inevitable expansion takes place on the eve of the peace conference.

In the second place, the need for special help may be met by calling in temporary officers. Just as the Army, the Navy, the Treasury, and the Office for Production Management have drawn upon competent civilians for assistance, so the special division of the State Department established to prepare for the peace conference can call upon the world of scholarship and experience for help. As we have seen, there is ample and wholly satisfactory precedent for that procedure in the United States, Great Britain, and France. There is no lack of experts and the staff work of diplomacy is

## *Prepare for Peace!*

not so esoteric that competent civilians cannot be mobilized in time of emergency.

Not all the assistance need come from individuals serving full time. The committee already functioning in the department has had the co-operation of endowed foundations, of university groups, and of other organizations which possess special competence in their personnel. That kind of co-operation should be encouraged, and could assist without in any way usurping official functions. There is work enough to be done so that officers should be eager to accept competent help from any source. One of the most encouraging developments so far has been the hospitable reception of such assistance.

Being a division of the Department of State, the special peace division would have a normal and official channel through which to find out precisely what the British Foreign Office is doing in preparation for the coming peace conference and also to learn about Canadian plans, as well as Australian points of view. The Secretary of State would thus have the fullest assurance that no secret treaties were withheld. Such a serious situation as arose through ignorance of the World War secret treaties could not occur again.

One of the features of this proposal most certain to be criticized is in reality a mark of strength. If this special peace division is in the hands of experienced diplomatic officers, they will be familiar with the de-

## *The Strategy of Peace*

pendence of the department upon precedent, which is the procedural reflection of the continuity both of problems and policies. Such men will not be deceived into that kind of extravagant hopefulness which has proposed so many utopian solutions and suffered so many disillusionments. It is, perhaps, the fault of professional diplomats, as of professional military men, that they tend more to conservatism than boldness. But in the tense and hectic atmosphere of a peace conference, solid, substantial, and precise points of view are a great safeguard. Limited objectives fully realized are better than dreams shattered in the morning.

The essential function of the proposed special division would not be to gather information. Data on almost any subject the peace conference will touch are available in bewildering quantities. The real task is to sift, evaluate, and interpret. The approach to this effort should be of the same general character as the advanced work at the Naval War College. We do not think it extraordinary for the navy to detach officers from active operations to seek intellectual solutions for possible or even probable military situations which may arise in the future. In the same way it is now possible to foresee and identify emerging diplomatic issues, and to undertake the severe intellectual work of analyzing, defining, and considering alternative solutions.

The result of these studies should be reported in brief but authoritative handbooks. Even more essen-

## *Prepare for Peace!*

tial, however, would be draft statements of policy, cast in alternate forms, providing explicit choices of clearly conceived action in different circumstances—including a not wholly satisfactory military outcome. Such statements should be extremely short, depending upon clarity rather than bulk. To express something complex with precision and brevity is hard intellectual work. It cannot be done in haste; it requires reflection. It must be done, not once but many times, each reformulation getting the whole into more compact compass, stating it in plainer and simpler terms, making more precise its definition of the interest of the United States, and exactly what obligations are involved in the protection or implementation of that interest.

Most competent students of diplomacy would agree that great national interests can be expressed within the compass of a few words. The policy of isolation outlined by Washington in his Farewell Address and the Monroe Doctrine furnish classic examples. A recent American illustration is the memorandum on our economic foreign policy given to the French Minister of Finance, M. Paul Reynaud, by Under Secretary Welles, March 9, 1940. It contained less than 350 words. It summarized a policy which had been actively discussed for seven years, and took advantage of the many previous expositions.

Drafts of alternative proposals can best be worked out in group discussions. That is one of the reasons for

## *The Strategy of Peace*

setting up the special peace division outside Washington, and in circumstances which would promote a method of attack for which there is relatively little opportunity in government offices. Again, the best analogy is furnished by the advanced work at the Naval War College. The solutions worked out there are not the achievement of a single man; they are the joint product of many minds, each attacking the problem in his own way, and then submitting his ideas to the criticism and clarification of other minds. A single expert is almost certain to have a viewpoint which lacks adequate breadth. His own formulation may not express the whole policy. That is especially likely to be the case where, as in so many instances, a political objective has profound economic, social, and even military and naval implications. The refinement of such statements should be the task of a group composed of men of different experience and training. They must work together in an atmosphere of relative leisure. Certainly the hurly-burly of Washington does not permit anything even approximating relative leisure, and interdepartmental committees meeting briefly and occasionally do not provide enough opportunity to develop harmony of outlook.

If the task of the special peace division is well done, there would be full assurance that the plenipotentiaries to the future conference would be well advised. There would be available to the commissions and committees



## *Prepare for Peace!*

not only experts but men experienced in diplomatic protocol and the exigencies of negotiation. It would not be necessary to transform scholars overnight into negotiators and drafting officers, as at Paris. They did extraordinarily well then, considering the circumstances, but it is not fair to them or to American interest again to attempt such a swift and drastic change in function.

### 7. A FOREIGN SERVICE COLLEGE

The problem of setting up the proposed special division would be greatly facilitated if the foreign service had long had a "foreign service college" on the model of the war colleges of the army and navy. There would then be available among foreign service officers a considerable group whose practical experience had been supplemented by the precise sort of reflective consideration of American policy which the special division should now undertake.

However greatly we regret that lack, it is clear that such an institution must wait the passing of the current crisis. It is not too much to hope that in connection with the special peace division some thought should be given to the eventual development of such a college. The location and quarters of the special division might well be selected with that eventuality in mind. As the work of the division develops, care could be taken to search out those officers who show the greatest adapta-

## *The Strategy of Peace*

bility to the new technique, and they could become leaders in the proposed enterprise.

There would be no waste involved in such an establishment. When one considers, for example, the importance of the work of Admiral Mahan, it is clear that the Naval War College justified itself from the start. His contributions to understanding the significance of sea power and the issues of naval strategy had a profound influence upon history. What he began and illustrated so brilliantly in his writings, other men have carried on. None have been so prolific in published studies, but others have been as original and as penetrating in the search for guiding principles and their application to characteristic naval problems. In that exercise many have been prepared for the competent discharge of crisis assignments.

The Department of State has been fortunate in being able to borrow scholars from the universities. But after the Inquiry returned from Paris, the scholars who composed it scattered to their several universities. While their experiences enriched their own instruction, the foreign service got no permanent benefit. If a foreign service college was established and the members gave profound study to the background, dimensions, and evolution of major diplomatic problems, they could return to the active service which would be enriched and strengthened by their work.

There is no lack of issues that would repay the kind

## *Prepare for Peace!*

of review that only such an organization could give. The Monroe Doctrine, for example, is a basic policy of the United States. But like any expression of political reality, it has had many vicissitudes and vast modifications. Many sensitive and complicated questions center in it, and will certainly do so in the future. The integrity of China and the "open door" in the Far East are two phases of a significant and much-challenged American policy. Certainly they need penetrating review. Those problems and also the great question of future relationships with Canada might well be studied jointly with the Army and Navy War Colleges. The commercial, political, and military strategies of the Far East are so intimately linked that a uniform method of attack upon their analysis would be of great value.

The study of the future peace treaty and of the problems growing out of its impact upon the international structure would furnish enough problems for years to come. The method has been explored and has proved its effectiveness in the colleges of the military services; it is desirable, even a pressing need of the foreign service. The military officers are usually offered this special opportunity when they are about to assume posts of higher command. It would be most appropriate for diplomats as they move to the position of counselor or chief-of-mission.

The cost would be small. The first item of expenditure would be a modest increase in the number of foreign service officers. The growth of the Army War Col-

## *The Strategy of Peace*

lege was greatly facilitated by a similar change in army policy. It used to be customary to operate the peacetime army with barely enough officers to direct it. When that policy was reversed, and in anticipation of crisis assignments the peacetime army was given an excess of officers, their detachment from regular duty for study at the war college was made readily possible. In order to establish and get the most from the foreign service college, there would have to be enough extra diplomatic officers to permit the detachment of some from regular assignments for a year of study.

Other costs would be modest. The head of the college should always be a foreign service officer. His salary would be that of an assistant secretary. He should be a man whose work during his own period of study at the college and in his active assignments abroad and in the department showed him to have special capabilities for this kind of position. The Naval War College has been successively under fifteen or twenty officers, and nearly all have made some distinctive contribution to its development into the brilliantly successful institution of today. The fact that the school now operated in the Department of State for its novices is so useful is evidence of its capacity to direct a college for advanced studies upon a level as high as the colleges of the armed services.

The building need not be elaborate or very large. Indeed it might be possible to add to the Naval War College at Newport and put the two institutions in juxta-

## *Prepare for Peace!*

position. That would allow the new college to have the advantage of a fine library which has taken many years and a considerable sum of money to assemble. Such a plan would also facilitate the exchange of students and joint attack upon problems of common interest.

Finally there should be a modest expenditure for the occasional lecturers who would be called in for the particular contributions they could make on special topics. They need not be many, and they could be borrowed from universities for brief periods. The major purpose of such an institution would be to encourage foreign service officers not so much to absorb new or technical knowledge as to sort out the significance of what they already know. Its function would be to make thought more orderly, more effective—and to give rein to imaginative and critical analysis of meanings.

Every university recognizes that the program of sabbatical leaves for mature members of its faculty is a necessity rather than a luxury. Similarly the two armed services have found that the gain which comes to officers who are rising to important positions of command is worth much more than the cost in time and money. There seems to be every reason to expect the foreign service to profit in similar manner and in like degree from a college for the advanced study of major diplomatic problems. The object of all such institutions is the same—clearer minds working at significant tasks in better perspective.

## THE TRANSITION TO PEACE

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### 1. THE ENVIRONMENT OF THE TREATY

WITH the signature and ratification of the treaties at the close of war, the strategy of peace enters its third phase. It is the slow process of recovering sanity after madness, a time of convalescence. The treaties initiate that process. Their ratification constitutes a dramatic rather than a decisive action; their proclamation achieves the form of peace; the substance remains to be developed.

At best the treaties cannot achieve the whole result, for they do not by any means constitute the entire international structure. There are vast geographical areas not touched at all, and others only slightly. The peace conference does not consider their problems, for neutrals do not usually attend. Moreover, many relationships between belligerents are merely suspended during war, and revert to a normal status at the end of the struggle, without being modified by the treaty of peace.

Nations, like individuals, live under a vast network of formal and informal relationships. An analogy between a peace treaty and the Constitution of the United

## *Prepare for Peace!*

States may be suggestive. Neither of them occupies its respective field completely or exclusively. An American citizen lives not only under the federal Constitution, but also under a state constitution, a county government, a city charter, and perhaps several other district agencies with taxing and other governmental powers. Moreover, he lives under an enormous complex of laws including the statute law of state and nation, common law, equity jurisdiction, ordinances, regulations, customs, and precedents. They are so many and so various that even a partial list seems terrifying. If we approached the matter speculatively, rather than upon the basis of experience, we might well conclude that the citizen, held legally to a knowledge of all rules and laws applicable to his actions, would be so bewildered that he could not function effectively. Yet so great is human adaptability that the ordinary individual acts with a great amount of freedom. Though the federal Constitution is the fundamental instrument of government under which he lives, only rarely does he feel its direct impact.

In the same way the series of treaties at the end of a world war is indubitably of fundamental importance. But those treaties do not stand by themselves. They become part of a vast complex of agreements, understandings, habits, and precedents by which international life is governed. Even international law, the status of which seems to many at this moment to be highly equivocal,

## *The Transition to Peace*

emerges from the smoke of war as an important force, and one which by the very nature of things must increase in importance. As there can be no personal freedom without law, so peace, which is freedom for international action upon a constructive plane, cannot exist without the dominance of law over impulse and desire.

Most of the daily activities of a citizen are not governed by the Constitution. Much of life is completely outside its scope. Similarly treaties at the end of war have no effect upon an infinite number of matters which lie beyond those immediately at issue between the signatories. So, while these instruments initiate peace between specific parties, they have little or no effect on strife or on peaceful relationships elsewhere. This fact was copiously illustrated at the close of the last world war. Violence did not cease when the treaties were signed, and a tremendous number of vital issues were dealt with wholly outside the framework of the peace, even though signatory nations were often involved.

Although Russia constituted then, as now, an exceedingly important area in the world's politics, it was not a party to the peace treaties. Events of profound importance relating to it remained to be dealt with entirely outside the deliberations of the conference at Paris. For example, Russia had recognized Poland by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk; Austria did likewise by the Treaty of St. Germain; Poland's boundary with Germany was established by the Treaty of Versailles. How-



## *Prepare for Peace!*

ever, Poland was ambitious and had an appetite for land. Taking advantage of the great civil war raging in Russia, the new nation went to war in 1920 to seize the Ukraine. For five and a half months the war continued, Poland receiving military aid from France and support from an Allied blockade. The Treaty of Riga which closed that war was by no means a part of the treaty structure designed at the Conference of Paris.

Russia also illustrates another aspect of international politics outside the peace treaties. It had fallen into revolutionary ferment early in 1917, and for more than two years a state of civil war continued. In a country so vast there was unlimited opportunity for counter-revolutionary activity. Because the communist revolution was designed to be world wide, other powers regarded it as their common enemy and counter-revolutionaries were given moral, material, and even physical assistance. So strange are the bedfellows of revolution that in at least one instance in 1918 the Germans backed a moderate government in one district of Russia, and after the armistice with Germany, France gave support to the same elements, though for different reasons. A puppet government in northern Russia was maintained by an Allied intervention through Murmansk and Archangel; intervention in Siberia was a mixture of invasion and counter-revolution. The liquidation of all these various enterprises took years. It was not merely a domestic matter but an international proc-

## *The Transition to Peace*

ess which fell outside the scope of the Paris treaty settlements.

Revolution was by no means confined to Russia. China was a cauldron seething with a revolution so complex that no occidental can fully comprehend it. Hungary, after declaring its independence of Austria, was first a republic, then a communist state under the terrifying Bela Kun, then a monarchy with a regent but no king. When the king returned and started to march on Budapest, violence followed and he was exiled. The fascist revolution in Italy was a forcible response to communist activity and governmental demoralization. All these manifestations illustrate the disorderly aftermath of war. Their liquidation required separate acts or agreements, quite outside the work of the peace conference.

War is a deep infection of the international body politic, and breaks out in many places and in strange ways. Once violence is accepted as a mode of settlement, it is adopted not only by governments but by private groups and even by individuals. After so great a war as the last, there are bound to be sporadic outbursts of filibustering and a good deal of irregular fighting. The most famous among these incidents was the bizarre combination of private war, revolution, and conquest at Fiume. Italy, bitterly disappointed at having been denied Fiume by the peace conference, sought compensations elsewhere. But the Italian poet and sol-

## *Prepare for Peace!*

dier, D'Annunzio, unwilling to accept the denial of Fiume, gathered a band of volunteers and took the city. When disavowed by the Italian government, he declared war upon it, and was ejected from Fiume by force. In 1922, however, a Fascist coup again led to Italian occupation with a promise of independence, but in 1924 the promise was broken and the region annexed.

Filibusters and irregulars played active parts in the three-year dispute over Vilna, which city was at issue among Poland, Russia, and Lithuania. Similarly in the conflict between Poland and Czechoslovakia over Teschen, in the struggle between Austria and Hungary for Burgenland, and in upper Silesia, revolutionaries, insurrectionists, irregulars, and filibusters were involved. Sometimes such activities were officially supported, sometimes countenanced, occasionally suppressed. It is safe to say that violence in one form or another was prevalent in over twenty places after "peace" had come.

Moreover, a great many important issues not involving the use of force were entirely outside the scope of the treaties of peace. Such, for example, were the involved questions arising from the desire for recognition on the part of the new Baltic states, Finland, Latvia, Esthonia, and Lithuania. In addition, the neutrals had many interests which were profoundly affected by the new order and needed consideration. Yet these states had no real part in the Paris Peace Conference; they

## *The Transition to Peace*

were invited to appear, but their "week-end" attendance proved to be a farcical performance.

To deal with such European questions in the years immediately following the signature of the great treaties, a whole series of international conferences was held. In a period of five years the Baltic states, for example, had nineteen such meetings in order to discuss a wide range of topics, such as their relationship to Russia, economic questions, disarmament, railway problems, proposals for arbitration, and prevention of smuggling. During the same period the Little Entente engaged in nine international conferences dealing with their own boundary disputes, economic and financial questions, as well as political interests. There were larger conferences sometimes, as at Genoa, attended by most of the governments of Europe and the British dominions. Seventeen such international gatherings, varying in size and scope, dealt with many topics, such as trade-marks, financial and economic reconstruction, as well as questions of high politics. There were seven conferences on labor which were somewhat related to the peace treaties, but not wholly so, and two conferences of the International Postal Union, all before 1925. The system of conferences in Europe culminated at Locarno.

Several important international conferences were likewise held during the post-war years in the Americas. The United States had long exercised an active influence in Central America; such an interest was bound

## *Prepare for Peace!*

to become increasingly vital as the Panama Canal grew in importance. In 1922 a Central American conference held in Washington resulted in eleven conventions and three protocols dealing with a whole series of issues. The next year delegates from eighteen of the twenty-one American republics met for the Fifth Pan-American Conference at Santiago, Chile; four conventions were signed, and there was a discussion of permanent significance regarding the Monroe Doctrine.

In 1921 and 1922 the Washington Conference was held to deal with the reduction of naval armament, as well as Pacific and Far Eastern questions. Representatives of thirteen states attended and a series of treaties was negotiated, all of which were ultimately ratified. They halted the Japanese policy of aggression for a period and supplied relief from naval competition then desperately needed.

It is indicative of the significant role of international conferences and the diplomatic structure of the world that in 1928 the State Department set up a Division of International Conferences and Protocol and then in 1937 separated it into two divisions, devoting one entire division to international conferences. This is eloquent evidence of the fact that as a method of dealing with questions in which many states have an interest, the conference system is firmly established and will indubitably play a significant role after the peace treaties are signed at the close of the present war.

## *The Transition to Peace*

Besides these international meetings, there were the continuous interplay of normal diplomatic activity and all the bilateral treaties which belong to the same post-war period. In four years the United States negotiated over eighty treaties with thirty-one countries on nearly fifty different subjects. Other nations were equally active. The number of such treaties is legion, and the range of topics dealt with is as wide as international interests.

No pretense of a diplomatic history of the period is involved in this discussion. It is designed merely as a series of suggestions regarding the range, volume, and significance of international action outside the direct scope of the peace treaties in the years immediately following the last world war. It provides all the evidence needed to support the assertion that the treaties of peace did not dominate international life because of the enormously significant and vital range of activities quite outside their purview.

In a period overwhelmed with its own troubles and discontented with its own progress toward the ideal of peace, there is a strong tendency to believe that its unhappy experiences are unique. And sometimes reference is made to the Congress of Vienna and to the hundred years of peace between that classic gathering and the World War in 1914. But if one takes even a casual glance at the experience of the fifteen years succeeding the Congress of Vienna, it will be observed

## *Prepare for Peace!*

that it was a stormy and difficult time. In that respect it was not unlike the period after the World War.

There was a marked degree of restlessness throughout the world, and where it was suppressed, it manifested itself in secret societies, plots, and assassinations. In 1815 France suffered the White Terror after Louis XVIII came back in the "baggage of the Allies," and fanatical royalists treated Bonapartists and revolutionaries with great brutality. In England disturbances were so acute that by the Coercion Acts of 1817 habeas corpus was suspended, a rare event in British history. For two years, from 1815 to 1817, a combination of rebellion against the Turks and civil war between rival families marked the second Serbian insurrection. The Albanian regiments in the army of Mohammed Ali in Egypt revolted in 1815. In Spain insurrection broke out in 1820 and the king was virtually a prisoner until 1823. Shortly thereafter France had a series of conspiracies and military plots and Russia the Decembrist rising in 1825.

Some of the rebellions were so violent as to be revolutionary in character. In 1820 there were revolutions in Portugal and the Kingdom of Naples, in 1821 in the Kingdom of Piedmont; in 1830 revolution swept France and sections of Germany, Belgium broke loose from the Dutch, and the great Polish revolution flared up. During this period, and intimately connected with

## *The Transition to Peace*

events in Europe, revolutions in Latin America finally loosened that continent from its European masters.

The same years saw many wars: the conquest of the Sudan by Egypt, the long Greek war for independence in which Britain and Russia played significant parts, war between Russia and Persia, war between Russia and Turkey, and the French seizure of Algiers. In addition to these wars, there were several punitive expeditions and interventions. It seems to be amply evident, therefore, that beyond the reach of the treaties which end a great war are the dislocations and difficulties which the outbreak of violence upon a great scale is certain to bring in its train.

It is clear, however, that the international environment of the treaties following 1815, and again after 1919, affected the development of the interpretation of those treaties in action; and there were also many sorts of activity which had a direct effect upon the viability of the peace treaties. Indeed, it may be said with some assurance that there were evidences of the same kinds of disorder, strife, and conflict in the fifteen years after Vienna as in the years after Versailles. Only the advantage of hindsight permits us to say the prospects of peace were much better in 1830 than in 1930.

### 2. INTERPRETATION OF THE TREATY IN ACTION

The peace treaties are only part of the intricate fabric of international life. Moreover they are not so



## *Prepare for Peace!*

stable as the imposing signatures and formal seals would indicate. Even when the text of the treaty is fixed, its phraseology is by no means wholly decisive. Any written instrument is only half done when the text is completed, or even less than half done.

The acid test is the treaty in action. Its interpretation in words, through discussion, commentary, judicial decision, and diplomatic correspondence, begins as soon as it is drafted. Its even more decisive interpretation in deeds endows the original text with a reality which may be quite different from the expectations and intentions embodied in the treaty at an international conference. Its evolution proceeds not for a brief time only, but continuously, as long as it is regarded as a valid document among the signatory parties. That evolution may be informal, and often, at any given moment, unnoticed or misunderstood. Or it may be formal and consciously directed as, for example, when the treaty is amended by mutual agreement. In all political documents change is inevitable, and the course of evolution is not dictated or controlled by the opinions of those who drafted and signed the original instrument. The decisive factor is the course of thought to which it is made to conform.

A parallel may illuminate the point. Americans are proud that their Constitution has survived for a vastly longer period than any other modern instrument of government. Nonetheless, the beginnings of our na-

## *The Transition to Peace*

tional government were not wholly promising. The Constitution was not the first but the second fundamental law. The Articles of Confederation, the result of the first such effort, were not intended to be temporary; they were designed to supply a stable basis of operations. They were not drafted hastily or carelessly, but were under consideration for more than a year. They were framed by men as patriotic as those who labored through the summer of 1787 in Philadelphia. Indeed nine men who were in Congress while the Confederation was framed later attended the Convention in Philadelphia, among them Benjamin Franklin, Roger Sherman, and John Dickinson, who had been chairman of the committee to draft the Articles. Also in Congress at the time were Thomas Jefferson and John Adams. Moreover, the document was given long and earnest consideration by the states before adoption. Many believed it an ideal constitution. There were critics, of course, but they were no more caustic than some who discussed the Constitution when it was later submitted for ratification. Yet the historical verdict is that the Articles of Confederation failed.

When we are tempted to be scornful of the men at Paris who so egregiously failed to set up a successful world structure in 1919, it is worth while reminding ourselves that the founding fathers of our nation, those patriots whose courage and wisdom we have quite properly applauded, did not succeed in their first effort

## *Prepare for Peace!*

to form a union. Likewise the first efforts to draw up other treaties of peace have failed. The final act of Vienna, which was to form the basis of European politics for years, was not yet signed when the interlude of the Hundred Days threw it temporarily into the discard. And it was not until the four great powers—Britain, Prussia, Russia, and Austria—victorious over Napoleon for a second time, had reknit their alliance in a semi-permanent form that the chances for European peace became really promising.

The attempts to establish an American federal government present further parallels with the growth of an international structure of peace. Even the second trial of the founding fathers came perilously close to failure on several occasions—in the Convention at Philadelphia, during the process of ratification by the states, and afterward as late as the War between the States. The document, called by Gladstone “the most wonderful work ever struck off at a given time by the brain and purpose of man,” was long the subject of extremely violent controversy. The Constitution was ratified in state conventions by a series of narrow margins, and only on the implicit understanding that it would be promptly amended. In fact the first ten amendments were essential to its initial acceptability. Furthermore, for all their wisdom, the framers provided no steam for the boilers of the new engine of government. In their effort to avoid factionalism, they

## *The Transition to Peace*

attempted government without political parties. But it soon transpired that parties were essential, and the Constitution had to be amended to recognize their reality.

Furthermore, the government in action has become something quite different from the government which its founders had in mind. The bare bones of the Constitution have been clothed with the substance of precedent. Not infrequently these acts appear to be at variance with the text. The President has appointed, and few now would challenge his right to appoint, certain types of "ambassadors" without the advice and consent of the Senate. At least two classes of "treaties" are not submitted to it for advice and consent. Executive agreements are a development never envisioned by the framers.

We speak of the Constitution as our organic law. It is a happy phrase, for it reminds us that an organism has an unpredictable future. When a baby is born, he is handsome to some, ugly to others, and ridiculous to many. Whether his life will be long or short, no one can know. Whether he will have health and strength or be feeble, no chart of his ancestry can tell. He may be the child of gifted parents and be stupid, or of dull parents and turn out brilliant. A thousand times ten thousand incidents and accidents will affect his growth, development, decline, and death. So it is with an organic instrument. The best laid schemes "gang aft

## *Prepare for Peace!*

a-gley." On the other hand a most unpromising document may survive and become increasingly useful. Magna Carta furnishes an illustration; it could never have exercised a vital influence unless it had come to be misinterpreted. By tradition it has attained a modern significance quite at variance with its meaning in 1215. Gladstone said, "The British Constitution is the most subtle organism which has proceeded from progressive history." His eulogy of the American Constitution would have been more accurate if he had described it in similar terms rather than regarding it as having been completed at "a single stroke."

The survival of an organic law and its long use do not prove that it is perfect, or that it necessarily grows toward perfection with the years. Some parts become more easily and freely effective, others operate with difficulty, and evolution may increase rather than decrease these difficulties. From the moment the Constitution became operative, the treaty-making provisions offered difficulties. When George Washington appeared before the Senate, in an effort to carry out those provisions, his experience led to chagrin and irritation. The behavior of the senators upon that and a subsequent occasion when he attempted to confer in person led to a reversal of precedent which destroyed one of the expectations of the framers. But it was over a hundred years before it seemed likely that the co-operation of the President and Senate would break down and

## *The Transition to Peace*

the treaty power be stalemated. Then, after a tense period, ways and means were found to carry on, but never with ease or complete satisfaction. The Constitution in operation is uneven in its virtues, like any other document; some of its serious defects cannot be removed by amendment, because of political obstacles.

We know that environment has an important influence upon any organism. The fact that the fate of a child cannot be foretold at birth does not mean that his life cannot be influenced by care and skillful attention. Growth can be stimulated by proper diet and hygiene; many a weakling has become an effective adult. So it is with an organic instrument, such as a constitution or a peace treaty. A promising beginning is desirable, but if it survives at all, its future is not hopeless. The process of change sets in early and is continuous, although the direction of the change is not fixed. It may be altered again and again.

Therefore, just as it is stupid to take the fatalistic attitude that "the war makes the peace," so it is equally stupid to insist that the Versailles Treaty caused the present war. Many took a critical attitude concerning that document from the start. With pharisaical self-righteousness, they denounced the treaty, washed their hands of responsibility, and with sardonic relish watched the world fulfill Wilson's prophecy and go down the road to Hell. Such people, despite their gestures, are no less responsible for the current war than

## *Prepare for Peace!*

“the old men” of the Paris Peace Conference. A treaty merely gives direction to events, or rather it indicates the direction of men’s thoughts. That direction can be changed, not once, but many times.

The responsibility for the pace and direction of the change does not rest with the victors alone. During the process by which the treaty is developing in action, the defeated nation has an opportunity to exert tremendous influence. Even though a treaty is “dictated,” its interpretation, its amendment, formal or informal, cannot continue to be imposed by the victor upon the vanquished. The effect of victory is too transitory. Shrewd, continuous, and forceful policies give the defeated party great influence. The program and action of Stresemann, for example, in the later twenties were modifying the effect of the treaty in one manner; the action and policy of Hitler in the thirties altered the treaty in a wholly different way.

The Versailles Treaty was not a good treaty; but it was about as good an instrument as is likely to be drawn at the close of a long, bitter, and exhausting war by statesmen whose first preoccupation is certain to be continuance in office. Though it was not a good treaty, it was nonetheless better than it is now given credit for having been. Its failure was due in some measure to its inherent faults, but even more to its interpretation and modification in action.

For a time it seemed that constructive action would

## *The Transition to Peace*

make it a workable, if not wholly satisfactory, instrument. If the "spirit of Locarno" had persisted, its history might have been one of gradual and expanding success. Such positive attempts would have led to a constructive evolution. If the United States had joined the League of Nations, and if it had continued to gain competence and increase its prestige as it did for several years, an effective agency for peaceful change might have been developed. If the World Court had secured the adherence of the United States and had gained prestige by its exposition of international law in settling disputes between nations, still another effective instrument for the transformation of the treaty in action would have existed. But in spite of many constructive measures and instrumentalities, the dominant tone through the years became negative rather than positive, so that the ultimate evolution of the treaty was degenerative. The responsibility for that development did not rest with the men who made the treaty; they had long since retired from office. Responsibility rested with those who shirked their opportunities and duties under it. Blame must be assigned to men who failed either to accept or modify it, either to enforce it or make it enforceable.

This should be a reminder, as we contemplate the liquidation of the present war, that as the armistice does not end the war, so the treaty does not make the peace. Both are dramatic incidents in a continuous



## *Prepare for Peace!*

process. War is simply the culmination of a long decline of dependence upon consent and consensus, upon reason and compromise; it evolves from a growing accent upon force, potential or actual—force as a threat or in action. Peace, on the other hand, is the fruit of a long period during which budding faith in good will and in reason comes at last to flower. The transition from hatred to friendship cannot be swift; the emotional pace cannot be hurried.

### 3. VIENNA AND VERSAILLES

Fundamental problems, such as peace, are never completely solved. When crises in their evolution occur, there are marked similarities in the attempts at amelioration, and in the results. Thus, though history does not repeat itself, recurring experiences are worthy of study and analysis. Past events throw light on present problems.

This generation is acutely aware of the Treaty of Versailles and its failure. We may gain some perspective upon its strengths and weaknesses by looking back a hundred years to the Congress of Vienna, making comparisons and contrasts between what was done then and what was done in our own time at the Conference of Paris.

Both came at the end of long and exhausting wars, and both were dominated by a single idea: this must not happen again. Quiet and a period of recovery

## *The Transition to Peace*

were passionately desired. Therefore both sought to hold in leash the aggressive power and frowned upon the system of ideas which seemed to have made that nation aggressive. Neither treaty embodied a political philosophy or ideology; both were dominated by hope of stability. But the ideals of the aggressor and his aggression were so firmly identified with each other that the peace had the effect of disapproving and distrusting a system of ideas as well as the nation which exemplified them. In 1815 it was France and the ideas identified with its troublesomeness which fell under the ban. In 1919 Germany and its ideology were in the minds of the peace-makers.

The French Revolution challenged the dominant forces of the eighteenth century. On the political side, the monarch had been supreme. The famous assertion attributed to Louis XIV, "I am the state," expressed the reality. The head of the state treated his subjects with such affection, wisdom, or prudence as he possessed, but he was the master, they the servants, of the state. Benevolent despotism might do much in a paternal way, but its gifts were not obligatory. Colonies were owned in order to be exploited, and commerce under the mercantile system was managed in the political interest of the state rather than to the real economic benefit of the people.

These dominant characteristics of the age had been challenged intellectually by writers in England, and

## *Prepare for Peace!*

then in France. But it was in France that criticism eventuated in violent action, and the blaze of revolution kindled there swept from country to country. Liberty, fraternity, equality were proposed as substitutes for despotism, the caste system, and privilege. Kings found that with such ideas abroad, thrones were not safe, and peace impossible. When the Revolution was captured and prostituted by Napoleon, his organizing skill and military genius made its political heresies even more terrifying.

It was almost inevitable, therefore, that when Napoleon was finally defeated and banished, every effort should be made to organize the peace in such a way that France could not again menace the world. The way to prove that revolution did not pay was to restore the things revolution had sought to overthrow. The Bourbons were the very symbol of dynastic continuity; the Bourbons were restored, and legitimacy became the watchword. The dynastic state not the national state, the rulers not the people were the essential materials employed by the architects of a restored Europe. Privilege was again enthroned, the citizen was no longer master. Liberalism and nationality were sacrificed to the "safety of . . . States, and . . . the general tranquillity of Europe." Those forces, said the Congress of Vienna, were to be curbed precisely because they were the "Revolutionary principles which upheld the last criminal usurpation" and "might

## *The Transition to Peace*

again . . . convulse France, and thereby endanger the repose of other States.”<sup>1</sup>

However natural such a reaction may have been, Americans then and since have regarded it as hostile to the interests of the United States. This nation was the product of revolution; indeed it had provided some of the stimulus for the French Revolution. Referring to the Declaration of Independence, John Quincy Adams said that it “made certain a revolution which would ultimately overthrow all of the absolutist governments of the earth.” Later Abraham Lincoln declared that the document “meant not alone liberty to this country but for all the world and all future time.” Obviously President Roosevelt is not the first to demand “a world founded upon . . . essential freedoms” equally available “everywhere in the world.” It was by way of prophecy that the Great Seal of the United States bore the Latin inscription, a “new order of the ages.”

This nation was specifically committed to the aggressive principles which the Congress of Vienna sought to curb. It did not propose war on their behalf but looked upon revolutionary strife as sometimes necessary. The author of the Declaration of Independence expressed the thought cogently: “The tree of liberty must be refreshed from time to time with the blood

<sup>1</sup> C. K. Webster, *The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 1815-1822* (London, 1925), p. 54.

## *Prepare for Peace!*

of patriots and tyrants. It is its natural manure." Such doctrine was enough to make the blood run cold in statesmen seeking peace and stability.

The United States remained the active enemy of the reactionary principles of Vienna. Everything within the limits of prudence was done to stimulate revolution in Latin America. Propaganda in favor of liberal and republican institutions was spread by agents dispatched for that purpose. Ultimately the program of the European reactionaries came face to face with the policy of the United States. The Russian minister, Baron Tuyl, delivered a lecture to Secretary of State John Quincy Adams upon the principles of Vienna; the response was a tart exposition of republican and liberal principles. The Congress of Verona seemed to be moving to restore Latin America to Spain; in response the Monroe Doctrine warned Russia from the Pacific coast and Spain from Central and South America; it declared that "the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintained, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers."

Resistance by the United States to the principles of the Congress of Vienna was not limited to this hemisphere. Every opportunity was exploited to encourage liberal and nationalist revolutionaries in Europe. American diplomatic agents were active in the revolu-

## *The Transition to Peace*

tions of 1848, for example. One went so far as to draft a constitution for Germany. Recognition was granted at the earliest moment to revolutionary governments; and if insurrection failed, the United States offered not only asylum but acclaim to those whom European statesmen regarded as incendiaries. Daniel Webster, as Secretary of State, wrote in answer to a protest from the Austrian chargé d'affaires:

Certainly, the United States may be pardoned, even by those who profess adherence to the principles of absolute government, if they entertain an ardent affection for those popular forms of political organization which have so rapidly advanced their own prosperity and happiness, and enabled them . . . to bring their country . . . to the notice and respectful regard, not to say admiration, of the civilized world.<sup>2</sup>

As long as the principles of the Congress of Vienna retained any vitality, they met the continuous hostility and the active opposition of American policy.

The attempt by that congress to sacrifice liberal and national ideals to peace was a failure. The spirit of nationalism continued to grow, and the principle of the monarchical state to wane. This was dramatically illustrated by the Greek war for independence, which attracted the support of liberals everywhere. Germany

<sup>2</sup> *The Works of Daniel Webster* (Boston, 1851), VI, 496.

## *Prepare for Peace!*

and Italy, before the century was out, furnished other conspicuous examples. The process of "self-determination" was by no means complete, but the moral ascendancy of the principle was assured.

Also the spirit of liberalism made head against the system embodied in the Vienna settlement. Popular government steadily supplanted despotism. The revolutions of 1830 and 1848 were evidence that liberal ideas had vitality, and with occasional set-backs they moved toward realization. Constitutions were granted even in such dynastic absolutisms as Russia and Japan; neither very liberal nor wholly sincere, they were nevertheless a sign of the times.

Mercantilism, the characteristic state economy of the eighteenth century, went the way of legitimacy and despotism. It was smashed by the impact of capitalism and the dynamics of the industrial revolution. Doctrinaire free trade and complete laissez faire were never realized, but their opposite was discredited.

It is not too much to assert that the political ideals of the Congress of Vienna were practically destroyed in the course of the nineteenth century. By its close liberal ideas no longer displayed an explosive or revolutionary character. Faced with less and less effective opposition, these doctrines lost the fervor of aggressiveness. There was more and more dependence for complete success upon time and momentum as opposed to energy and revolution. The peaceful mode

## *The Transition to Peace*

of gradualism and compromise blunted the sharpness of their dogmas; definitions became blurred as progress became pacific. Achieving success, liberalism yielded the initiative to its beaten rival. Revolution had become peaceful!

To complete the ideological reversal of alliances, reaction became belligerent. At the beginning of the twentieth century the demand for a place in the sun came from a state which had short-circuited genuine liberalism by supplying its material benefits without its spiritual content. The state socialism of Bismarck was benevolent despotism with a heavy accent on benevolence. Germany, with its essentially reactionary political system, became the expansive force which had been so long exemplified by France. Through pursuing an aggressive policy, first in Europe, then in the search for empire, Germany, during a half century, expanded its frontiers at the expense of its neighbors, made Austria-Hungary a satellite, acquired a colonial empire, and bade fair to dominate the Balkans and the Middle East. The reversal was complete. France achieved its revolution and the ideas that had inspired it lost their aggressive character; they offered no challenge to peace. Germany exemplified the old doctrines of monarchy and reaction, but rattled the saber, and was held to have precipitated the World War.

When the passage at arms was finished, the Kaiser was in exile, like Napoleon a century before. But as



## *Prepare for Peace!*

the men of Vienna feared France, even though the Bourbons were restored, so the men of Paris feared Germany, even though a republic had been proclaimed. In both cases the reason was the same—fear of the resurgence of the vanquished idea.

The Conference of Paris, therefore, was intent upon making it impossible for Germany to set the world ablaze once more. The method followed an old formula: Germany was stripped of colonies, reduced in size, disarmed and subjected to an army of occupation during a probationary period, saddled with reparations payments, and ringed about with a watchful alliance. Knowing full well that a nation could not be chained forever, the Allied statesmen made an attack upon the ideas Germany typified. This was facilitated by two events which had occurred almost simultaneously, the collapse of Russia and the declaration of war by the United States. The fall of the Czar relieved the Associated Powers of an embarrassing ideological inconsistency. The participation of the United States set the stage for a liberal interpretation of the war.

All that had been said for the liberal point of view by Jefferson, John Quincy Adams, Webster, and others furnished background for Woodrow Wilson. A nation which had made a hemisphere safe for democracy by the Monroe Doctrine sought to do the same for the whole world. Not having a secret treaty to its name, it could demand open covenants. Having insisted upon

## *The Transition to Peace*

the right of twenty American republics, some very small, to choose their own way of life, it could maintain that the same right should be exercised in Europe. As the most successful great federation of states in history, it could envisage a league of free nations as a natural step along the path of progress. On the analogy of the Supreme Court, which renders judicial decisions between the sovereign states of the Union, the United States could continue to strive, as it had since 1899, for a world court with comparable jurisdiction among the nations.

All these ideas were associated and even identified with the concept of peace. It was in order to achieve safety in 1919 that monarchs were swept away; with them was to disappear the authoritarian principle and the militarist ideal. Henceforth, as President Roosevelt was later to phrase it, "war by governments shall be changed to peace by peoples." Not states but peoples furnished the pattern; even small fragments of population, if they were cohesive and exhibited a national spirit, gained recognition. What had been achieved for Latin America, Germany, Italy, and others in the nineteenth century was extended in the twentieth to Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Esthonia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and many more.

Thus the Congress of Vienna and the Conference of Paris, though a century apart, sought in similar ways to guard the peace. Each did it by fixing a monitory

## *Prepare for Peace!*

eye upon a great and vigorous power. Each fortified its work by giving preference to ideological concepts associated with peace and the victorious powers. But both reveal the fact, shown many times before, that force will associate itself equally with opposite ideas under different circumstances. Absolutist France had been as disturbing to the peace of Europe as revolutionary France; and now again authoritarian states are the aggressors. All history furnishes clear evidence that aggressive ideas cannot be suppressed by force. Defeat may bring momentary discredit, victory may supply brief kudos. But treaties cannot quarantine a political creed. Ideas must be beaten upon a plane other than physical, and by instruments quite unlike guns.

Both the Congress of Vienna and the Conference of Paris set up instrumentalities to continue their work. Both sets of agencies, those of the nineteenth century and those of the twentieth, ultimately came to a common impotence. The course of that decline will show that the absence of world war in the nineteenth century was not due to the wisdom and foresight of the statesmen of Vienna. They saw no further ahead than the men of Paris. Friedrich von Gentz noted his opinion on the day the Final Act was signed at Vienna in 1815: "The Congress has resulted in . . . agreements between the Great Powers, of little value for the future balance and preservation of the peace of Europe. . . . The Protocol of the Congress bears

## *The Transition to Peace*

the stamp rather of a temporary agreement than of work destined to last for centuries.”<sup>3</sup> His judgment was abundantly justified.

### 4. THE INSTRUMENTALITIES OF THE PEACE

Just as each vanquished nation suffered penalties and the ostracism of its ideas in both 1815 and 1919, so also there is a marked similarity in the instrumentalities employed by the victorious powers. The two international conferences, despite the range of their decisions, were forced to leave many questions, settled only in principle, to be worked out in practice. To that end in each instance committees or commissions were set up to determine the details. In 1815 they were concerned, for example, with the abolition of the slave trade, the Barbary pirates, boundary problems. In 1919 plebiscites, boundaries, repatriation of prisoners, and other topics were referred to such commissions. It transpired in both cases that the representatives of the several powers on these committees were often divided on questions of policy and had to refer disputed points to their governments.

After the Paris Conference in 1919 these committees reported to a Conference of Ambassadors of the Allied powers resident in Paris. That body was self-constituted; it was not established by the treaty or any other formal instrument. It met once a week to hear reports

<sup>3</sup> Quoted in *The Cambridge Modern History* (Cambridge, 1902-12), X, 2.

## *Prepare for Peace!*

and take whatever decisions were necessary to make the treaty operative. Some committees finished their tasks, the work of others proved abortive; the conference itself found the essential unanimity more and more difficult to attain. In the course of a relatively short time that informal organization ceased to function.

The Conference of Ambassadors after 1815 was more formally organized, being provided for in the treaty of peace. It met, moreover, in the capital of the defeated nation, in sharp contrast to its twentieth century counterpart. Furthermore, it was given supervisory functions regarding the domestic life of the beaten power; it was to receive daily reports from the king's government, and was free to offer "advice" on internal or foreign policy. This counsel was likely to be persuasive as long as there was an army of occupation, which also came within the sphere of the conference. There was danger that such a body would enlarge its office, and Castlereagh, the British Foreign Secretary, insisted that the ambassadors "be kept within the bounds of their original institution and not be suffered to present themselves as an European Council for the management of the affairs of the world." In point of fact, however, the conference was really held together by the Duke of Wellington, the commander of the army of occupation. The Conference of Ambas-

## *The Transition to Peace*

sadors was generally so divided in policy that it inevitably fell into impotence.

More important as an instrumentality of peace was a series of international congresses held after the treaties had become operative. The sixth article of the Final Act at Vienna in 1815 provided that the powers should "renew their meetings at fixed periods . . . for the consideration of the measures which . . . shall be . . . the most salutary for the repose and prosperity of Nations and for the maintenance of the peace of Europe."<sup>4</sup> The meetings, therefore, were not limited to issues arising from the treaties, but were concerned with any European diplomatic problem in which the powers were interested. Their acts were to be "for the happiness of the world."

This conference system had the appearance of a real confederation of Europe. But beneath its formal unity there was a deep rift of opinion. England was loath to permit interference in the domestic affairs of individual states, even the internal affairs of France. The British were too far committed to the principle of nationality and their budding liberalism was too far advanced to permit wholehearted co-operation in such a program.

Government by conference did not have its first real test for three years. The decision to meet at "fixed periods" was honored in the breach, and the powers

<sup>4</sup> Webster, *op. cit.*, p. 55.

## *Prepare for Peace!*

awaited an issue of sufficient magnitude to draw them together. The problem of the army of occupation furnished the occasion. The status of such troops is always equivocal and grows more so with each passing month. Wellington realized that his forces were spread so thin as to be in danger in case of an uprising. In 1818 the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle met to consider this and other accumulated issues. It was a gala occasion with full dress representation. Evacuation of the occupied region and settlement of the indemnity levied upon France were speedily disposed of.

Then the statesmen faced a fateful issue: when should France be admitted to the Concert of Europe? Alexander of Russia felt that the revolutionary fire was burning in the embers and might flare up. Metternich thought the admission of France would create an ideological inconsistency, "an amalgam of the conservative principle with that of innovation, of the remedy with the very evil it was intended to cure, of stability with movement, of security with risk." Prussia also felt itself menaced now that France was no longer held in leash and hesitated to make a partner of so suspicious a character. Great Britain, as usual, was for taking France in and getting on with it. The solution was a characteristic diplomatic "formula"—two alliances, one including France and a second excluding France. The recent enemy was to be a colleague when the powers were dealing with European questions, an

## *The Transition to Peace*

outsider when its own behavior was under consideration. The real consequence was a stiffening of the British attitude against interference in the internal affairs of states and a total unwillingness to become involved in any obligation to employ what the twentieth century called "sanctions." Great Britain was showing evidences of that "isolationism" which reflected its insular position.

Nonetheless the congress at Aix had great prestige. Of the questions brought before it for consideration, some were settled with clarity and firmness, some were compromised, some referred to committees, others debated and postponed. Unhappily postponement was the fate of some important questions. The reason was simple: the powers could prescribe bitter pills for others, but they gagged at taking their own medicine. When a significant interest of a great power was involved, harmony went out of the Concert. Moreover, much as they feared their old enemy, France, their fears of each other were scarcely less intense. The inevitable disintegration of alliances was in process.

In the interim between the adjournment of the congress at Aix in 1818 and its reassembly at Troppau in 1820, the contrariety of interest among the powers was illustrated again and again. It was not a good augury that the new conference was to deal with revolution in Spain and Italy, and that the purpose of Metternich was armed intervention. Britain was adamant; it was



## *Prepare for Peace!*

ready to fulfill its treaty obligations, but quite unready to engage in "a species of general government" to deal with "all objects present and future, foreseen and unforeseen." Castlereagh absented himself; his representative had no plenipotentiary powers, but was permitted only to "report." Under these circumstances all that could be done was to state a principle which Great Britain was certain to repudiate.

The Laibach conference was a continuation of Troppau, and widened the breach still further. The implicit opposition of theory and policy between Britain and the powers of Eastern Europe became explicit. Discord could no longer be denied. Before the Congress of Verona met in 1822 Castlereagh was dead. He had attended only one of the congresses after Vienna, and if he had gone to Verona, he would doubtless have reached the same decision to break the conference system made by his successor, Canning. The Congress of Verona decided upon intervention to suppress revolution in Spain and glanced in the direction of forcing a return of Spain's lost American colonies. The intervention was carried out, but Great Britain would participate no more in what Canning called the "European Areopagus." "England is under no obligation to interfere or to assist in interfering in the internal concerns of independent nations."

By 1822 the alliance was effectively broken and by 1830 the formal treaty fabric was seriously modified.

## *The Transition to Peace*

The structure which was to secure peace was destroyed in seven years after the Congress of Vienna. That does not mean that there were no more international conferences. The nineteenth century saw many. They were *ad hoc* gatherings, however, called to deal with specific items and did not constitute a continuation of the international government, the Concert of Europe, which had been envisaged by the Congress of Vienna.

After the World War there were two agencies to perform the functions of the Concert which succeeded the Congress of Vienna. A series of international conferences was held, and the League of Nations was organized. In all, fifteen Allied conferences on issues growing out of the treaty of peace took place. Just as a hundred years before the problem of admitting France to the Concert of Europe was a burning question, so the acceptance of Germany as a full partner in international affairs was a critical issue. A more speedy preliminary adjustment of relations with the former enemy was achieved, for within six months of peace Germany was invited to some of the meetings. But the permanent adjustment was tardy; the "equality" remained merely formal for too long a time. While its territory was partly occupied and the reparations question was unsettled, real equality was impossible. These conferences dealt with reparations, the army of occupation, relationships with Russia, and many other topics. However, there was the familiar disintegration of alli-

## *Prepare for Peace!*

ances. Finally Poincaré, on becoming Premier of France, announced his preference for normal diplomatic procedure, and the conference system languished.

The general tone of international life had improved for some time in spite of slow progress and some degenerative influences. Six years after the treaty of peace, at a conference at Locarno, Germany, France, Belgium, Italy, and Great Britain signed a treaty of mutual guarantee of the western boundaries of Germany; they also signed a series of arbitration treaties and treaties of mutual assistance. Thus the instrumentalities for interpreting the treaty in action showed constructive power, and even its formal amendment was not beyond the boundaries of hope. The effect, in turn, was greatly to strengthen the structure of peace in Europe and to give rise to the feeling that a new spirit of understanding was growing, a spirit symptomatic of an era of international progress toward healing the breach between Germany and the Western powers.

The real parallel to the Concert of Europe was the League of Nations. Its Council represented the great powers continually and small powers in rotation. Its Assembly was a forum for discussion of world questions. One of its articles provided for recommendations for the revision of treaties. Others provided sanctions to be used against aggressor powers.

The League was only a partial instrument for peaceful action, since the United States abstained from join-

## *The Transition to Peace*

ing and Germany and Russia were not members for some years. After Locarno, Germany was admitted to membership and to a permanent seat on the Council. Thus the League lost to a certain extent its partisan character. Its development was not spectacular, but it gained several important successes. If it did not justify the lyric expectations of its proponents, it gave promise of becoming a useful agency of international understanding. Fear was slowly giving place to hope and confidence. Despite innumerable difficulties, inescapable after so enormous a strain, the orientation was toward peace and collaboration.

At the same time, the League had the faults characteristic of international conferences, such as the requirement of unanimity for action. But the difficulty was not so much with its structure as with the policies of the powers. During the period between the two wars, from 1919 to 1939, policy in many nations was singularly unstable and the rhythm of change from one extreme to another proved to be unfortunate. In England, for example, the shift of emphasis from the "strong" policy of Lloyd George to the pacifism of Ramsay MacDonald was marked. In France the distance between the policy of Clemenceau and Poincaré at one end and Blum at the other was enormous. Moreover the rigorous and uncompromising attitude of the former came at a moment when appeasement would have been a sound procedure, while Blum's "soft"

## *Prepare for Peace!*

policy came at a time when firmness was desirable. The oscillation in Germany was equally extreme, from the understanding and adaptability of Stresemann to the intransigence of Hitler—an enormous shift in a short time. The crusading zeal of Wilson gave place in a few years to the chilly isolationism of Calvin Coolidge—an almost equally severe reversal. During the same years Japan was torn between the military party and the civilians, who were eager for accommodation and understanding. At the close of the World War the militarists were still in control, but after the Washington Conferences the moderates came into the ascendant; then once more the saber-rattling group launched new adventures in Manchukuo and China.

Even Russia, which through all the period was controlled by one party and one system, varied from uncompromising insistence upon world revolution and contempt for the League to vigorous propaganda for peace and collective security through the League. These shifts in emphasis were reflected not only in Russia's attitude toward the League but in its treaty relations. Soon after Versailles it made a treaty with Germany—a union of the outcasts. Indeed their collaboration included exchange of military information and the use of German military experts in the Soviet army. Subsequently the tie with the Reich was abandoned in favor of an alliance with France; Germany, on its part, joined with Italy and Japan in an anti-Comintern pact.

## *The Transition to Peace*

Indeed Hitler indicated, not only in *Mein Kampf* but in concrete political gestures, that national expansion was to be at the expense of Russia. For his part, Stalin in the great purge shot the military men who had collaborated with Germany and then, on the morrow of that sweeping gesture, again reversed alliances and made the fateful return to a German connection.

The League would have needed more adaptability than a chameleon to have succeeded in pursuing a steady and constructive policy in the face of these enormous shifts in policy among the powers of the world. Its members being unable to agree upon positive programs of change, the organization tended to become a device for maintaining the *status quo*. The article of its Covenant providing for alterations in treaties was never employed.

Under these circumstances the League never dominated the international situation. When, after Locarno, France and Germany worked together, the organization was useful and grew in prestige. When, however, after the great economic debacle and the advent of Hitler, the League was used to discipline aggressors, it rapidly lost its favorable position. Then the application of sanctions against Italy for its attack on Ethiopia proved a failure and the League collapsed as a political agency. The fault was not so much in the structure of the organization as in the policies of the powers. They neither curbed Germany effectively nor yielded enough at

## *Prepare for Peace!*

strategic moments to fortify the prestige of pacific statesmen in that country. Concessions were "too little and too late," and when firmness was needed, for example in resisting German occupation of the Rhineland, the policy of the powers was epitomized by the same phrase—"too little and too late."

Finally, it should be noted that nationalism, identified with the concept of peace in the treaties, did not actually contribute to peace. During the nineteenth century the spirit of nationalism had united the scattered states of Italy and Germany. In breaking up incoherent aggregates like the Ottoman and the Hapsburg Empires, the peace treaties relaxed a great many tensions by relieving profound injustices. But the relief of one set of wrongs did not assure that right would prevail.

Each of the many new states wanted to be independent in every sense. Each wanted to "develop" itself in order not to be dependent. Forgetting that their very existence rested upon a strong international order, they followed particularist and nationalist policies. Their history was to illustrate the validity of the statement of the Bohemian patriot, Palacký, nearly a century earlier: "If the Austrian Empire did not already exist, it would be necessary, in the interests of humanity, to take immediate steps to call it into being."<sup>5</sup> The risk involved

<sup>5</sup> Quoted in Robert Dunlop, "Austria: a Retrospect and a Forecast," *Quarterly Review*, CCLIV (1930), 39.

## *The Transition to Peace*

in the break-up of the old system had been foreseen by many. In the fall of 1918 General Smuts had said: "From Finland to Constantinople, the map will be covered with small nations, divided by profound antipathies and most of them with minorities conducive to internal weakness. We may therefore expect more dangers of wars in Europe than in the past. Therefore, it is imperative that we create an international organization to keep peace."<sup>6</sup>

The small new states, many of which had existed as provinces within large free-trade areas, established tariff boundaries along political frontiers. They succumbed to neo-mercantilist ideas and sought to develop rounded economies in areas where a partial economy had been the rule and was natural by reason of resources and tradition. Thus the barriers to freedom of movement rose higher and higher; wealth was sacrificed to political considerations and autarchic techniques were followed under circumstances that can only be described as fantastic. The normal economic ties, therefore, were destroyed and the coherence of continental economy disappeared.

Throughout the post-war period there were continuous loans and financial rescue missions of one kind or another, but all were mere palliatives of painful symptoms, while the disease progressed. States weakened themselves to the point of collapse; as a result aggres-

<sup>6</sup> *New York Times*, November 16, 1918.



## *Prepare for Peace!*

sion could be swift and "peaceful" until at last the pattern of domination became clear and the crash came.

Britain destroyed the Concert of Europe after the Congress of Vienna because the Continent had interests in which its participation was remote and partial. After the World War, the essential difference between Britain and France grew out of that same fundamental factor. The separatism of Great Britain from its European associates has a long history, and realistic foundations.

## CHAPTER V

### CENTRIFUGAL FORCES

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#### 1. ISOLATION

ONE of the central factors in the fate of any treaty of peace is the relationship to the international order of two powers which have long controlled the balance of power. Great Britain and the United States as the two great sea powers have certain traditional attitudes and policies which are unlike those of other nations. They take a distinctive position regarding the political steps to world peace; that point of view is called isolation.

The phenomenon of isolation as a policy in foreign relations has confused the minds of men for centuries. Yet a grasp of its meaning is essential to any understanding of the failure of the treaty structure after 1919. It is equally necessary if the problems of the next peace are to be realistically assessed.

Isolation has been thought characteristically American. But it has also been a keystone of British policy, and a puzzling one. The reason is that it is a flexible and not rigidly logical compromise between two realities. Both can be stated in a single sentence: England is almost part of the continent, but not quite. The "almost"

## *Prepare for Peace!*

means that when great issues are clear, Britain participates actively in the solution of continental problems. The "not quite" means that when issues are not so great or not so clear British participation is passive or negative.

When is an issue great? It is a question that defies a precise answer. When is a great issue clear? The answer is a matter of opinion. What is the measure of "active" participation? That is a relative matter. The realities are a series of variables; by their nature they are elusive; they defy hard and fast definition or even description. From the point of view of formal and rigid logic, the pattern they make is neither clear-cut nor always coherent. From the point of view of policy, they open the way for wide oscillations and the consequent charge of inconsistency. "Perfidious Albion" is a critical expression describing the tactics which implement the political strategy of "almost, but not quite."

The relationship between these realities and the balance of power system is intimate. Without a measure of detachment, the shift of support or resistance from one group of powers to the other would be vastly more difficult. Europe has certain interests which touch England only indirectly or even remotely. Those have often and will often affect continental political alignments without profoundly affecting British interest one way or another. It is only when those alignments give one group of powers the preponderance that British inter-

## *Centrifugal Forces*

est is deeply engaged and the balance principle invoked. It is precisely because Great Britain is an island that it is possible readily to make such a maneuver. The shift of sea power from one group of allies to the other is physically and diplomatically much easier than the transfer of support in the form of an army. British possession of sea routes was long so complete that the transition often involved no outward action at all.

Strategic considerations of a military, as well as a political, character are involved. Britain has been invaded several times, and threatened with invasion many more. Therefore the political geography of the western coast of Europe is a vital matter to it. Invasion ports must never fall into the hands of a great power which is unfriendly. British interest in Holland, Belgium, and Portugal would be determined by that consideration, if no other. England tenaciously held possession of a bridgehead on the Continent long after substantial territorial ambitions there were abandoned.

Another strategic consideration is also of great consequence. Britain long ago discovered that sea power, however effective for control of empire and defense of island security, could never scotch danger at its source. When the nation was facing Spanish power, Queen Elizabeth said that "whensoever the last day of the Kingdom of France cometh, it will undoubtedly be the eve of the destruction of England."<sup>1</sup> Later, when France

<sup>1</sup> Quoted in Richmond, *op. cit.*, p. 79.

## *Prepare for Peace!*

was the enemy, the Duke of Newcastle expressed the same military conclusion in altered words: "Naval force, tho' carried never so high, unsupported with . . . a force upon the Continent, will be of little use. . . . Our marine should protect our alliances upon the Continent; and they . . . enable us to maintain our superiority at sea."<sup>2</sup>

Through centuries, consequently, for vital strategic reasons, Britain has had to find a way to support an army in Europe. The problems of bridgehead and supply, the difficulties surrounding the maintenance of an army over water have led to the policy of subsidizing continental allies with money, materials, and supplies rather than sending men. Sometimes a token expeditionary force has been sent, and in moments of great danger a formidable army. It was the last procedure that was followed in the days of Napoleon, and again in the World War.

Variations of policy within the isolationist orbit are not always nicely calculated. Perhaps one should say they have rarely been planned upon the basis of detached and rigorous analysis. Emotional responses have been as influential as cool calculation in determining the measure of participation or withdrawal. Thus after a long and bitter struggle in Europe, Britain is apt to feel itself bound too tightly to one continental interest or another. There develops a tendency to react too

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 159.

## *Centrifugal Forces*

rapidly toward a more extreme form of isolation than the actual circumstances warrant at that moment. The reaction is likely to disrupt the alliance which has been for some time the apparent center of policy, and makes further co-operation difficult or impossible.

If isolation is natural to Britain, how much more is it natural to America. The Revolution itself was a move for separation after a century and a half during which the colonies had been used as pawns in the game of European power politics. Then the artificial tie with Europe had been so close that a shot in the Ohio wilderness opened a world war—the Seven Years' War.

The new nation exemplified at the first opportunity the reaction from the former bond that seemed too close. Scarcely was the Revolution won when the French alliance, no longer useful, was broken. Washington stated the case for isolation with perfect clarity: "Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none or a very remote relation. . . . Our detached and distant station invites us to pursue a different course. . . . Why forego the advantages of so peculiar a situation?" The Monroe Doctrine was a further effort to fortify that unique advantage and develop a conscious policy of isolation. By barring Europe from further encroachments in this hemisphere, the United States would make its detached position more secure.

It must be remembered, however, that America was invaded several times in colonial days, and once after

## *Prepare for Peace!*

independence was won. The British established bridge-heads easily in the War of 1812. On other occasions the United States has felt threatened. When the small Spanish navy crossed the Atlantic in 1898, it spread panic along our coast. I lived in Gloucester during the Spanish-American War and remember the fear of the populace that Cervera's fleet would make a landing!

European possessions in America have always been potential bases of military operations. Strategic positions like New Orleans were the subject of special attention, Jefferson calling the possessor of the mouth of the Mississippi our natural enemy. Napoleon's ambition to restore the French colonial empire in North America caused considerable alarm early in the nineteenth century. However, the expedition sent to subjugate Santo Domingo was decimated by disease and Napoleon's attention was soon absorbed by the threat of renewed war in Europe. Consequently, he abandoned the American enterprise and agreed to the sale of Louisiana to the United States. But the menace had been very real, and fully accounts for the concern of the United States for the fate of Santo Domingo. Similar interests explain the acquisition of Florida, even at the cost of some decided irregularities in procedure.

For over a century Cuba was watched with anxious eye for fear it would furnish a means of attacking the United States. At the time of the threatened European interference with Latin America after the Congress of

## *Centrifugal Forces*

Verona, John Quincy Adams, who had as clear a view of American policy as any statesman in our history, said, "The annexation of Cuba to our Federal Republic will be indispensable to the continuance and integrity of the Union itself." Like other American statesmen, he was willing to have it remain in the hands of weak Spain or be independent, but he was quite in accord with his Secretary of State, Henry Clay, when the latter said, "We could not consent to the occupation of those islands by any other European power than Spain under any contingency whatever."

As American naval power became self-conscious, the need of island bases became clear. During the Civil War the Virgin Islands were resorted to by the American navy, and at its close Secretary of State Seward negotiated a treaty to buy them. However, the Senate, under the leadership of Charles Sumner, refused. After Theodore Roosevelt "took Panama," a second attempt was made to buy them, but failed. Then in 1916, when Germany appeared as a possible successor to the Danish interest, a third effort succeeded. In short, there is a long diplomatic history of the attempt to achieve physical isolation.

While the United States was engaged in the Civil War, the French occupation of Mexico challenged the Monroe Doctrine. When the war was over, and the United States had the largest army in the world, Seward sent General Schofield to France with graphic instruc-



## *Prepare for Peace!*

tions, "I want you to get your legs under Napoleon's mahogany, and tell him he must get out of Mexico." The episode had shown clearly that it was possible for a European nation to get a foothold upon this continent unless the United States was in a position to prevent it.

Determination to keep European nations from taking advantage of small states in North and South America in order to gain new bridgeheads on this continent, therefore, is old. It accounts for the explosive and jingoistic episode in Cleveland's administration when England was rudely repelled from disciplining Venezuela. A President who had been so mild and scrupulous in his dealings with Hawaii was party to a virtual threat to one of the great powers of the world.

After the Panama Canal was launched as an American enterprise and Great Britain inferentially removed the veto on its fortification which had been involved in the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850, the Caribbean policy of the United States became aggressive. Armed intervention was resorted to in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, and Honduras. More recently, diplomacy has succeeded armed intervention as the technique, but there can be no doubt that if serious danger of European penetration arose in that area, the United States would take any means to repel it. With the expansion of national interest, the protection of its physical isolation has been pursued with persistence and determination.

## *Centrifugal Forces*

Nevertheless, extraordinary circumstances put a different light on the issue of non-participation in European affairs. Washington recognized that fact clearly; he spoke only of "ordinary" events in Europe as justifying abstention from its concerns. He looked forward to choosing freely "peace or war, as our interest, guided by justice, shall counsel." When the choice was war, we might "safely trust to temporary alliances for extraordinary emergencies."

The extraordinary emergency which arose from the French Revolution and the Napoleonic era put the doctrine of isolation to the test—and the United States fought at different times against first one, then the other side. From 1798 to 1800 there was an undeclared naval war with France. That nation had uttered explicit menaces; naval action constituted a complete defense. When France later acquired Louisiana, only Napoleon's readiness to sell stopped the marriage of America to the British fleet and nation. Still later British action impaired our security. The War of 1812 consisted of an attempt to take Canada, thus destroying Britain's bridgehead in America, and naval actions for the maintenance of the freedom of the seas as a basis for our own isolation. The burning of Washington gave graphic evidence of the vulnerability of the United States to invasion from overseas.

No world war occurred for a hundred years after 1815, and the events of Europe did not draw the United

## *Prepare for Peace!*

States into the local wars that were almost continuous. But the principle of isolation has always been recognized as limited, though the definition of those limits is far from precise. Extraordinary events in Europe were certain to challenge it, the more so because one set of injunctions by Washington had been totally disregarded, but in a manner which he did not have in mind. He had warned against "artificial" ties and "interweaving our destinies" with those of Europe. The intangible bonds of political connection and the entanglements of alliances were in his mind. In those respects he was obeyed, but in a physical sense Americans created artificial ties of a far stronger character. Though we sought political isolation, physical isolation had proved intolerable. Cultural habits, commercial needs, and a hundred other forces made Americans want communication with Europe to be quicker and cheaper than in colonial days.

Our forefathers were glad to flee Europe, but except in a military sense they were sorry that the barrier of the ocean was so great and sought to reduce it. They were glad to occupy this vast land, but they knew its political union depended upon physical union. Therefore, they turned their youthful energies with fierce zeal and rich ingenuity and magnificent courage to those tasks.

When Robert Fulton built the "Clermont" to ply the waters of the Hudson, he launched a revolution in transportation which ultimately made it possible for

## *Centrifugal Forces*

the United States to send two million men to France and for the nations of the earth to burden the seas with their traffic. When Americans built the "Merrimac" and the "Monitor," they altered the structure of sea power and laid upon the nations of the earth a tax for the building of navies beyond the wildest dreams of the imagination. When the Wright brothers lifted their fragile power kite from the sands of Kitty Hawk, they changed the face of war, they changed the face of communication and of transport, they altered the habits of the earth. Now commerce is borne literally upon the wings of the wind. Their triumphs, exploited by their successors, have brought unforeseen but no less real and inescapable consequences for Europe and Asia, the islands of the seas, as well as America.

When the first message went over the Morse telegraph, "What hath God wrought?", its inventor might well have added, "And what have I wrought?" Similarly, when Alexander Graham Bell spoke for the first time over his telephone, he also altered the habits of the world and made it possible for men at a distance to confer as though they were in one room. When Cyrus Field laid the Atlantic cable amidst the laughter of the skeptics, he created a tie between Europe and America that no wishful thinking can destroy. By that cable an American changed the future of Europe; the structure of the world was altered and we cannot slough off the responsibility.

## *Prepare for Peace!*

When Edison and his successors turned loose upon the world a flood of brilliance, and engineering caught the forces of electricity to harness them, power re-energized the implements of mankind in Europe as well as America. When Americans speeded up the industrial and the agricultural revolutions and developed the processes of mass production by automatic machinery, they profoundly altered the character of trade, reshaped the problem of raw material, affected the cost of goods, and revolutionized the distribution of benefits.

All those connections made political isolation increasingly difficult to maintain, for they transmitted the shock of European strife more directly to our shores. No sooner did the dimensions and character of the war which began in 1914 dawn upon America than the urge to be neutral in thought and word as well as deed began to undergo a change. Ultimately the United States did what Britain has done many times; it redressed the balance of power and participated in the affairs of Europe in a decisive way. It did not expect or intend to furnish more than sea power, supplies, munitions, and funds. But when the crisis deepened and defeat seemed to stare its associates in the face, the United States, like England on similar occasions, sent an army. Isolation was set aside in installments; the full scope of the ultimate commitment was not foreseen and planned; events dictated it step by step.

With the physical commitment went political and

## *Centrifugal Forces*

moral commitments, until American statesmen and the American people envisioned the United States as the arbiter of the destiny of the world. Perhaps one reason for so much official carelessness about the secret treaties was the overconfidence in the decisive role the American delegation would play at the council board.

With the end of fighting, the revulsion of feeling set in. The delay in assembling the peace conference allowed it to progress. Then, as it dawned upon the public that Woodrow Wilson could issue no proclamation of emancipation from war, the emotional reaction gathered momentum. Just as Britain had done many times before, indeed as Britain tended to do even in the twenties of this century, so the United States let itself be carried away from the task to which it had set its hand before the work was finished. The military objective was achieved; the moral and political and economic obligations were jettisoned. The reaction became so complete that the retreat from responsibility became a rout. Finally it constituted a flight from reality.

### 2. THE FLIGHT FROM REALITY

Woodrow Wilson was a tragic figure as he returned from Paris. That he had been defeated and his prestige fatally impaired no one could doubt. It was soon to transpire that his resiliency was gone and that stubbornness had succeeded firmness. His long absence had al-

## *Prepare for Peace!*

lowed a hostile majority to consolidate under spiteful leadership; that was equally obvious.

Tragic as was Wilson's failure, it was not so poignant as that involved in the refusal of Congress and the public to accept any responsibility for the peace, in their unwillingness to yield up some minuscule fraction of sovereignty. Worse yet was the resurgence of moral arrogance which led irresponsible senators to thank God that we were not as other men. In the light of the current situation when it is proclaimed on every hand that our policy is really shaped by the Axis dictators, the surrender at that time of a moiety of our freedom of action in behalf of peace does not look so serious. The price we pay in a single year for "preparedness" now makes the price of peace we refused to pay look small indeed.

Wilson stubbornly demanded all or nothing; a Senate majority, no less stubborn, gave him nothing. The treaty was refused ratification, the League was voted down, the tripartite treaty of guarantee for France was thrown out as an entangling alliance. The American people reluctantly wrote off their participation in the World War as a dreadful mistake. They remained proud of the victory but afraid of its consequences. Without waiting for a new treaty, Congress by joint resolution sought to declare peace, a device which only the Bolsheviks had attempted before. President Wilson, stubborn to the end, vetoed the resolution, but when

## *Centrifugal Forces*

it was passed again his successor signed it. Treaties with Germany and Austria were not signed until a month after peace had been proclaimed in this unusual fashion.

A separate treaty was made with each of the Central Powers. The Germans had hoped for more lenient terms than the Treaty of Versailles provided. In fact, however, the American treaty incorporated all the penalties; it even included the "war guilt" clause; it gave Germany no concessions at all. Its sole effect was to reserve to the United States any and all advantages it would have received by ratifying the Treaty of Versailles, while avoiding the responsibilities that would have been incurred by ratification. Senator Lodge expressed the new situation with pathetic clarity: "We secure every advantage . . . and have not been asked to make any concessions. . . . We are left absolutely free in regard to assuming any obligations under the Versailles treaty."<sup>3</sup> Benefit without obligation was a far cry from "a world organized for peace."

Even so the Senate was not satisfied; in a reservation it attempted to impair the power of the President by forbidding him to be "represented or participate in any body, agency or commission . . . in which the United States is authorized to participate by this Treaty, unless and until an act of Congress of the United States shall provide for such representation or participation." Once

<sup>3</sup> *New York Times*, September 25, 1921.



## *Prepare for Peace!*

before such an attempt had been made and a President had met the challenge flatly, saying: "This is an utterly futile statute. Congress has no power to control the President in this matter, save by withholding appropriations." That was the correct constitutional statement, but the new Executive was not so bold, and for the next few years the world was treated to an extraordinary spectacle.

Having interests in the commissions and agencies set up under the peace treaties, the United States needed representation; being forbidden to send official representatives, the President resorted to unofficial observers. For years Europe was reminded of the anomalous situation by the presence of these conspicuous but shadowy individuals who watched American rights while they avoided obligations. Sometimes their opinions were decisive, but always some other nation had to shoulder the responsibility. These diplomatic spooks contributed nothing to the repair of war-shattered nerves.

The Reparations Commission was the most important of the commissions. It had been anticipated that a citizen of the United States would be chairman. Such a solution might have had an enormous effect in bringing perspective and sanity into the demands upon Germany. Abstention by the United States made the problem which the commission faced practically insoluble, and had the effect of widening the breach between the French and British.

## *Centrifugal Forces*

This escape from responsibility produced one other disastrous consequence. During the war, both before and after the armistice, the United States made loans to the Allies. It was partly to find money to discharge those obligations that the reparations demands upon Germany were made so great. All the world knew that the funds for the payment of the inter-Allied debts came from reparations. As early as 1922 the disastrous effect of these mountainous accounts became clear and Lord Balfour suggested cancellation of reparations to the extent of the debts, together with the debts themselves. The response of the United States was a resort to a legalistic unreality: there was no connection between the debts and reparations.

For years the United States moved upon a magnificently simple premise: "they hired the money." That was true, but not the whole truth. It was one relevant fact among many others equally pertinent. Twice the facts were recognized by inference though sturdily denied in words. Late in 1923 the breakdown of the reparations scheme was so patent that some change became imperative. The Secretary of State spoke to the American Historical Association about the matter, making some inferential suggestions. The historians were only mildly interested, but European statesmen were more alert and responded promptly. The politicians called upon a commission of "experts" to provide a way of escape. The chairman was an American citizen, General

## *Prepare for Peace!*

Dawes, and he was generously supplied with a staff from the State and Treasury Departments. His commission made recommendations which were accepted, but from the point of view of the United States it was all quite unofficial. Again in 1929 another American citizen, Owen D. Young, performed a similar service, under similar assumptions.

Even as late as 1932 the separability of the two dependent systems of payment was still insisted upon. The United States had already been driven to scale down the debts, and when the reparations payments collapsed, debt payments to America practically ceased. Fiscal fact overcame legal fiction, but the unreality of American policy greatly retarded the recovery of the world from war.

One relatively minor development was symptomatic of our amazing retreat from responsibility. Ever since Europe had recognized the United States as a world power, this country had sought to promote an international court to deal with justiciable questions upon the basis of juristic principles. At the Hague Conference in 1899, the American proposal seemed too radical and a weak substitute was provided. Again at the Second Hague Conference in 1907, the United States insisted upon a court so organized "that the whole world will have absolute confidence in its judgments." The nations agreed in principle, but the project awaited a satisfactory method of securing judges.

## *Centrifugal Forces*

After Versailles the court was established precisely in accord with this long-time policy; its composition was suggested by Mr. Root who had been Secretary of State in 1907. When the United States Senate gagged at any responsibility, the Statute of the Court was modified to meet its wishes. Despite the support of successive Presidents and Secretaries of State, the Senate nevertheless killed the project for American adherence. It was one of the most extraordinary and disillusioning events in the post-war period; it would be difficult to find a parallel in history. Having attained our heart's desire, we would have none of it. It was as though Jacob, who labored fourteen years for the hand of Rachel, had fulfilled his labors and jilted the girl.

The retreat from responsibility became a flight from reality when it was proposed to "outlaw" war as an instrument of national policy. Nothing more perfectly epitomizes what happened than a very old saying, "They have seduced my people, saying, peace; and there was no peace."

Late in the twenties men were somehow persuaded that they could escape the ills to which flesh is heir. By a false interpretation of economic experience, the public was persuaded that it had entered upon a new era of perpetual prosperity. Men spoke seriously of the abolition of poverty, as though their generation, on the morrow of a war that decimated wealth, had solved a problem as old as man. Herbert Hoover declared that "we

## *Prepare for Peace!*

shall soon . . . be in sight of the day when poverty will be banished from this nation." In something like the same grandiose manner, the Secretary of State announced, as though the wish alone were necessary, that the United States "desires to see the institution of war abolished." The end of poverty and the end of war, two great scourges mastered simultaneously—and all at no further cost in human agony!

Thereupon a simple declarative treaty was drafted; nations were to "condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounce it as an instrument of national policy." To be sure that war should never come again, the treaty was not for a term of years; it was perpetual. The document was signed, and soon afterward the Secretary of State received the Nobel peace prize.

Such an astounding example of diplomatic self-hypnotism had not been seen since Czar Alexander of Russia proclaimed his Holy Alliance, which bound sovereigns to behave as Christians toward each other and their subjects. Castlereagh, the British Foreign Secretary, had described it as "a piece of sublime mysticism and nonsense," and Metternich, the architect of the remodeled old order, called it "a loud sounding nothing."

Briand was more polite in referring to the outlawry of war, at least in his published statements. He realized, however, that something more than a pious expression

## *Centrifugal Forces*

was needed to achieve permanent peace. At the ceremony of signature he said: "Peace is proclaimed. That is well; that is much; but it still remains necessary to organize it. In the solution of difficulties right and not might must prevail. That is to be the work of tomorrow."<sup>4</sup>

When tomorrow came, and it was suggested that something tangible and practical be done to implement the Kellogg-Briand Pact, we drew back. The United States would have no part in the General Act proposed by the Ninth Assembly of the League of Nations. That act, specifically designed to implement the Kellogg-Briand Pact, made provision for conciliation and arbitration, and also opened the way for nations to accept a clause providing for compulsory arbitration. Twenty-three nations undertook the obligation. Though for a hundred years the United States had been a leading exponent of those very processes, it would take no part in this effort which grew out of a treaty framed by the American Secretary of State. Indeed the Senate of the United States consented to ratification of the pact itself only after attaching a wholly needless and defensive declaration.

Yet despite all evidence of its utter futility, we clung to the mirage of peace by declaration. As late as the end of 1932, when Europe was already on the dreadful spiral

<sup>4</sup> Quoted in D. Hunter Miller, *The Peace Pact of Paris* (New York, 1928), p. 259.

## *Prepare for Peace!*

descent toward war, the United States thought it useful to induce Germany, France, Great Britain, and Italy to promise "not in any circumstances to attempt to resolve any present or future differences between them by resort to force." The nearer force came, the louder were the protestations.

We had paid and are still paying and will long pay a dreadful price for the last war, and for this one. But for peace we would pay no price except a scrap of paper, which in the light of what has since transpired appears as a more terrifying mockery than anything that had ever gone before. For the prohibition upon war has had the fate of the prohibition upon alcohol, and temperance in the use of arms has not been taught as well as temperance in the use of spirituous liquors.

Those great experiments, noble in purpose, teach the same lesson: that a negative attitude achieves nothing. A positive evil can be overcome only by a positive good, not by a negative prohibition. Hatred of war and fighting is a purely negative reaction, and to denounce war may be merely an attempt to escape from the things which press upon us rather than to meet them. The essential tragedy of the outlawry of war lay in its flight from reality. Peace and prosperity are not gained so easily.

There were several other manifestations of unreality in thought about peace, equally futile and all tragic. A wave of pacifism which had swept over England fil-

## *Centrifugal Forces*

tered into America. In 1933 the Oxford Union, that cradle of British statesmanship, voted that it would "in no circumstances fight for its King and country." There is a form of pacifism which arouses respect. It is based upon profound religious conviction; it has been held by some sects for many years, and under circumstances that required such faith and courage, and in the face of hardships so severe, that no one could say it was an attempt to escape from the horrors of war. But the pacifism of the late twenties and the early thirties was not of that kind. It was the pacifism of disillusionment. It exemplified the feeling that the World War had achieved nothing, and could achieve nothing; that all war was futile; that circumstances could never arise where it would again be necessary to fight. Being a product of circumstances, such pacifism became an easy victim of circumstances.

This flight from reality was symbolized in a movement stimulated among college students by obscure agencies organized to exploit youth. It took the form of a peace "strike." That word was significant because a strike is "against" something. The intimation was plain that someone in authority somewhere in this country wanted war, and the way to prevent war was to put pressure upon that person or group of persons to forestall their attempts to promote a war the public did not want.

The lesson of all this seems clear. Isolation is a fun-



## *Prepare for Peace!*

damental American policy. It is not the creation of any statesman's imagination. It is a simple recognition of obvious geographical facts. Even in a world apparently dominated by technical progress, geography, though effectively modified, is still potent.

Generally speaking, only great issues that deeply touch American interests entirely overcome the basic principle of our isolation policy. When that occurs only the most careful limitation of objectives can prevent a violent reaction. It was the sweeping and extreme quality of American leadership just before Paris, which carried hopes and expectations too high, that made the reaction more severe when disillusionment set in. If a pendulum is swung abnormally far in one direction, its backward motion will go almost equally far in the other direction.

The effect of this retreat from responsibility upon the evolution of the Treaty of Versailles was unfortunate. So great is the weight of the United States that it can upset the balance not alone by throwing its weight toward one side or the other; jumping off the teeter board entirely is likely to let one end down with a resounding thump and throw the other high in the air.

The policy of the United States destroyed the moral position of the Treaty of Versailles at the very outset. The repudiation of the League robbed that agency of the opportunity to become a great force in the structure of peace. The abandonment of the World Court took

## *Centrifugal Forces*

away the support of one of the two powers which for over a century had steadily built up the judicial process in international life. Refusal to have anything to do with collective security made the whole project impossible. If economic sanctions could have meant anything under any circumstances, certainly they could not have been effective without American participation.

The flight from reality had a disastrous effect upon American preparation for the next crisis. It made certain that our neutrality laws would be founded upon false premises and would fail to achieve their stated goals.

### 3. THE FRUITS OF UNREALITY

The flight to unreality required its own myths for justification. It was inevitable that men with a pathological fear of even moving along parallel lines with the League of Nations should devise some escapist explanation. The method was simple; it was to search out scapegoats and lay upon them the responsibility for our entrance into the last war. By painting their villainy in colors sufficiently dark, the escapists could cover up all other explanations. Responsibility for the "betrayal of the American people" was loaded on the munitions-maker, the international banker, and the foreign propagandist.

Congress appropriated money for a Senate committee, with Senator Nye as chairman, to investigate the

## *Prepare for Peace!*

munitions industry. The hearings uncovered serious abuses and the committee made proposals for their abatement. The chairman, however, went far beyond the formal report.

Men and institutions have come to learn that there is very large profit for them in these mad programs of preparing for more war. Men and institutions . . . have learned by experience there is one thing more profitable than preparing for war, and that one thing is war itself, and that for them and their kind of business profit flows thickest when blood flows most freely upon fields of battle.<sup>5</sup>

This sounds oddly like Hitler's declarations: "Thus this ultra-capitalist clique of people with a personal interest in the war clamored out for its continuance." "Certain political personages, who have financial interest in the armament industry, [believed] that war was a good business provided it was a long war."

By a prolonged campaign of speeches Senator Nye and others sought to lay upon the munitions-makers a considerable share of responsibility for provoking war. The direct effect of his propaganda was to make it disreputable to be in the business of supplying the United States with materials necessary for its defense. For that we are now paying a heavy price. But the secondary effect was vastly more serious. The plain implication

<sup>5</sup> "The Munitions Investigation," *Journal of the National Education Association*, XXIV (1935), 187.

## *Centrifugal Forces*

was that the American democracy had been the dupe of armament concerns. Nye made it appear that the interests of the American people had been sacrificed to profits, and that they had not had the wit to protect themselves. It was a subtle assault upon the whole democratic process, a blow to the essential self-confidence of the American public. It sapped the vitality of our own institutions and showed no faith in their moral solvency. The pretense that the people were manipulated like marionettes by the munitions-makers made it appear that the World War was for profits, not principles. That became the generally accepted myth, so that Hitler could assert, in September, 1939, that the reason nations were waging war was "merely the desire for profit and the political interest of a small clique."

The international bankers were the second group of scapegoats. They make a profit on international trade; in peace time the profit is upon commerce; in war it is upon munitions, among many other things. During the World War they served as agents for purchases by foreign nations in this country and marketed the obligations of those nations among American citizens. The allegation was made that to increase their profit they betrayed the interests of the United States. Indeed the indictment was more explicit: to protect their own profits made by passing on "worthless" bonds to an innocent public they helped drag this nation into war.

Senator Clark stated the thesis: "In order for us to

## *Prepare for Peace!*

continue our trade in munitions, and other supplies to belligerent nations, it became necessary for us to loan the nations the money with which to buy supplies. . . . As a result of those loans and the policy then inaugurated, it later became necessary for us to expend billions of dollars in the prosecution of a war of our own." That declaration was repeated over and over by many men in varying words, always with the clear inference that the war was fought for an ignoble reason. Such talk calls to mind the sarcastic words of Hitler when he said, "They sacrifice [peace] simply because a handful of infernal warmongers and war-profiteers want to drive the nations into war."

International bankers are essential to international trade—except barter between totalitarian states! By making the banker a scapegoat along with the munitions-maker, the isolationists threw suspicion upon an essential element in the structure of peace. The international banker is the very epitome of free enterprise in the international world. As such he serves a vital public interest and contributes to peace. It is no accident that after the international banker had been smeared, government agencies were organized to make international loans. All the evidence shows that this transition from private banking operations to public lending represented a shift from loans made upon an economic basis to loans based upon political considerations.

A yet more important result of stigmatizing the inter-

## *Centrifugal Forces*

national banker was the implied aspersion upon the competence of democracy as a form of government, and upon the intelligence of the American people. The inference was that a great and free people had been led into war by bankers. The implication was that in spending a hundred billion on the past and future costs of the World War, in sacrificing the lives or the health of thousands, no public purpose was achieved. The net effect, according to this interpretation, was to make a profit for a small group from the sacrifice of many. In building this myth, its proponents did everything possible to document Hitler's allegations regarding the stupidity of the "pluto-democracies."

Besides the banker and the munitions-maker there was a third scapegoat, the propagandist. He was pictured as so subtle, so clever, so ingenious, and the mind of the American democracy as so stupid, obtuse, and oafish that the latter did exactly as the propagandist directed. Senator Nye made it explicit:

I make bold to assert that the Pierian springs are poisoned with propaganda. I make bold to assert that 20 years ago we were led like lambs to slaughter into the most cruel and merciless and useless war the world ever witnessed. I contrast the 27 charges levied against George III of England, which have stood the test of a century and a half of historic research, with the lies, the falsehoods,

## *Prepare for Peace!*

the fancies, the wild extravagances, the distortions of truth, the hypocrisies, so deftly foisted upon us by the paid propagandists of European powers which led our people like sheep to slaughter for the economic aggrandizement of empires.<sup>6</sup>

In promulgating this aspect of the myth, the isolationists did not recognize that propaganda begets its own counter-propaganda. Both sides play the same game, and will always do so. Listen, for instance, to Hitler's recent sneering taunt: "Those dabblers ought first to take elementary lessons in propaganda from us." If we look about us, we cannot fail to see that both sides employ propaganda now as they did then. Moreover, those who sought to shift responsibility to the propagandists did not emphasize that facts and realities existed, as well as lies and propaganda, that substantial interests other than commercial or financial were involved.

The escapists insisted that the sly work of foreign agents made fools of the American people; senators and others accepted, as though it had been proved, the assertion that democracy could not make up its own mind. Their indictments differed little from Hitler's declaration: "The lord of the so-called free press is the man who supplies the capital, this press moulds public opinion." Such men exhibited an essential contempt for the

<sup>6</sup> *Congressional Record* (76 Cong., 1 Sess.), Vol. 84, Part 2, p. 2198.

## *Centrifugal Forces*

democratic process and developed in the American people a fear of propaganda so acute that it amounted, a year and a half ago, to an actual public neurosis.

The escapist myth, as an explanation of America's entry into the last war, was vastly over-simplified. It neglected the whole moral setting of the decisions made in 1917. Then, as now, there was propaganda, tons of it. Now, as then, some of it is devious and subtle. But there are hard, ineluctable facts as well. It is not "propaganda" that Norway, the perfect neutral, is overrun. It is no lying invention that inoffensive Denmark is in "protective" custody. It is not a "fancy" that Holland and Belgium are overwhelmed. None of those are "have" nations, none of those committed any aggression, or are dedicated to "economic aggrandizement." It is not hypocrisy or falsehood to maintain that an assault is now being made upon freedom, democracy, and good faith. True, the fault is not wholly on one side; but that is a different matter from the inference that there is nothing to choose between the parties to the war.

There were similar concrete facts and a like moral setting for the decisions of 1917. At that time the American people made a choice; nothing has ever been brought forward to show that choice irrational or unjustified. The American people went to war; that may have been the wrong decision. It is conceivable that another course would have been better, though that is



## *Prepare for Peace!*

sheer speculation. But the repeated assertion that in making the choice the American people were dupes and fools, that their motives and actions were sordid, is wholly unwarranted.

The myth that the war was foisted upon the American people was both a manifestation of the retreat from responsibility and a stimulus to the flight from reality. It naturally found a reflection in legislation. Being predicated upon the idea that men are moved not by moral judgments but only by profits, the solution for the eternal problem of peace was made to appear very simple: take the profit out of war and no one would fight. Take the profit out of international trade in war time and there would be no "involvement." Keep ships and citizens out of combat areas and there would be no "incidents" to precipitate war.

In reaching that conclusion the extreme isolationists admitted that moral considerations must be suppressed. A congressman made that point clear during the course of debate: "In addition to monetary sacrifice necessitated by the maintenance of neutrality, Americans must be willing to forego the personal desire of seeing justice triumph all over the world. We will doubtless be ridiculed and stamped as cowardly, told that we should be ashamed of our selfish policy. . . . But we must stand firm. . . . Are we not willing to give up a measure of our pride in order that we may save our tears, our lives and our blood?" "Nothing short of total isolation is full

## *Centrifugal Forces*

assurance" of peace.<sup>7</sup> The explicit reason for making the Neutrality Law mandatory and allowing as little discretion in its enforcement as possible was to prevent any moral quality from creeping into our policy. Moral judgments involve risk; this was a proposal to attain security by avoiding even that risk.

Clearly, peace was not regarded as something to be achieved; it was misinterpreted as a mere avoidance of war. It had no positive quality; it was a method of escaping blood, sweat, and tears. It involved no responsibility, indeed it was predicated upon shedding responsibility. It might even involve the choice of cowardice over courage, of callousness to brutality instead of loyalty to justice. It was appeasement carried to its logical extreme: abandon all the world to the aggressor but save our own skin.

No one who had any knowledge of the American people or any glimmer of understanding of the bases upon which democracy is predicated could have expected such a program to be permanent. A government that evades responsibility in one area will seek to escape other obligations. Abandoning interest in international justice means abandonment of justice at home. Selfishness is not a trait which can be defined by a boundary; the pretense that a nation can be generous at home and selfish abroad is mere pretense and nothing more.

Something like the same program had been tried

<sup>7</sup> *Congressional Record*, Vol. 84, Part 2, pp. 1364-65.

## *Prepare for Peace!*

earlier in our history. The Embargo Act of December 22, 1807 was the original test of whether keeping away from war would keep us out of war. It was then tried under circumstances vastly more favorable than current conditions. Effectively, the war was then much farther away, and there was no clear moral issue between the combatants, for both sides were guilty of abusing our citizens and commerce. Nevertheless, even in 1807, the abandonment of rights led to loss of self-respect, and to loss of respect by the belligerents also. Deep domestic divisions always follow a craven policy. Between abuse and injury from abroad and dissension at home the effort to stay away from war failed. The reaction from that failure was an important element in producing the War of 1812.

The modern embargo, written into Neutrality Laws during the last decade, played directly into the hands of the dictatorships. It is their policy to arm to the teeth; on the other hand the democracies, with their civilian ideal, are dependent upon the import of arms. Our new program operated particularly to the disadvantage of Great Britain because one of the normal benefits of sea power is ability to purchase arms from neutrals. The United States, itself dependent upon sea power for safety, nonetheless endorsed a policy contrary to its own interest. In a formal statement President Roosevelt declared that the "wholly inflexible provisions" of the act "might have exactly the opposite effect from that which

## *Centrifugal Forces*

was intended. In other words, the inflexible provisions might drag us into war instead of keeping us out.”<sup>8</sup> Secretary Hull asserted that the “embargo encourages a general state of war both in Europe and Asia” and was therefore “directly prejudicial” to a true American interest in peace. It was, he said, “misleading the American people to rely upon a false and illogical delusion as a means of keeping out of war.”<sup>9</sup> It was not surprising that a former judge of the World Court described the law as “a curious blend of homicidal and suicidal mania.”

In the course of four years the neutrality laws were altered several times, and changed again after war broke out. Even in its final form the law abdicated neutral rights the United States had always claimed. When the strongest nation in the world jettisoned those, the repercussions upon smaller neutrals were disastrous. Norway could not follow our example; its ships had to sail. The withdrawal of American shipping took away Germany’s principal hazard in attempting a counter-blockade. Norway, not strong enough to vindicate its rights, paid the price in great losses of shipping. Furthermore, Germans used the corridor behind the Norwegian islands for their own purposes, and when that use was threatened by Britain, the Norwegian invasion followed.

The American surrender of neutral rights also cre-

<sup>8</sup> *Department of State Press Releases*, XIII (1935), 162-63.

<sup>9</sup> *Department of State Bulletin*, I (1939), 45, 44.

## *Prepare for Peace!*

ated a powerful vacuum to draw the Germans into the conquest of Norway. It was recognized in Berlin that if Norway was occupied, the United States would be required, under the Neutrality Law, to forbid its ships to enter Norwegian waters. That would leave the Germans free to torpedo any ship in waters north of Portugal wholly without warning. Our law was thus of great assistance in the attempt to establish a counter-blockade against Britain. By this policy we showed ourselves not only willing, in Representative Thill's unforgettable words, "to forego the personal desire of seeing justice triumph"; we went yet further and helped precipitate a gross injustice upon a friendly nation whose neutral behavior was impeccable. In the last war neutral rights had a powerful defender, and Norway, though it suffered great losses, was not invaded. For a false sense of security we contributed to the sacrifice of Norway's freedom.

The Neutrality Laws did not stand alone. Another manifestation of the flight from reality was the Johnson Act. It was founded upon the same premise that war was made and lives sacrificed to collect debts. It was the surrender of policy to the theory of economic determinism; all moral considerations were left out of account. It belonged to the same school of thought as the historical interpretation of the Constitution as the product of speculators on government loans seeking to make good their speculation. Once we meanly interpret one

## *Centrifugal Forces*

great choice of policy the whole history of the nation is open to the same sordid construction.

The attitude of mind which Representative Eaton described as "moral sterilization" was reflected in many pieces of legislation, but specifically in the tariff. The ideal of taking no international responsibility was embodied in the Smoot-Hawley tariff. The protective tariff was an old policy, but that bill climaxed a long degenerative process. It was an especially bad law for two reasons. In the first place it failed to take any cognizance of the changed position of the United States. From being the world's largest debtor, the nation had become the world's greatest creditor. So fundamental a change in status demanded a reconsideration of policy; instead an inappropriate policy was carried to an irresponsible extreme. It was as effective in preventing payment of the inter-Allied debt as though it had been designed with that end in view. It was isolationist in principle and practice.

Though the tariff law was domestic legislation, conceived in the spirit of "sacred egoism," its international repercussions were marked. Thirty-three nations protested against it, and when protests were disregarded, many countries resorted to retaliation. The international result was higher trade barriers everywhere, a decrease in both volume and value of international commerce, an increase in separatism, and further disintegration of the economic structure of the world.

## *Prepare for Peace!*

The policy embodied in the Smoot-Hawley tariff was the direct antithesis of one of Wilson's "fourteen points," a mockery of the principle announced as the World War came to a close: "The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its maintenance."

The Hull trade agreements represented a return to the realization that the best chance of peace lay in restoration of private trade and of an economic emphasis in place of a political objective in international commerce. In retrospect it must be admitted that this return toward reality was "too little and too late." The economic structure of peace was destroyed.

John Randolph said in 1806, "The surest way to prevent war is not to fear it." The last ten years have shown that the surest way to promote war is to run away from responsibility, to fly from reality, and to shift the responsibilities for the trouble of the world to domestic scapegoats or other nations. The only way to avoid war is to maintain peace. To let the world drift to war and then attempt to run away from war is futile.

## CHAPTER VI

### A THEORY OF PEACE

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#### 1. THE NATURE OF PEACE

THE Treaty of Versailles was by no means a complete barrier to peace. It was a disappointment, as the settlement after Napoleon had been a disappointment, indeed as most treaties have been disappointments. Imperfect as it was, its mistakes did not have a fatal effect. For five years, from 1925 to 1930, peace seemed possible of attainment despite the lack of active co-operation from America. The international body politic was gradually throwing off the infection of war. Convalescence was slow, painful, and often discouraging; there were disturbing relapses; but progress was perceptible. In Europe the voices of Stresemann and Briand were pitched in tones of hope. Briand was persuasively advocating a United States of Europe, and scoffers were no longer so vociferous.

After the end of the third decade the descent began again. The tendency to disintegration became stronger than the constructive elements; first slowly, then more rapidly, the forces of violence gained momentum. There was no theory of peace that seemed to capture



## *Prepare for Peace!*

imaginations. Discussions of disarmament became less and less constructive. A final effort at stabilizing international exchange, essential to any resumption of healthy international trade, was torpedoed without warning by the United States. That act of nationalist particularism gave the coup de grâce to effective international economic co-operation. In a sense it was the most thoroughly isolationist gesture of the whole post-war period. It complemented the Smoot-Hawley tariff and helped set the stage for the German system of exchange control, which further impaired the world's international financial and economic structure.

The initiative was surrendered to the aggressors, who concealed the direction and nature of their trespasses upon peace in a cloud of words. The occupation of the Rhineland, the rape of Ethiopia, the creation of a puppet regime in Manchukuo made it seem as though treaties could safely be disregarded. In the face of these vigorous manifestations, peaceful policies became feeble.

Except for the Hull trade policy, the United States had little positive to contribute. Following a program of attempted escape from environment, the most powerful potential force for peace in the world was, in the language of Congressman Eaton, "neutralized, sterilized spiritually and morally." The adequate reason for the failure of moral sterilization in America, as well as of appeasement in Europe, was, in each instance, the

## *A Theory of Peace*

poverty of its spiritual content. Such spiritual poverty made war inevitable; utter selfishness offers no program for mastering great forces.

What is the nature of the peace which was missed perhaps by a narrow margin? It is a great and never-ending quest, like the search for truth. It is an act of faith which summons all moral and intellectual and even great physical energies, just as the search for truth makes insistent, continuous, and powerful demands. It represents an ideal which, by definition, can never be fully attained. There can be no pause, no rest in its pursuit or it vanishes over the horizon and is lost.

Therefore peace can never be a status; those who seek to distribute the world's assets equitably with the hope of a stable peace are doomed to perpetual disappointment. For peace has to do with persons, not property. The material factors are only pawns in the game. Boundaries do not make war, nor do natural resources, nor gold, nor any other physical thing. Men make war, and men only. "Human nature being what it is, there must either be adventures of peace or adventures of war." One of the ancient prophets spoke of peace "as a river"; it is a suggestive metaphor, full of motion, power, change. Peace may be continuous, but never the same; it is dynamic, not static.

"Security" is its deadly enemy. No normal human being long wants security. For life is an adventure; the only security is the grave. Normal men want to live and

## *Prepare for Peace!*

feel the tingle of excitement that hazard and danger bring. If everything is orderly and safe, life gets dull and men turn to gambling to bring the element of chance again into the foreground. Men have sailed the seas, not for gain alone, but also in response to age-old impulses of a wholly different kind. Those who go down to the sea in ships do not go for "security"; they know they cannot escape storm and danger. Men have always longed to fly. We are jealous of the birds who do so easily what we seem forbidden to do. For centuries men have been determined to transcend each physical limitation set upon them. That cannot possibly be interpreted as a program of "safety first."

"Security" is the most corrosive word in the dark lexicon of our time. It is a denial of all that life means; if it were taken seriously, it would close the door to thrilling achievement. If we were really dedicated to safety first, we should not build bridges and tunnels, we should not manufacture cheaper cars to go faster—or ten thousand other things. Achievement comes first, security somewhere behind. Anyone who so misreads the nature of man as to seek to reverse that order is the enemy of peace. "Whosoever shall seek to save his life shall lose it" is a hard saying, but it is validated by the experience of the race in its day-to-day life. Running away from trouble to "security" is one of the fundamental causes of this war.

Only when an ideal seems worth the gamble of life

## *A Theory of Peace*

itself is any really vital achievement possible. Peace as a supreme accomplishment involves special hazards. Being an ideal of men with passions, energies, and all sorts of unstable and disturbing forces surging within them, peace must be a dangerous business.

It is, therefore, one of the ironies of life that peace is impossible unless we are ready to accept the risk of war. Peace is the opportunity to fulfill some mission, to attain some objective, to organize the life of nations in accordance with some constructive principle. No great achievement is possible without risk; every significant effort is certain to meet with determined resistance. That opposition may amount to war. War is terrible, but not so terrible as submission to defeat in some noble enterprise.

Fear is destructive to peace. For fear is surrender to danger, not its mastery. Danger may evoke prudence, or it may awaken courage; either of those responses is a source of strength to overcome the danger. But fear is paralysis; it freezes power instead of releasing it. Yet the fundamental argument for peace in America for twenty years has been based on fear—fear of “involvement,” fear of foreigners, fear of propaganda. The only action fear suggests is to run. Peace rests upon strength, courage, faith, upon clarity of mind and firmness of will, never upon the doubts of fear nor the frantic confusion of panic. The defensive mood is identical with defeat.

## *Prepare for Peace!*

Peace is certainly not the elimination of friction, resistance, stress or strain. It is the art of turning those apparent enemies into friends and using them for constructive purposes. Friction is essential to any movement at all. Without it we could not walk a step. Electricity is its product. Unless there was friction not a train could move, nor a car. Men could neither swim nor fly except in a resisting medium. No building would stand for a moment without stress and strain. Peace is a condition of fluent power with friction harnessed; it is the sense of assurance that stress and strain are adequately compensated. Peace, therefore, constitutes a release of energies, not their confinement.

Football provides a good illustration of peace and its relationship to struggle. No one would want to play the game, or see it played, if it were not a struggle. The crowd roars "Fight!" They enjoy a hard tackle, a charging line, a strong block, as do the players. Every boy who plays knows he will be hurt; sometimes the injury is serious and occasionally a boy is killed. Despite struggle and pain, despite danger and injury, the game is nonetheless peaceful. Youth and training prepare the players to stand the struggle; rules and sportsmanship rob the fight of deep bitterness. Security? With that for an ideal there would be no game at all.

The war of political parties furnishes another kind of illustration. Certainly they are engaged in a vigorous struggle for power, and when a national election occurs

## *A Theory of Peace*

the fighting is often bitter. After the polls are closed the opposing leaders resume social relationships, sometimes upon an intimate basis. There is no insincerity or inconsistency in this phenomenon. It is simply a reflection of the fact that the things which unite them are stronger than those which divide. There are differences, important but not vital; when the differences are vital it means civil war. Peace is maintained because the minority respects the judgment and trusts the moderation of the majority more than it covets power. Obedience to the rules of the game makes the party struggle peaceful.

These illustrations show the relationship of order to peace. Men find their activities futile without order and discipline just as they find them useless when subordinated to security. The democratic thesis and the totalitarian principle are alike in their recognition of the need for discipline, but they are poles apart in the method of its attainment. The adventurousness of democracy achieves order by as few rules as possible and by an accent upon self-discipline. The contrary philosophy of government achieves order by what has properly been called "the police state," with its accent upon regulation and external discipline. Since peace requires fluent power, it is achieved best when action is self-controlled by internal discipline. It is not to be achieved by suppression at all. Order is the happy mean between immobility and chaos, and is essential to peace.

## *Prepare for Peace!*

Justice is not synonymous with peace. If those two words were really one, the world would be altogether different from the world as we know it. Men have fought—they are now fighting—just as readily for unjust causes as for just. Indeed if one set out to remove the causes of war by taking away the things about which men have fought, there would be little or nothing left. That is one of the central fallacies of appeasement. Giving the bully what he wants may whet his appetite rather than lead to satiety. It may well persuade him that truculence pays dividends; that is why weak policies so often bring war. Hitler again and again has proclaimed himself satisfied, but has invented a grievance later to justify fresh aggression. “The German Government is determined to accept in its innermost soul the Pact of Locarno.” With the Sudeten problem solved, “I repeat there will be no further territorial problems in Europe and Germany.” “We have guaranteed to all contiguous neighbors the inviolability of their territory so far as Germany is concerned.” These protestations could be multiplied indefinitely, and always in strong terms: “That is not a phrase—that is our sacred will.”

There is no argument against justice; it has its own values, which are intrinsic and of great significance. Justice may take away all vindication of war, but not its occasion. It may make the aggressor doubly wrong; it does not curb his aggression. That fact indicates an-

## *A Theory of Peace*

other fallacy of appeasement; it was predicated upon accepting the assertions about the "have" and "have-not" nations as the substance of the difficulty, rather than its form alone. The injustice should have been righted. Unfortunately there is no evidence that righting the wrongs would have saved the peace.

The scale of the grievance, real or manufactured, is not decisive. Men have fought over matters of great significance, and things which were trivial. They have battled for honor and for things material. Over the spoken word men have often fought to the death, over the fall of the dice, the smile of a woman. Make the list indefinitely long; men have fought over anything and everything that remotely touches the wellsprings of life. The love of money among the rich has been as corrosive of integrity as the longing for money among those in abject poverty; so rich men have fought for more as readily as the poor for a share. The love of power has tempted the strong to aggression oftener than revolt has stirred the oppressed.

Peace is the mastery of great forces; it is not the solution of a problem. Often our habits of speech mislead our thoughts. Because the words are borrowed from mathematics, when we speak of a "problem" we always think of a "solution." Because the solutions in mathematics, however difficult, are so perfect, so complete, and so final, its discipline has always charmed the minds of men. But problems of the dimensions of peace do



## *Prepare for Peace!*

not have neat, simple, or final solutions. Rather they must be in perpetual process of solution, and assume fresh forms as we reach new stages.

Perhaps it will be suggestive to say that what a coherent personality is in the life of an individual, so is peace in the life of the world. Precisely as a well-ordered personality goes from one stage of realization on toward a fresh ideal beyond present attainment, so the aim and ideal of peace must expand and lead to a more satisfying interpretation of international life. Even the most effective personality meets defeat and occasional failure; so will the ideal of peace. But we must not let impatience overestimate the failure.

That is a warning especially pertinent to Americans. So wonderful have been our achievements in mastering a continent that modest gains sell at too heavy a discount. The President, with characteristic American opulence of statement, calls for 50,000 airplanes a year. Thereupon the failure promptly to achieve that rhetorical goal leads to headlines featuring the words "bogging down" and "bottleneck." So also, since the Treaty of Versailles did not bring a new order all over the world, it was considered not merely a partial failure, but was denounced as a total failure and stigmatized in unmeasured language.

A sense of proportion is essential to peace. Just as the phrase "total war" is a misnomer, so also "total peace" is an impossibility. In time of peace there will be local

## *A Theory of Peace*

outbursts of violence; as long as men remain human that is inescapable. In time of war there are some—more than one might suspect—who go the even tenor of their ways, less troubled by war than by the domestic difficulties of sickness, poor crops, drought, or bad storms. This is not to argue that the difference between peace and war is insignificant, but it ought to remind us that we should not overdramatize either.

We should fight to master war as we fight to master the scourge of cancer, persistently, resourcefully, courageously, responsibly. Periodically some quack or someone suffering from self-hypnosis will announce a miraculous “cure.” Those who accept the proclamation face bitter disappointment. Patience and persistence, a sense of proportion are more valuable than reliance upon magic or miracles.

### 2. INDIVIDUALISM AND INTERNATIONALISM

No one in his right mind would seize a pencil and “write a peace.” But some theory of peace is essential to effective thought. Framing such a theory involves choices; the principles chosen will not be followed slavishly, for doctrinaire logical perfection does not appear in human behavior. On the other hand a set of principles will give coherence to the pattern of peace. They will indicate the direction of policy.

The first choice must be between an organization of the world upon the principle of exclusive states,

## *Prepare for Peace!*

each seeking to be as nearly independent in every respect as possible, or, as an alternative, the organization of the world into states which frankly recognize their interdependence, surrendering the goal of autarchy—economic, racial, and moral. Consciously or unconsciously a choice has already been made; rather two contradictory choices have been made—the international principle for all that politics does not dominate and the nationalist principle for whatever politics controls. This schizophrenic decision has had phrenetic consequences. Political life and extra-political activities should be brought into harmony.

The central paradox in the world's search for peace lies in the attempt of nations to destroy by political means their own cultural, scientific, and engineering achievements. That is perfect evidence of the divided personality of states. The whole of life outside politics is organized upon a basis frankly international and interdependent. However, politics, which should be the servant rather than the master of life, insists upon perfect national independence. The narrower and more obscurantist the nationalism, the more patriotic it conceives itself to be. If the left hand of politics checkmates the right hand of science and technology, the result is hailed as a great triumph in protecting the national life. Peace becomes a mirage while any such self-defeating program is tolerated. The first step toward

## *A Theory of Peace*

peace is to establish political life upon a basis in harmony with the other aspects of life.

The cultural heritage of the world is one. Music, art, and letters fly over national boundaries. Music has the great advantage that it requires no translation; so basic is its beautiful language that it is not necessary to distort it by modifying its idiom. Many nations share the greatest music with perfect equality, undisturbed by tariffs or quotas. None is impoverished when others participate; all are enriched. Art has a like advantage. Neither time nor space inhibits beauty. Some fragment dug from the ruins of an ancient civilization, some bronze brought by a fisherman from the depths of the sea may be as exciting and as rewarding as any local and contemporary work of art. Literature must be translated, but that itself may be a literary achievement of the first order—as, for example, the King James version of the Scriptures. Shakespeare, Dante, Goethe, Molière, Dostoevski are not partisans in the present war; no belligerent can destroy them with all the bombs in the world. They are an international heritage.

The spread of science is as the speed of light. In the very year the war broke out, the atom of uranium was smashed. The achievement was based upon the experiments of an Italian in 1934; it was accomplished in Berlin in 1939. Within an incredibly brief span of time it was the common property of laboratories across

## *Prepare for Peace!*

America, of universities throughout the world. The miracles of chemistry defy boundaries; the United States has profited greatly from the discoveries of foreign chemists. Science is part of an international world and the intellectual profits are not limited to the nation which makes a discovery. *Mathematical Reviews* publishes abstracts and summaries of articles written in thirty-two countries. Colleagues within the same field may be half a world apart and yet freely contribute significant ideas each to the thought of the other. So it is in all learned fields. Free of quotas, restrictions, and political obstacles, that which enriches one enriches all. The United States at this moment is being seriously impoverished because some of the best scientific minds across the sea are cut off from their normal American contacts by war. The notion that we do not need Europe would be rejected as fantastic by any competent scientist.

Disease and its enemy, medicine, do not pay the slightest attention to boundaries. The development of airplanes for over-ocean traffic from Dakar to Natal brought the Gambian mosquito, *Anopheles gambiae*, to Brazil. In one infected region 90 per cent of the population had malaria, 10 per cent died, and the interruption of work was so serious that virtually the whole population had to go on relief. The report of the Rockefeller Foundation quotes a competent authority as declaring: "This invasion of *gambiae*

## *A Theory of Peace*

threatens the Americas with a catastrophe in comparison with which ordinary pestilence, conflagration, and even war are but small and temporary calamities. Gambiae enters into the very veins of a country and may remain to plague it for centuries." Dangerous as it is, Congress has not wrangled over it. The leadership in the effort to protect American interests is left to private initiative. Yet the warfare against this species of anopheles is not a national but an international—an intercontinental—matter. It can know neither eastern nor western hemisphere; our frontier is not the Rhine but the Congo.

Sulfanilimide and its derivatives, which have made such a marvelous contribution in the battles against streptococcus infections and pneumonia, were the product of German initiative, followed up in France, developed in England, and again further developed in the United States. It was an international triumph of the first order. These drugs have probably saved more lives than have been lost in the war thus far. Such dramatic instances are simply samples from a mass of proof that medically the world is one. In surgery, likewise, the technique of one nation is soon the free possession of all.

In commercial applications of science and technology, international co-operation is the rule except where political obstacles are too great. Synthetic rubber, rayon, plastics, engines, machinery demonstrate the

## *Prepare for Peace!*

point. Thousands and thousands of mechanical slaves, infinitely more efficient than human slaves, have traveled between nations in scientific journals, in drawings—and in heads. The radio was the joint product of many men in many lands. But the United States developed the technique of world-wide broadcasting and gave the spoken word the speed of thought itself. Language runs round the world faster than a beam of light can be bent about its surface. Censorship is becoming impotent before it, and people in Italy and Germany clandestinely hear forbidden news.

The miracles of communication and transportation have made a world market not only possible but necessary. Despite political barriers the volume of international trade is greater than even a half century ago, before the laissez faire principle was repudiated. It is not what it should be, but its vitality is so great that it overflows political obstacles. By engineering and invention, by ingenuity and technology, by courage and treasure, by pouring out energy and life, we have developed an amazing volume and mobility of commerce, making world trade not only possible but inevitable. A simple economy does not require rare metals or elusive raw materials. It is precisely the economy of abundance which is the economy of interdependence. Not all the shrill denials of politics can alter that stubborn fact.

No nation in the world, not even the Soviet Union

## *A Theory of Peace*

or the United States, is, or can become, independent of others for the materials of a rich economic life, any more than for its cultural and scientific life. Nor should it need to be. Adam Smith, in the very year of our Declaration of Independence, showed the wealth-producing possibilities of the division of labor. That principle is as profitable upon an international scale as in a specific industry. When statesmen really want to abolish poverty, they will not erect barriers to the flow of wealth into their own nations.

If we seriously mean to prepare for peace, we must not continue to organize the whole of life outside politics on an interdependent basis and let politics cancel out the normal benefits. Is it rational in such a world as ours to say we have no responsibility for Europe and Asia? Is it a contribution to our own wealth and welfare to let either fall into such a state of decline as to set back the common war on disease, ignorance, and want? Yet that is what isolationist leaders plead for. "Let Europe solve its problems and we will solve ours." What problems? If we do not co-operate in solving their problems, we lose their help in solving ours, and their contributions to the richness of our life are beyond calculation. Europe reduced to poverty, without the money for experiment and research, would deprive us of uncounted discoveries and inventions. Europe exhausted to such a point that its cultural development



## *Prepare for Peace!*

was halted would entail a profound impoverishment in our own life.

The separatist spirit in politics is a disease. When the infection sets in, it not only disintegrates the international world; it rots the fabric of our own nation. It was precisely during the retreat from responsibility in our international relations that interstate barriers rose to the highest point in our history. When, in the name of patriotism, men cut our commercial ties with foreign nations, then, in the name of local "advantage," they sever the arteries of trade with other states within our own union. If the United States is to take care of itself and the devil take the rest of the world, then states will manifest the same spirit.

The United States has been the largest compact industrially and commercially developed free-trade area in the world. We had thought that the War between the States had validated for all time Andrew Jackson's famous toast: "Our Federal Union, it must be preserved." Despite the Constitution, new nullificationists, by indirect and devious ways, have established "invisible" tariffs at state boundaries. They seek to whittle away constitutional guarantees against interstate barriers. When those guarantees were established, trade between the states was limited by distance. Means of communication and transportation had not yet made a national market possible. Now that we have fulfilled the dream of making those boundaries meaningless by

## *A Theory of Peace*

taking to the air, men regret their own achievement. Every state has enacted some law calculated to impair the national unity. That is not only short sighted; it is the road to impoverishment; it can become the method of national disintegration.

All such devices are anachronisms; it is essential that politics should act in harmony with the rest of life, opening the avenues to wealth and health across which it now throws barricades. The crowning absurdity is autarchy, which is nothing less than national impoverishment in the name of national independence. It is epitomized by the phrase "guns before butter." Autarchy can have no less consequence than physical impoverishment; its worst effects are moral and spiritual.

To refuse consistently for years to accept the efficiency of international interdependence is simply to rob the populace of forms of nourishment which no amount of political pap can replace in their diet. Autarchy, an economy of scarcity and substitutes, is ultimately disastrous to the state itself. No amount of bureaucratic "efficiency" can offset the disadvantages of a policy that is intrinsically self-defeating.

Science and technology built a world market. Economics implemented it under the impulse of capitalism. The international gold standard was not the cause but the consequence of the world market produced by the industrial and technological revolution and the general

## *Prepare for Peace!*

freedom of commerce characteristic of the nineteenth century. The international price system was not an invented device but an organic result of commerce. Those things have been destroyed by political action, for political reasons, at the cost of both peace and prosperity. As long as politics insists upon plowing under the wealth it does not and can never produce, there will be tension so great as to insure war. The indispensable step is to bring politics into line with the rest of human experience.

The logical consequence is not world government and the suppression of local and national management of political affairs. Freedom is the greatest need. The scientist co-operating across the hemispheres does not work through governmental agencies. His contributions are the most individualistic products in the world. He is able to work with his fellows abroad precisely because he does not use government channels. Free trade in ideas means substantially no government. Few serious difficulties have arisen over the contact of scientists because government prestige and national jealousies are not involved. There are quarrels, but they represent the disagreements and enmities of individuals, which evaporate for want of instruments with which to fight. If each had a government behind him, every squabble would become an international "incident."

The internationalism of culture and science is not, therefore, an argument for more international govern-

## *A Theory of Peace*

ment. On the contrary the lesson to be drawn from their experience is that less rather than more political interference is desirable. One of the poignant tragedies inherent in the totalitarian idea is the political domination of both science and culture. Even before the war, the persecution of scholars, the prostitution of teaching, the loss of freedom for research, the censorship of literature and of art characteristic of totalitarianism had begun seriously to impair the effectiveness of international co-operation. The deadening effect of state control has been one of the striking manifestations of recent years. It has not fully achieved its goal, for scholarship and science and letters have so much vitality that to some extent they still elude the bureaucratic blight.

Normal scientific and cultural intercourse, uninterrupted by national barriers guarded by political sentiments, has enriched the world. The extreme individualism of art and music and scientific research is the very epitome of perfect internationalism. It is a fountain of enrichment for each nation and the whole world. In contrast, political barriers have so bedeviled economic life as to impoverish the world; that is the epitome of anarchy. The inference is clear. Let economic life cross boundaries as freely as ideas, researches, letters, and the arts. That cannot be done at one stroke; it would be too drastic a remedy for the weakened patient to

## *Prepare for Peace!*

endure. The essential is a new direction of policy; the method is less government, not more.

### 3. THE WAVE OF THE PAST

The demand for less government of international economic life raises the second question fundamental to any theory of the peace. Where is the political center of gravity to be located? There are only two possible answers—the individual, or the state. No middle course is permanently available. Germany and Italy have been operating upon the assumption that the state is all, the individual nothing. Britain and the United States have assumed that the individual is first, though there is some evidence of wavering in that orientation.

Strikingly enough the proponents of a “new order” exemplify an old idea. The exponents of the “wave of the future” concept are riding the backwash of a comber that broke on the beach in the days of the French Revolution. When the infant United States boldly engraved upon its Great Seal a Latin motto proclaiming a new order of the ages it was no mere figure of speech. For the new nation was the first explicitly to put the citizen at the center and make the state his servant. The Declaration of Independence was perfectly definite: “Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.” The first three words of the Constitution embody the whole thought: “We the

## *A Theory of Peace*

people." That was a revolutionary idea; it was genuinely a new order.

The Fascist and Nazi political philosophy, on the contrary, is counter-revolutionary. During the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries the center of gravity was the state. Therefore the core of the authoritarian and totalitarian regime is a reaction toward an idea against which our forefathers rebelled.

The theory of the state which our forebears defeated also identified economics and politics. The reversion to that basic fallacy is one of the principal reasons why the world is being impoverished today. Germany furnishes the perfect pattern of neo-mercantilism, a revival of ideas long discredited. It makes economic life the servant of the state's political power, not of the individual citizen's welfare.

The mercantilist ideas were clear and explicit on that point. As under the Nazis, the individual was nothing, the state all. One of the most lucid among the mercantilist writers spoke of the people as a "flock" to be shorn whenever profitable to the state. Economic activity was managed in the interests of the power of the state. When everything is made subservient to power, there can be only one outcome—war. It is perfectly evident in theory, and history demonstrates it was regularly operative in practice, that war became the normal rather than the exceptional manifestation of political activity. The theory and the record are in

## *Prepare for Peace!*

perfect accord. It has been aptly summarized: "Absolutism, mercantilism . . . and militarism were so closely interdependent that they were blended into a single political phenomenon."<sup>1</sup> That might well have been a description of Nazi Germany.

Hitler's emphasis upon expansion of territory, even over non-Germanic regions, and the demand for colonies can be understood only upon the basis of his devotion to the mercantilist theory of exclusiveness and exploitation. Such a concept is an utter anachronism, for it is founded upon another idea which the scientific, agricultural, and industrial revolutions have wholly overthrown. It is the idea of a static world, where there is just so much wealth to be divided among states. It is precisely upon that notion that Hitler launched the fantastic argument summarized in the threadbare phrase, "the haves and the have-nots." It totally neglects the ideas of expanding production, of the creation of new wealth, of a widening economic horizon, of an international division of labor. The world is a pie; get the biggest slice. The world economy is "mature" and can expand no more. Not only in Germany, but wherever that dogma is accepted, men have already surrendered to Hitler.

Another fundamental mercantilist idea has been given fresh currency. Montaigne expressed it in a few

<sup>1</sup> Walter L. Dorn, *Competition for Empire, 1740-1763* (New York, 1940), p. 12. This section was written after a careful review of Eli F. Heckscher's *Mercantilism* (2 vols., London [1935]).

## *A Theory of Peace*

words, "The profit of one man is the damage of another . . . no man profiteth but by the loss of others." It was upon the basis of so crude a concept that the mercantilist put great emphasis upon exports and a "favorable balance of trade." Hitler, in one of his explosive phrases, put his utter dependence upon mercantilism in three words, "export or die."

One of the most amazing aspects of this reversion to an outworn and discredited idea is the fact that Hitler has gone back to its early and crudest form. He attempted to avoid buying as much from any specific country as that country bought from Germany; he sought not only a "favorable" general balance, but a favorable bilateral balance—a "profit" on the trade with each particular country. Even mercantilism abandoned so crude a device soon after the end of the sixteenth century, and was content with a general favorable balance.

The more one examines the economics of the power state, the less validity "the wave of the future" theory appears to have. Do we want "the wave of the sixteenth century"? Its inevitable consequence was put tersely by Francis B. Sayre while he was Assistant Secretary of State, "If goods cannot cross international frontiers, armies will."

The classic device to transform economic productivity into political power has been the managed economy. The expression "managed economy" or "planned



## *Prepare for Peace!*

economy" is new, but the substance is old; it was the characteristic technique of the *ancien régime* which the French Revolution sought to overthrow.

Planned economy is dependent upon a vast organization of bureaucrats. That is the adequate explanation of the fact that Germany and Russia now support an officialdom of really incredible proportions. They had their prototype in eighteenth century France when an army of civil servants sought to determine the size of handkerchiefs, the number of threads in a measure of cloth, the design and size of the boats from which the humble fishermen of Brittany might set their nets and cast their lines. They fixed the price of meat; they numbered the fish to be caught and their price; they pegged the price of bread. Regulations, orders, prohibitions were like leaves on the trees. "Administrative law" was rampant, and proliferated amazingly.

The planned economy then as now achieved neither wealth nor welfare. Both were sacrificed to the power of the state. Such a policy can go even further than "guns before butter." Russia deliberately permitted starvation upon a large scale in order to achieve the inevitable goal of the planned economy—the power of the state. Never has the system been tried when it did not work out into an economics of scarcity. That is the inexorable consequence of infinite rules which put a needless burden upon production. It is the only possible outcome of restrictions upon imports, quotas,

## *A Theory of Peace*

exchange control and all the other bewildering mazes in which production is first confused, then lost. Indeed the mercantilist theorists spoke scornfully of "a dead stock called plenty." It is a phrase worthy of Hitler himself.

Everything works together under the managed economy to produce dictatorship. If the state is all and the citizen nothing, there still must be some person to represent the state. The head of the state holds all its power and must be all-powerful. Condemning rugged individualism, the head of the planned economy must be a rugged individual. One man, said Hitler, forms "granite principles" and brooks no challenge of their "sole correctness." Only a man with such ideas could go his way "with trancelike serenity."

Political economic management ultimately produces the same result even if a humane program of individual welfare is the objective. The bewildering complex of governmental interferences with production is cumulative. Mistakes are inevitable; they do not rectify themselves by bankruptcy, but only by "co-ordination." Many rules cancel each other and give rise to ever more need for co-ordination. As co-ordination is piled on co-ordination there must ultimately be a supreme co-ordinator—the dictator. What starts as "efficiency" ends in tyranny.

It need not be argued, the evidence is so complete all about us, that economic dictatorship does not and,

## *Prepare for Peace!*

indeed, cannot stop with economic matters. If political power can commandeer productive energies, it may, indeed it must, control all energies. It can brook no rival, neither science, religion, art, nor letters. There is nothing accidental in the anti-church attitude of Germany and Russia. The Communists denounced religion as the opiate of the people. The real opiate is statism—"leave all to the leader."

If the world is made up of states each devoted to the planned economy, each convinced it must export or die, who will plan the world economy? The question is beyond answer, for on such a basis a world economy is inconceivable. If the planned economy could produce plenty, the question would not be worth asking. But it never has been, it never can be other than an economy of scarcity. Its very machinery dooms it to that result; men chained to the chariot wheels of the state have never in all history lived the abundant life either physically or spiritually.

A world economy under such circumstances is impossible. The Nazis are intelligent enough to recognize that fact. Alfred Rosenberg, their official political philosopher, said Germany would escape from "the so-called world-economy" and he predicted that economy would collapse. Such a collapse produces sheer anarchy. International movements of goods would continue to decline, as they have declined under the planned economy. International movements of capital

## *A Theory of Peace*

would disappear, as they have been disappearing in the "planned" areas. There would be only one outcome—war. The state with greater striking power would absorb the weaker nations, exploit them to increase its striking power, and strike again. That is exactly the process we have been witnessing.

Only three things can halt the program. In the end its sheer weight would destroy it. Despite the official fiction, the dictator is not governed by absolute knowledge and crystal reason. His principles are not "granite" and their "correctness" is sham. His satellites are far from supermen, and petty officials will always be petty. The system which depends upon perfect efficiency makes efficiency impossible. Mercantilism bogged down in the eighteenth century; so would neo-mercantilism in the twentieth. Indeed, in spite of discipline, in spite of propaganda, despite ersatz, rationing, and endurance in the face of shortages, autarchy had already been proved impossible before the war. Even the fully mobilized state could not achieve economic independence. That fact reveals one weakness which ultimately would doom the system. Revolution is a second force that would eventually master it. Men have had a taste of freedom. Even though its sweet taste cloyed, the diet of tyranny will be doubly bitter. Sheep will permit themselves to be shorn, but men will resent being treated like sheep. Burdens are already too heavy; they will grow intolerable. War is the third force which may

## *Prepare for Peace!*

overthrow neo-mercantilist tyranny. The system may be broken on the battlefield; that is the greatest hope of gain from the immediate struggle.

It would be foolish to underestimate the tenacity of this system which contradicts every historic presupposition of American life. It is the antithesis of a government of the people, by the people, and for the people. It is the opposite of an economics of plenty. It is the deadly enemy of free enterprise. It is committed to militarism and to war. It pours contempt upon freedom. It contains no shred of any American ideal. Yet can anyone doubt that its fundamental mechanism, the planned economy, has tempted us?

The United States partially succumbed to seductive mercantilist ideas. The advance of the tariff to absurd heights in the Smoot-Hawley law was evidence enough of their fatal attraction. Bad as that was, it was only one symptom. In 1933 the President of the United States destroyed the International Economic Conference at London with these words, "The sound internal economic system of a nation is a greater factor in its well-being than the price of its currency in changing terms of the currencies of other nations." That was a declaration of independence from international responsibility; it said earlier the substance of what Rosenberg said later about escape from "the so-called world economy." It was isolationism in its most destructive form.

## *A Theory of Peace*

That conscious decision to turn to an experiment with a managed economy led to the devaluation of the dollar, which effectively increased the tariff to heights never before known. Moreover the threat to alter the value again was continuously maintained, and for eight years the dollar has been upon a "twenty-four hour basis." The protectionism involved in that program did not stand alone. It was buttressed by many forms of invisible tariffs and quotas.

Production was restricted, the growth of capital was treated with open hostility because its expansion would embarrass a "mature" economy—an intimation of the static economy of mercantilism, described by a word more suave. Inevitably men talked more of wealth to be "divided" rather than of wealth to be created. Farmers were told by the bureaucracy how much to plant, and agricultural products were plowed under. The President voiced an old and familiar mercantilist dogma when he said, "The cure is not to produce so much." Surpluses were viewed almost as "a dead stock called plenty." Not only the import market but even the export market was disrupted. Foreign trade fell continuously for several years.

The President stated our gold policy in clear terms: "We are not ready to export gold. We are not ready at this time to make any kind of agreement by which we would morally obligate ourselves to export gold." We gathered gold and buried it, until the gold market

## *Prepare for Peace!*

was cornered so completely that an old-fashioned exponent of mercantile bullionism would have been green with envy. Now we are faced with the ancient problem of Midas: what to do with it?

Even a flirtation with the planned economy had its effect upon the organization of the government. The power of the executive rose steadily. A process which history has made familiar elsewhere followed its inexorable course. Moreover, executive powers were increasingly personal in character, not subject to legislative or judicial check. For example, the President was granted power to alter the value of the dollar, absolute discretion over a huge "stabilization" fund, and authority to issue three billion paper dollars.

The bureaucracy also followed the historic pattern; it grew apace, more than doubling in size. Such an organization can never be content with the process of education and individual action. Therefore it resorted to the standard bureaucratic technique—rules. Regulations, administrative law, and bureaucratic agencies multiplied beyond belief.

It has been urged that the United States would not suffer the baneful results of the planned economy observed elsewhere because of a purer motive. The objective, it is argued, is a new sort of utopia, the "social service state," a sugar-coated transition to socialism. All the evidence contradicts that expectation of a better result. The reason is simple, and as old as human

## *A Theory of Peace*

history: in the long run the means determine the ends. You cannot realize democracy by the use of institutions contrary to its genius; you cannot attain a democratic end without the democratic process. The machinery of the planned economy can be no other than bureaucracy, and no great bureaucracy in the history of the world has ever been controllable by the democratic process. The two stand at opposite poles.

Furthermore, it is not possible wholly to discredit free enterprise in economic matters and justify the principle of freedom in politics. Totalitarian economics and laissez faire politics cannot exist together. You cannot insist upon uniformity and collectivist economics under state management and simultaneously preserve individualism in political life. Freedom is indivisible.

Differences of opinion are intolerable under the planned economy, for they constitute deviations from the plan, the complexity of which makes it difficult to approximate consistency in the best of circumstances. To add the confusion of free debate would be impossible; there can be no such thing as a "loyal opposition." It is not fortuitous that nations with a managed economy have only one political party. Germany, which employed the planned economy for striking power, and Russia, which originally sought social objectives, both had the same experience. Not only were all parties but one suppressed; even that ruling party was purged



## *Prepare for Peace!*

with ruthless brutality. High purpose is no protection; the means determine the ends.

The experience of the United States even with the preliminary stages of political economic planning has shown that good motive does not insure good result; the "end product" is uneconomic, and hostile to sound international relations. Yet these developments have had the support of most isolationists, and for a very simple reason: they make an international structure impossible.

It was not an accident, it was a normal consequence, that contemporaneous with the flight from reality and the experiment in a planned economy there was also a wave of demands for political miracles in the economic sphere. Huey Long's "share the wealth" program raised state paternalism to a religion—as an opiate of the people. His economic fantasy, the Townsend plan, the "ham and eggs" frenzy, and dozens of other less widely accepted schemes were all typical of the mercantilist conception that wealth is to be "divided." The Declaration of Independence called upon the state to protect "the pursuit of happiness." It did not promise a daily delivery, neatly packaged, as demanded by these groups. This same period was also the age of the technocrats, who worshipped god in a machine, embodied in the state. One journey into wonderland invites another through the looking glass.

Has the end been reached? The Temporary National

## *A Theory of Peace*

Economic Committee spent over a million dollars in the investigation of our economy. Its chairman has given voice to his own conclusion: "If we are frank with ourselves, we must realize that if the democratic world had succeeded in the past in distributing the products of commerce and industry among the masses, if it had been successful in preventing the growth of the proletariat, there never would have been such a thing as the rise of the totalitarian State."<sup>2</sup> He measured democratic success not against other systems in a real world, but against a utopian absolute. Because our democracy had not yet achieved what has never been done anywhere, he counted it a failure, despite the fact that it came nearer the goal than any other nation, or any other system of economy. He predicted that "big government" would take control in the United States.

Nothing could be more lucid. It is the planned economy that he has in mind. His statement reflects admiration for the achievements of "big government," a euphonious synonym for totalitarianism. He failed to say that "big government" in Germany ended unemployment only through militarism—and war. "Big government" in Russia liquidated whole social classes, and in Germany "an end has been put to the equality of man." In neither does labor have the right of organization. In the annals of economic failure, there is none more complete than those. No "big government" has

<sup>2</sup> *New York Times*, January 16, 1941.

## *Prepare for Peace!*

ever approximated the American standard of living. Yet instead of pointing to this ghastly shortcoming the Senator offers a characteristic example of yielding the initiative to the totalitarians. He illustrates the trend toward surrender to their program.

On every hand men say "big government" may be wrong, but you cannot reverse so powerful a trend. Such an attitude is intellectual and moral cowardice. It is surrender to unidentified forces stronger than thought, more powerful than will. The argument from a trend is no argument at all. The "trend" fallacy led men in the late twenties to believe in the "new era of prosperity." Curves on charts that went outside the cross-hatching, up, up, up, were projected on up as though they would never bend downward. All the ups and downs at the left side of the chart were neglected as irrelevant. The dream crashed when the curve descended more rapidly than it had risen. Looking back at the pattern of those charts, we wonder that men ever accepted a trend as an argument, much less as a conclusion. Yet today the trend to "big government" is dealt with in the same fatalistic spirit. Because neo-mercantilism has been on the increase since the 1870's, the argument is that it will never recede.

Preparation for war at great speed accentuates the temptation to a managed economy. For that specific objective the planned economy was developed. It is adapted only to war. Priorities, rationing, special

## *A Theory of Peace*

rulings, and all such devices are founded upon the precise pattern of the planned scarcity that diverts energy into striking power. If we do not recognize that fact, we shall make "inevitability" appear yet stronger. Every such step now taken should be clearly designated as temporary. This is the moment to determine that with peace the trend will be reversed. Else forget liberty.

If we wish to prepare for peace, there is one fact which cannot be dodged: the planned economy is a complete denial of international responsibility. It is isolationism raised to the nth power. That is its diamond-hard core. Therefore it makes peace utterly impossible. No glittering language should so dazzle our minds as to make us forget that if we do not reverse the trend it is useless to go through the utter farce of attending a peace conference.

The planned economy is an assault upon physical fitness; it is an attack upon economic welfare; it is a program of intellectual impoverishment. Beyond all it is a program of spiritual impoverishment; the state is made into an infallible god. The result is no better than an idol of gold or clay. It achieves unity by crushing opposition with violence. It has failed in every objective; it has not acquired independence; it has no plan for a world economy; it has no real internal stability and no instrument to achieve it but terror.

Hitler himself pays unwilling testimony to the

## *Prepare for Peace!*

efficacy of free enterprise. He frankly asserts that the nations with a free economy have great wealth; he calls them pluto-democracies for that reason. He makes war, he says, to get it from them. It is a tacit admission that his economic legerdemain cannot achieve the economic success of free enterprise. He would conquer the wealth he cannot produce.

The theory of the peace for Americans is the restoration of the individual to the center of political gravity. The counter-revolution of neo-mercantilism should be repelled. That means much more than the defeat of Hitler. The elimination of his government touches one important sector of the problem. But we must ask repeatedly and insistently what his defeat means. Does it mean that we disapprove the planned economy for Germany but desire to follow it for ourselves? That would be folly indeed. We have no right to deny others the logical consequences of a policy with which we flirt. Economic life should be devoted to the welfare of the citizen. The state should be his servant, not his master. That means democracy.

### 4. DEMOCRACY

Democracy is the political aspect of an assertion of the supreme values in individual life. It is predicated upon the sacredness of the individual, his right to self-development, physical, mental, and spiritual. It assumes his infinite worth, and the measureless riches that come

## *A Theory of Peace*

from the variety of his inventiveness, and the unpredictable resourcefulness by which he shapes his destiny. It is designed to implement his right to self-expression in vocation and avocation, with the greatest possible reliance upon self-discipline and the least possible dependence upon compulsion. The government is controlled by the individual acting in concert with other individuals; it is a mutual enterprise and he consents to its rules governing part of his actions to assure freedom in constructive activities.

Democracy, therefore, is a great act of faith, for it is a choice of values. Such choices are absolute; they cannot be proved. They may be elaborated and refined and enriched by argument and by exposition. But they must be achieved by insight, reflecting not the power of mind alone but the spirit of man.

That is why democracy may be submerged by military force without being destroyed. It is not vulnerable from without; the application of force cannot do more than conceal its manifestations; the reality may remain. It can be defeated and destroyed only by the rotting away of faith.

Any great act of faith is an expansive force. It is always and everywhere expressed by the missionary spirit, and if faith is great the overflowing is intensified. "The zeal of thine house hath eaten me up." That spirit has been exemplified through most of American history; by example and argument free institutions

## *Prepare for Peace!*

Napoleon with his barges at Boulogne. Technology works to make complex what once was simple, but equally to simplify what once was difficult.

Again it is made to appear that democracy fails because class distinctions are being accentuated, that society is stratifying. Social classes are as old as recorded history. They exist in every society. The party membership at one end and the Jews at the other are characteristic of Nazism. The party members and the bureaucrats are privileged groups among the Soviets. Some classes have been "liquidated." Social classes are less characteristic of democracy than any other political order, and they have greater fluidity in America than elsewhere. No form of collectivism or authoritarianism offers any hope of producing a classless society. Democracy is the only hope.

Critics of democracy have proceeded upon the fallacious assumption that specific failures were due to inherent weaknesses in the democratic process, rather than ineffective instrumentalities or leadership. They have measured the achievements of democracy against utopian perfection instead of standards applicable to a real world. Ten years of continual harping upon the pathology of democracy has brought evidence of resultant hypochondria.

The practices of democracy are never fully in accord with its professions, because as practices improve, the ideal leaps yet further ahead. The eyes of democracy

## *A Theory of Peace*

Wilson said it over and over again, and in many phrases. Men heard the words, understanding them not.

That was the intellectual weakness of the isolationists. They were too blind to see how they could make the League an expression of common democratic faith rather than an alien body. The ground had been plowed and harrowed; the seeding had been completed. They turned away even as the field grew white to the harvest.

The spiritual poverty of the isolationists lay in their lack of faith. Thus they denied and destroyed the expansive power of the idea of freedom. Nothing but feebleness of faith in a great ideal would have yielded the initiative wholly into the hands of the exponents of an ignoble escape from individual responsibility. Men firm in faith would not have condoned the destruction of liberty. When Mussolini proclaimed he would trample the "rotting carcass of liberty" it was the inevitable response to the isolationist retreat from responsibility. Faith has no negative ingredient whatever; it is all positive or it is nothing. If democracy is not good for the world, it is not good for America—or for the individual. All or nothing: there is no halfway point.

Again and again, by every route, we come back, therefore, to the individual as the center of gravity if there is to be democracy. That is precisely where the canker of doubt began its deadly work, and at that point faith must be restored. Many who would hotly assert



## *Prepare for Peace!*

themselves to be democrats would nonetheless put the supreme values not in the individual but in society. It is common to read, for example, "We may detect a shift from preoccupation with the individual to concern for society as a whole." Again it has been said, "This war . . . is but a symptom of a revolution. . . . It will mean the liquidation of the basic human value, of the ruling sense of man's meaning to himself as an individual within the mystery of life, which has subsumed and shaped the modern era."<sup>3</sup> That is, from the point of view of democracy, a perfect example of defeatism. Though Hitler loses the war physically, he still wins it spiritually.

Historically individualism is the characteristic American doctrine, but it has become fashionable to attach an adjective, rugged, and interpret the phrase as the law of the jungle. Doubters have learned to associate individualism with a past that is dead—like the vanished frontier. Much has been made of the lawlessness said to be its inevitable concomitant. Every man had a gun and used the quick trigger of the individualist. In a crowded and interdependent "modern" society, it is asserted, these characteristics must be curbed by the imposed controls of the state.

This association of individualism with primitive society is wrong. No social structure was ever more complex than that of the tribe in the forest. It was

<sup>3</sup> Waldo Frank, "Our Guilt in Fascism," *New Republic*, CII (1940), 603.

## *A Theory of Peace*

collectivist, authoritarian, and totalitarian. Social controls were utterly dominant. A sound reading of history shows that social control is the primitive technique, whereas the self-discipline of freedom is the highest form of political development. That is why democracy is the supreme achievement in political theory. The advance of the English and the American people has been through the substitution of self-control for social control. Individualism is the goal, not the beginning.

History has been misread to support another pessimistic outlook upon democracy. The life of the past, "slow, steady, unhurried by machines, unstimulated by rapid communication," has been pictured as an era of simplicity. Men faced local and familiar problems which did not require instant decision but yielded to the deliberate process of discussion and consensus. Now, we are told, the citizen is in a maelstrom of events and circumstances requiring swift, accurate, and vital judgments leaving no time for the gradual crystallization of public sentiment.

Such statements wholly misread experience. Relative to the means of gathering information, relative to the spread of education, problems are no greater and decisions no more swift than in older times. New instrumentalities give us more data and more effectiveness in action. Hitler, planning an invasion of England, finds it, relative to the means at hand, neither more nor less simple than Philip of Spain who sent the Armada, or

## *Prepare for Peace!*

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## *A Theory of Peace*

must always be fixed forward on some distant goal. If they are turned introspectively and self-consciously inward, the result is morbidity. Any idea, such as defense, therefore, which implies a fixed position, or a static program, is always and must ever, by its very definition, be wholly inapplicable to democracy. Consequently, attempts to defend democracy are certain to fail.

Defensive thought about democracy, translated into action, takes forms which limit freedom and supplant justice with safety as an ideal. Once set safety rather than freedom as the goal, then democracy itself is destroyed; the foundations are gone. In short, once democracy is put upon the defensive it is lost; only when it emphasizes its positive aspects, such as freedom and justice, can it possibly live.

Despite those of feeble faith, democracy is still the strongest government in the world; its fabric is tough. Initial striking power may rest with the totalitarians. They may have the advantages which come from treachery, from surprise moves upon the diplomatic chessboard made possible by bad faith and insincerity. They may even win a military victory, though no one has brought to mind any case where a democratic nation has been overwhelmed by a totalitarian country of like size and similar resources. However, even if a military victory is won, the ultimate organization of life in peace time remains. Peaceful and prosperous life has

## *Prepare for Peace!*

never yet been long maintained by a totalitarian power, whereas democracy has succeeded in both these respects.

Time would prove democracy more efficient than totalitarianism, but the proof would come too late for the coming peace. Time would prove that democracy has more tenacity and more elasticity than totalitarianism, but here again the proof would come too late. Those who have been dwelling upon the weaknesses, the shortcomings, and the failures of democracy have overlooked the weaknesses and the shortcomings and the failures of totalitarianism. But those who trust a shoddy unanimity, those who have faith in external compulsion, those with deep doubts of the possibility of effective self-discipline, those who read history through the prism of pessimism cannot be convinced by proofs which must wait on history itself.

If, therefore, democracy is to regain the triumphant note characteristic of the American tradition, that victory will be the reflection of an act of faith on the part of people who still believe in the individual, in his infinite worth, in the infinite riches that come from his self-expression.

What has this accent upon individualism to do with world peace? If the individual is the center of political gravity, there can be no chosen people, no favored nation, no elite class. Each individual is entitled to the same rights, such as the basic freedoms guaranteed by the first ten amendments of the Constitution, and the

## *A Theory of Peace*

right to pursue happiness promised in the Declaration of Independence. Those rights are not influenced or affected in any way by boundaries. They are the rights of man. They belong to all men—everywhere. They are the political reflection of human brotherhood. They exemplify Dante's great generalization, echoed by Goethe and many others, "Above all nations is humanity."

On no other political philosophy whatever is peace credible, even as a dream. For no political philosophy save individualism breaks the hard shells of groups with rival and antithetical interests. Awareness of that fact, explicitly or implicitly, is the explanation of the historic zeal and enthusiasm of the American people for the rights of man around the world, for freedom—everywhere. So great an act of faith demands patience and persistence. Only if we never falter can we realize the "new order of the ages."





















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